EUROPE TURNS THE CORNER

STANLEY HIGH

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THE REVOLT OF YOUTH

Europe Turns the Corner

By

STANLEY HIGH

Introduction by

COL. EDWARD M. HOUSE

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INTRODUCTION

When the war began no one could know how long it would last, and no one could know the factors which would determine the Peace.

In its scope, its cost, its fierce destructiveness, and the time it lasted, the war itself was a revelation. No one throughout the length and breadth of Europe, or the world for the matter of that, save Kitchener, thought it would last long, and many of those who best knew the temper and resources of the belligerents gave it but a few short months to burn itself out.

But the war had not advanced far before it was clear that the records of the centuries were to be shattered, and new terms must be used to describe its ruthlessness and its grim destructiveness. It was as different from the wars of the past as our means of transportation and communication are different from those employed a hundred years ago. New records were set, a new era for war was inaugurated. And so, indeed, it was with the making of the peace. There, again, all conceptions were at fault.

When the nations involved were in agony and the dissolution of civilization itself seemed near, then there was but one cry, a universal cry for an ultimate peace that would leave coming genera-

tions free from the shadow and the specter of war.

But when the Armistice was signed on that fateful day in November, and the last shot was fired and the last youth stricken or slain, the smoldering passions of hate and greed flamed up anew. The latent animosities that had been dormant during the hours of peril now became militant and were no longer cloaked under the cover of expediency. Buoyed by a nominal victory, when, indeed, the terrible havoc of war had left nothing but universal defeat, the so-called victors gathered about what was misnamed a peace table.

While the Peace of Versailles was no better and no worse than others in history, it should have marked a new era, so that some compensating benefit might have come from the general disaster. It was a time for humility and thanksgiving rather than for self-glorification. The soldiers in the ranks fought with courage and endurance, proving themselves blood brothers of those who died at Thermopylæ and at the Alamo, but no nation should have come out of the war with any feeling save thankfulness that disaster had not been its portion. Time and again a change of tactics in the field or in diplomacy would have made the defeated victors and the victors the defeated.

During those four terrible years of uncertainty no experiences were garnered by those who met in Paris to remake the map of the world to inspire in them a desire to meet the nearly universal de-

mand for permanent peace. No attempt to meet this demand came from the head of any delegation other than that of the United States. It was Woodrow Wilson's privilege to express, as he had so often done before, the hopes and aspirations of that multitude of men and women who have no voice in government but who seek with unselfish hearts the betterment of their fellow man. That he was not wholly successful is one of the tragedies of history, for it left unfinished a great dream for the emancipation of all peoples from the tyranny of fear.

And now comes Stanley High to tell us in his calm and inimitable way what has happened since June 28, 1919, and to give us a picture of Europe as he sees it five years after the war. He knows Europe at first hand and sees it with impartial yet sympathetic eyes. Those who have read his other books will know what to expect here, but to those who have not I offer my felicitations over the pleasure in store for them. He has written his story well and understandingly, and coming generations who would know of these times will be his grateful debtors. Meanwhile his readers of to-day who have known something of the war and been in touch with its aftermath will probably agree with him that at last "Europe has turned the corner."

Edward M. House.

New York City, January 23, 1925.

PREFACE

It is a very halting progress that Europe makes toward settlement. Every political overturn, each new conference, every investigation is heralded, in turn, as the promise of a new, more hopeful day. But disillusionment is certain to follow close in the wake of these prophecies. Unforeseen complications enter into the situation and developments do not come as predicted. The only real authorities on the European situation are those who refuse to commit themselves to any alternative, however plausible, without giving an equally positive commitment to its opposite.

But despite this international seesawing, which is so apparent in the day-to-day aspect of affairs, a considerable amount of constructive progress is apparent when one looks at developments over the entire period since the adjournment of the Versailles Conference. This has become particularly plain during 1924. It is generally agreed that during no year since the war has Europe gone forward so rapidly toward settlement as during 1924. And even in the face of the reverses which the policies introduced during 1924 have received there are many indications that the advance of that year marks the end of the first and the beginning of the second postwar period.

I have endeavored, in this book, to inquire into whatever indications there are that this transition has been or is being made. Even apart from such a change the constructive achievements of 1924 are of the utmost significance. No events since Versailles surpass in importance the Labor rule in England, the downfall of Poincaré in France, the London Conference, the Dawes Plan, the recognition of Russia by England and France, and the promulgation of the Protocol of the League of Nations. These developments in themselves merit the most careful study. But if they indicate that Europe has entered upon a new postwar period, they assume, of course, a much greater significance.

It is necessary, before our inquiry into this situation is undertaken, to make plain the fact that this change, if it has come, is not due to any particular political regime nor to any particular plan or machinery for settlement. Politics and plans are indispensable contributing factors—but only that. Political regimes in Europe come and go overnight. Plans and machines are launched and wrecked with astonishing facility. The problem of European settlement is too fundamental and altogether too critical to be tied up with the fate of any particular political party or any particular plan. It is only the most superficial view that finds no hope for the future in Europe save in terms of certain groups of statesmen or certain formulæ of adjustment.

Further, the results of this transition—if a transition has taken place—cannot be expected forthwith to reveal a transformed Europe. The war and the arrangements that ended it wrought a havoc that was too widespread to make possible any sudden emergence of a new order. There are indications that Europe has turned the corner—but not into the millennium. It is a serious mistake to discount the significance of this or any development because, at its beginning, the results which it may achieve in the end are not apparent.

Much of the material concerning the problems with which this volume deals has been gathered during three rather extended postwar trips to Europe. A period in Russia, during 1924, made it possible to study first-hand the situation under the Soviets.

I wish to express my appreciation to the editors of The Christian Science Monitor, the Atlantic Monthly and the Outlook for permission to use materials in articles which I had written for these publications. I wish also to thank the editors of The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the Editorial Research Reports, the Nation, the Review of Reviews and the Bankers Trust Company Publications for permission to use material quoted herein.

I wish, particularly, to express my appreciation to The Christian Science Monitor for making it possible for me, as the correspondent of that newspaper, to investigate, on the ground, these

questions of postwar European settlement, and to the many friends in the United States, in England, and on the Continent who assisted me in securing the information for which I sought.

STANLEY HIGH.

CHAPTER I

"VIVE LA PAIX!"

It was on the 18th of August, 1924, that Edouard Herriot, Premier of France, returned to Paris from the London Conference. The Paris press had been filled for days with extended accounts of the negotiations. It was known—everybody knew and was talking about it—that Herriot, at London, had agreed to the virtual abandonment of those policies upon which the French people, for three years, had been exhorted to rely as the only means by which reparations and security could be guaranteed to France. And Herriot, less than four months in office, was returning to Paris, having agreed to a new program that involved the surrender of those guarantees and the tacit admittance that France, during this first postwar period, had followed a mistaken policy—a diplomatic will-o'-the-wisp.

The Gare Saint Lazare was overflowing with a great mob when M. Herriot's train arrived. Other mobs had thronged it, not infrequently, during the past two years, to greet Raymond Poincaré and to shout their "Vive la France!" in recognition of his triumphs and of the ascendency which those triumphs were winning for the nation. But not since the arrival of Mr. Wilson had so great

a crowd assembled at a Paris station as that which broke through the cordon of police to welcome M. Herriot.

And the spirit of this crowd was different. M. Herriot in London had helped to release in France and in Europe enthusiasms suppressed through ten stern years of war and peace. When, therefore, the Premier stepped to the door of his compartment and waved to the crowd in the Gare Saint Lazare there was a great—and a significantly new—outburst to greet him. The crowd was not shouting for Poincaréism and the program of force-supremacy. It gave to M. Herriot spontaneous testimony of its faith in his policy with a shout that echoed down the platform and through the assemblage in the courtyard—a shout of "Vive la paix!"

That cry has been heard but seldom in Europe during these ten years since August, 1914. Almost every other sort of emotion has swayed the mob-mind, but not that of peace. The flaming passions of this war, as of all wars, were born of fear and hate. When hostilities ceased, those flames did not die down. They were generously fed by a revenge diplomacy only slightly less of a stimulus to the fear and hate impulses than the threat or the fact of hostile invasion. There were few to shout for peace even with the war at an end. The old war passions were kept too intensely alive. Thus the first period of postwar European history, from 1919 to 1924, is char-

acterized by the application of the spirit, and, not infrequently, the methods of the war to the problems of the peace. To that fact can be traced most of the disorders that have troubled Europe since November, 1918.

Europe might have chosen otherwise. The opportunity certainly was not lacking. The war itself was not an ordinary war. It should have ended in more than an ordinary peace. The principles for which the war was said to have been fought committed the treaty makers in advance. Those principles involved the establishment of a new world-order. Their pronouncement by the leading statesmen of the Allies and their incorporation into the Armistice terms should have made it difficult, if not impossible, to write a peace which failed to contribute to that new order.

There can be no denying that at the opening of the Peace Conference the Allied statesmen were obliged to choose between the program of the Fourteen Points, as outlined by President Wilson; and the program of a peace of revenge, as supported by M. Clémenceau. Nor can it be denied that the Allies, by solemn contract and international agreement, were bound to accept the program of Mr. Wilson. Not only in the Armistice terms themselves, but in previous communications with the government of Germany, the Allied statesmen had pledged themselves to the enforcement, through the terms of the treaties of peace, of "an impartial justice."

But though the war was lifted to the level of a great crusade, the peace, in its terms and more in its method, degenerated into little better than a diplomatic brawl. Had not one man, by a single-handed fight, made a place in the treaty for the verbal promise of a new world-organization there would be scant evidence in the Versailles document to differentiate it from any of the countless other pacts by which the quarrels of Europe have been temporarily patched up.

Not only were the terms of the Treaty of Versailles written under the influence of a hold-over war psychology, but the application of those terms to the particular problems they were to solve reflected much the same spirit. One must admit that the peace conference was under a fearful handicap. There was a widespread ignorance of actual conditions in Germany. Rumors of many sorts flew wildly about Paris in the days that followed the Armistice. And when the conference convened there seemed to be no one to suggest measures for ascertaining the state of the nation whose fate was in the hands of the victor statesmen.

There was another and more serious handicap to the peace deliberations. A two-hours' journey from the conference table began the long line of barbed-wire entanglements, ruined villages, and military cemeteries. The shadow of these things was over Paris. It was over the peacemakers. The high-sounding phrases of the great Crusade

might be forgotten, but not these devastations. The treaty terms reflected this remembrance.

But the period of peace enforcement was under no such poignant compulsion. Rehabilitation, and not destruction, could have been made the paramount purpose of the postconference adjustments. The terms of the treaty in certain major respects were decidedly elastic. What the conference failed to supply of a basis for genuine peace and settlement might have been compensated for, in some measure, in the interpretation and application of those terms. But still the war spirit and the war method persisted. The recalcitrance of Germany, which manifested itself as soon as the German people were convinced of the abandonment of the Fourteen Points, lent plausibility to the argument that any other course was impossible.

The people of Europe during this period were too shell-shocked to realize the peril that lay in the course which their politicians elected to pursue. With the Armistice an overwhelming war-weariness, an exhaustion, settled down over Europe. The public mind was dazed. Thus, in 1918, when Mr. Lloyd George went to the country and frankly asked for an extension of the sanctions of the war to cover the period of the peace, there were few who saw clearly enough to realize that the platform of the "Khaki Election," if carried through, could only hasten another catastrophe similar to that just ended. Again,

when Raymond Poincaré, at a Sunday dedication of a war memorial to the French dead in Rheims, or Bar le Duc, or Nancy, appealed for the maintenance of the war spirit, Frenchmen, generally, were too bewildered by the horrors through which they had just passed to perceive that Poincaréism, sooner or later, must bring a repetition of those horrors.

War weariness, however, accounts only in part for the apparent indifference of the people of Europe toward the policies which their politicians were following. Particularly in the Allied nations a great faith persisted that the whole peace tangle would be unraveled by outside help. Miraculous intervention from America, it was confidently believed, would help to save the peace as such intervention had helped to save the war.

Lloyd George, whose contact with Europe's efforts to solve its own postwar problems is unparalleled by any other statesman, declared in 1923: "I hardly need say that I am not venturing to express any opinion as to the American refusal to ratify the treaty as a whole. I am only stating quite frankly that, unless America takes a hand in reparations, real settlement will be postponed until the hour of irreparable mischief strikes. If, for reasons of which I am not competent to judge, America cannot occupy her vacant chair on the tribunal [The Reparations Commission] which may decide fateful issues for humanity, I despair of any real progress being made."

In the same year, 1923, Francesco Nitti, a former Premier of Italy, wrote, "It was America who decided in 1917 the issue of the war, and I believe America to be the only country, especially if she cooperates with Great Britain, whose influence can turn the tide of peace."

These opinions were dictated by the experiences of practical statesmanship. Popular opinion, moreover, reflected the same conviction; and based it less upon factual understanding of the situation than upon a great faith that America would not fail. This faith explains, to some extent, the widespread indifference to political blunders which otherwise could not have been ignored. Until American help should arrive, policies either good or bad were not subjected to critical analysis. And during the period of the peace conference and the months following it, when the treaty was being debated in the United States Senate, Europe, unwilling to move without the United States, simply marked time. Fully a year, the year when constructive policies could most easily have been inaugurated, was lost while Europe waited for America to make up its mind.

This loss, moreover, was significant beyond the fact that it delayed settlement. It was during this time that the German public, realizing the import of the Treaty of Peace, deliberately decided against an "Erfülling" policy, and for a policy of evasion.

At this period Allied statesmen were very loath

to concede that the German revolution reflected a genuinely democratic movement. Spokesmen for the victor nations were unwilling to hold out a hand of friendship to the liberal leaders who were attempting to gain control in Germany. Reaction became inevitable in the face of the opposition of the Allies to liberalism. If there has been any difficulty, during these last five years, in the maintenance of republican institutions in Germany a considerable portion of the blame must be upon those politicians outside Germany who refused at any time to extend either sympathy or help to the earnest efforts of liberal Germans to accomplish precisely those ends for which, according to Allied declarations, the war was fought.

Germany's choice against a "fulfillment" policy and for a policy of evasion was made certain at the conference at Spa in July, 1919, when the representatives of the Germans met, for the first time, with those of the Entente, and the German proposals regarding reparations were unconditionally and with scant courtesy rejected. The Allies, as usual, followed a policy of dillydallying. There was a strange unwillingness to make inquiry into the economic facts of the situation. No definite sum for reparation and no definite methods of payment were agreed upon. The Germans returned from Spa in despair. German industrialists intervened to prevent a further effort to meet the Allied terms. And Germany, once having chosen an anti-fulfillment policy was, henceforth,

to contribute the most powerful support to those whose methods were further to overcast the peace with the shadows of the war.

Self-interest and geography doubtless combine to account for the fact that Great Britain first recognized the hopelessness of the situation into which the postwar policies of the Allies were driving Europe. England, a commercial nation, soon forgot the slogans of the khaki election in her interest in the restoration of British shipping and the employment of a great army of a million and a half men who were out of work. Restoration was better business than revenge. That was plain enough in England. And upon that assumption British statesmen forthwith proceeded to act.

But immediately England found itself at loggerheads with France. France is an agricultural, not a commercial nation. Prosperity for France is not a matter of ships but of crops. And since the Rhine is no English Channel, the crops of France need the guarantee of some very tangible security. French spokesmen, therefore, made it speedily plain that the restoration of Germany could not be so easily agreed upon. France, to be sure, needed the reparations which only a restored Germany could pay. But, even more, France feared a restored Germany as a menace to her security. The French were in an unenviable position. They desired, as Sir Philip Gibbs put it, to keep the German mule strong enough to do their plowing but too weak to kick.

At the Genoa conference, which convened in April, 1922, a Franco-British agreement seemed, for a few hours, to be in sight. But Poincaré's persistent campaign against the whole policy of interallied conference, and his contention that the entire reparations question should be committed, without discussion, to the Reparations Commission, had made headway in France. The Nationalists in the Chamber of Deputies were impatient. A paper security such as Lloyd George proposed at Cannes seemed altogether uncertain. Aristide Briand, therefore, was summarily recalled; his government was overthrown. Raymond Poincaré succeeded to the premiership and the gulf between England and France widened immeasurably. Lloyd George, thereafter, stood alone in his demand for German restoration, for the support of Italy had been rendered wavering and uncertain by political developments in Rome.

The Genoa conference, as a result, went on the rocks. The Germans themselves contributed nothing toward the success of the restoration program which the British were sponsoring. Russia was in no conciliatory mood. The states of the Little Entente—Czecho-Slovakia, Rumania, and Jugo-Slavia—troubled lest the sanctity of the treaties of peace be questioned, supported France rather than England.

After Genoa Raymond Poincaré had a free hand on the Continent. When Lloyd George fell, the succeeding governments of Stanley Baldwin

and Bonar Law were no more favorable to Poincaré's program and no more successful in altering it. No undertaking could have been looked upon less favorably in England than the occupation of the Ruhr. But there was no preventing it. British opinion had been only a little less positive than French opinion in its assertion that Germany must pay. The conflict was over the question of method. And as a method of collection the English people believed the occupation of the Ruhr to be self-defeating.

Poincaré lost by the transaction in the Ruhr. France, from the point of view of settlement, probably profited by the undertaking, if, as is probably true, the occupation speeded a critical appraisal of the nation's postwar policy. The Separatist movement in the Rhineland, moreover, aroused a storm of disapproval. Poincaré even to many of his supporters appeared to have gone too far. And despite the fact that he had held office with few restraints upon his program for two years, the French outlook, under a continuance of his regime, was anything but hopeful. The franc under the government of Poincaré had depreciated eighty-six per cent; living costs had mounted amazingly; reparations collections had reached the vanishing point. Clearly, the Poincaré method had been given a fair trial and found inadequate. The establishment of a Labor government in Great Britain—a government with no precedents to prejudice its claim to good faith—

added strength to the demand in France for a complete change of policy.

"I conceive of life after the war," Clémenceau had said in the French Chamber, "as a continual conflict, whether there be war or peace. I believe it was Bernhardi who said that politics is war conducted with other weapons. We can invert this aphorism and say that peace is war conducted with other weapons."

This policy found its most extreme application when French troops marched into the Ruhr in January, 1922. It is too soon to appraise the full effect of the French occupation of the Ruhr upon the German people. Not only the fact but even more the method of the occupation infuriated all patriotic Germans. Conciliation has never been without advocates in Germany. It is doubtful if the peasant population of any country is more peace-loving than the German. But bayonets are an altogether effective prod to the most docile people—and French bayonets in the Ruhr were no exception.

There can hardly be any argument over the question of the oppressiveness of many of the measures which the French employed. Leaving aside all question of the colored troops in the Ruhr—the most serious source of ill-feeling—there still remains evidence altogether too imposing to be lightly dismissed that in many places French troops tyrannized and bulldozed and persecuted the people upon whom they were quar-

tered. Nor is this evidence the mere result of the conjuring of those agencies which on both sides of the fighting lines in the war manufactured atrocities to make good haters out of the troops engaged. Too many impartial investigators have substantiated the accounts of the situation in the Ruhr to permit the denial of these general assertions.

In France the peasantry was no more desirous of war than the Germans, but throughout the country a conviction developed through the last five years that another war was inevitable; that the Germans were merely biding their time; that military preparations were going on in secret. And instead of giving support to the only elements in Germany, the liberal forces that stood for peace, which could prevent such a catastrophe, the French policy worked directly to thwart those forces. And the French in the Ruhr, with German recalcitrance, combined to furnish real basis for the disturbing conclusion that another war was certain.

Along such lines for five years with few interruptions the peace of Europe was conducted. But the complete bankruptcy of the policy of settlement by force was becoming evident in 1924 and the way prepared for its replacement with a program more constructive. During 1924 that replacement, in part at least, has taken place. It is not too much to say that as a result there has been more positive progress toward settlement

in Europe in 1924 than during the five years preceding. For the first time there are significant indications that the war was not fought in vain. This fundamental change in the European outlook is reflected in the spectacle of the crowd in the Gare Saint Lazare receiving the French Premier with shouts of "Vive la paix!"

Several facts have contributed to the development of this new outlook. During the period of delay and uncertainty, when settlement seemed hopelessly out of reach, the public mind in Europe was undergoing a process of adjustment. The weariness and shell-shock which dulled to ordinary considerations the faculties of those who had lived for four years under the ghastly spell of war were being sloughed off. Peace was displacing war as a norm of existence. Life was regaining some of its lost perspective. To weigh issues and to recognize their implications was becoming less difficult.

The fact of this change made another fact apparent, namely, that the nations of Europe would be saved only by the working out of their own salvation. That, certainly, is one of the most important developments in the history of this first postwar European period. Four years of the five from 1919 to 1924 were required to emphasize that act strongly enough to give it directive force in European affairs. But by the end of 1923 it was recognized that the job of rebuilding was Europe's job and that America's "vacant chair" probably would not soon be of-

ficially occupied. This realization furthered the development, in Europe, of a self-assertiveness to which can be traced much of the progress toward settlement that has been made in the year just ended. And, significantly enough, in setting about the business of putting its own house in order, Europe has won a greater share of American cooperation.

Europe at London, or San Remo, at Cannes or Genoa was not likely to secure the active interest of the United States. Rightly or wrongly, the official spokesmen of the American people were of the opinion that they could do no good by meddling in Europe's petty politics, regardless of how deep their interest might be in the fundamental problems of the peace. Politics, petty and otherwise, had its day—too long a day it was too—from 1919 to 1923. And America's isolationists found ample justification in that fact for the continued enforcement of a "hands-off" policy. When, however, politics appeared to be relegated as they have been somewhat relegated during the last fifteen months, American interest at once began to revive. The spectacle of Europe tugging away in dead earnest at its own bootstraps, though it has not altered, as yet, the official policy of the American government, certainly brought about a more active unofficial cooperation. Great Britain sought to win America's support against the occupation of the Ruhr. But into such a controversy the United States

refused to be drawn. When, however, the situation in Europe had so completely altered that the Allies were willing to agree to an experts' committee to undertake to lift the major problem left by the war out of the realm of politics, the United States provided support—unofficially of course—without which such a committee could hardly have been convened.

It is significant to note right here, however, that the report of the experts and the Dawes Plan are European achievements. That the committee was able to hold a single meeting was due to the fact that Europe, temporarily at least, had buried its political hatchets. There was no compulsion from the outside .

Even the famous New Haven speech of Charles E. Hughes, the American Secretary of State, delivered on December 29, 1922, was merely a "take it or leave it" suggestion. It is doubtful, moreover, if Mr. Hughes would have ventured such a suggestion had he not been aware of the rising insistence in Europe that politics be subordinated while the machinery for permanent settlement was set up.

"The first condition of a satisfactory settlement," said Mr. Hughes, "is that the question should be taken out of politics. . . . If statesmen cannot agree and the exigencies of public opinion make their course difficult, then there should be called to their aid those who can point the way to a solution. Why should they not invite men

of the highest authority in finance in their respective countries, men of such prestige, experience, and honor that their agreement upon the amount to be paid and the financial plan for working out payments would be accepted throughout the world as the most authoritative expression obtainable? . . . There lies the open broad avenue of opportunity, if those whose voluntary action is indispensable are willing to take advantage of it. And once this is done, the avenues of American helpfulness cannot fail to open hopefully."

The "voluntary action" which Mr. Hughes declared to be the "indispensable" prerequisite to such an undertaking was in due time taken. The plan evolved, as a result, is a plan which Europe made possible. And a European plan for Europe's problems, with America's relationship merely cooperative, has every advantage over a scheme devised under the compulsion of an extra-European leadership. There is hardly any denying that the influence of the United States in Europe as a signatory of the Treaty of Versailles could have speeded up considerably the progress toward settlement. But Europe, without that influence, has been obliged to muddle through five chaotic years in search of its own way out. When that way, finally, is found, it is probable that the lessons learned in finding it will more than counterbalance the time lost through the failure of the United States to provide a short cut.

There are those, of course, who, in spite of this progress, foresee in the disorders that followed the war the complete collapse of democracy itself. "Though the war witnessed an apparent democratic advance in Europe," writes H. H. Powers in the Atlantic Monthly (April, 1924), "the whole performance of overturning thrones had about the same relation to the establishment of democracy that Fourth of July fireworks have to the winning of a battle. . . . This period of showy and more or less nominal triumph, however, has been followed by a series of unmistakable defeats. Democracy has lost immense territories and its position has been visibly weakened in territories which it nominally retains. Withal it seems to have lost ground in the confidence of mankind. . . .

"It is undeniable, therefore, that Russia represents in a very real sense, lost ground for democracy. . . . Italy furnishes another example of territory recently lost to democracy." Mr. Powers witnessed "the collapse of constitutional government in Spain." He recalls with sorrow the prewar fiasco of democratic government in Austria, and declares that "the Hapsburg ruler has been for a century a refuge of his peoples from the intolerable excesses of popular government. I prophesy that he will be missed. . . . Doubtless some hundred and odd millions of the American people feel encouraged by the fact that Turkey has unfurled the banner of democracy.

Doubtless the same persons will greet with acclaim the accession of Greece to the circle of republics. Whatever significance the proposed change may have, it has little bearing on the question of democracy. . . .

"It is too early to pass judgment on the new democracies in Germany and the other Central Powers. Conditions are too abnormal to permit of their natural working and development. . . . It is not too much to say, however, that democracy has shown no particular aptitude for dealing with a difficult situation."

In France, Great Britain, and the United States Mr. Powers sees "disquieting symptoms." "Both Great Britain and the United States have recently lost the conditions of majority rule and have fallen, at least for the present, into a condition of partial paralysis. We are to have emasculated programs blocs, and deals. The class struggle too shows ominous signs of getting out of hand. Despite the enormous representation of Labor in the British Parliament and its constitutional triumph, the demand for direct action is loudly heard."

There are others who deny that any real progress is possible since the treaties reflect a total depravity from which no good can ever come. Treaties of peace do not lend themselves to easy popularity, least of all, apparently, the Treaty of Versailles. The problems with which it dealt were too complex to win for it spontaneous ap-

proval however they were solved. It is left, therefore, with few defendants and many assailants. These assailants insist that no permanent settlement can come, and no American cooperation can avail until the treaties are rewritten to conform to the exact terms of the Armistice. Such individuals are in for a long wait.

"In the course of a few years," writes Nitti (*The Decadence of Europe*, p. 29), "Europe has become to a large extent Balkanized, and every day it shows signs of decadence." In part, at least, the chaos which Nitti saw materialized. There was a Red Revolution in Hungary; Austria and Germany suffered an economic collapse. The League of Nations proved impotent, less, however, because of its own faulty machinery than because Europe was in the control of politicians who feared to give that machinery a chance to operate. Democracy on the Continent seemed at the mercy of the Hitlers and the Ludendorffs, the Mussolinis and the Di Riveras. And these individuals apparently proposed to make short shrift of it.

But lest we rush forth too quickly to join this host that stands against European cooperation until new treaties are prepared, it is necessary to call to mind two facts of considerable significance. First, though the Treaty of Versailles willed to the world many minor unsolved problems, it appears to have avoided many major injustices with some show of success. There is no

Alsace-Lorraine to cast a permanent shadow across Europe's sky, nor even an Italian Irredenta to block the road to peace. Upper Silesia, to be sure, is most frequently mentioned as "Irredenta" and a certain source of future trouble. Neither the Poles nor the Germans were satisfied with the settlement. I was in Germany in 1922, when German troops evacuated Upper Silesia. Flags were flown at half-mast throughout Germany; there were great demonstrations; school children were lectured on the "crime of Silesia."

But this bitterness is disappearing. It is not that the Germans are reconciled to the present settlement, but that they recognize the difficulty of effecting a better settlement. Alternate schemes have been proposed and found even more unsatisfactory. In 1924 I found both in Germany and in Poland a willingness that was altogether absent in 1922 to accept the status quo and to substitute for the revenge program a policy of cooperation in Upper Silesia that promises to make the best of a rather bad arrangement. This is not to minimize the seriousness of the lesser problems left by the peace. But it is generally apparent that justice can be more speedily secured by reinterpretation than by redrafting. And it is worthy of note that though three years ago a whole crop of small wars flourished because of the treaty terms, to-day not one of these minor—and chiefly territorial—questions

is in the forefront of European interest and concern.

A further fact follows: that the unsolved problems which during the period that now is ending have kept Europe in disorder are less inherent in the Treaty of Versailles than in the method of its enforcement. And there are many indications that without rewriting a word of the Treaty of Versailles a settlement may finally be reached which will be less of a betrayal of the Armistice than the bare letter of the Treaty and the methods too often used to enforce it indicate.

Despite the certain portents of disaster, and despite the further fact that the treaties of peace have not been rewritten, Europe, apparently, has turned the corner. There is a calmness in the face of these questions of settlement and a confidence in the final outcome that has been lacking heretofore. Much of the fever heat which went with the discussion of issues two or three years ago has cooled. It is not that all of these issues have been satisfactorily or finally settled, but they have ceased to be war-provocateurs. Irreconcilable differences of even eighteen months ago have been harmonized in the interest of settlement.[1]

[1] The refusal of the Allied Powers to evacuate the Cologne area on January 10, 1925, as previously agreed, has appeared temporarily to obstruct the further development of this conciliatory spirit in the political atmosphere of Europe. Whether or not with official connivance, the Germans apparently have failed to fulfill the disarmament terms of the Treaty of Versailles. The resultant action of the Allies, however justifiable, has given comfort to the foes of the republic and the friends of military reaction in Germany and has made possible the deadlock that resulted in the establishment of a so-called "junker" cabinet. It is sig-

For France to consent to the virtual destruction of the authority of the Reparations Commission would have appeared wholly impossible in the fall of 1923. And yet, a year later, the Committee set up under the Dawes plan had succeeded to many of the functions formerly performed by the Reparations Commission. A year ago German hostility to the League of Nations made its membership in the Geneva organization a matter for the distant future. At the end of 1924 Germany was making preliminary inquiry at Geneva regarding German admittance to the League. The Little Entente, organized in 1922 to stand against a recalcitrant Hungary, in 1924 had agreed upon a plan for Hungarian reconstruction and floated a large part of the loan necessary to the plan's success. Russia at the opening of 1924 was beyond the pale of official European relationships. At the end of 1924 Russia had received the recognition or recognition was being negotiated with all of the powers save the United States. The reparation problem, which at the end of 1923 was far from solution, had been removed in 1924 from the political field, and under a wholly new scheme of settlement German finance had been

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nificant, however, that the reply of the German government, which contained a most decisive protest against this Allied action, was couched in conciliatory terms not at all like the tone of German communications earlier in this postwar period.

"The German note," declared the New York Times on January 8, 1925, "indicates that the Reich government considers the matter one to be discussed amicably." When the German government, in a matter such as this, turns a deaf ear to the ravings of Nationalist propagandists it is indicative that more than an ordinary change has taken place in the political outlook in Germany.

stabilized, German credit restored and reparations payments resumed. In this new settlement the Entente Cordiale between England and France was restored. Most important of all, from the point of view of the future, fifty-four nations among whom in 1923 agreement on critical issues seemed remote assembled at Geneva in the fall of 1924 and drew up a Protocol which for the first time in human history called upon the governments of the world to put the brand of outlawry upon aggressive war.

Therefore Europe, crying "Vive la paix!" is echoing no hollow shibboleth. The shouts of the throng in the Gare Saint Lazare marked the passage of an old era and hailed a new. The full significance of that new era cannot as yet be written, but it holds a promise that out of the strewn wreckage of ten years of war and peace a new Europe may be built and the foundation laid for a new world-order.

CHAPTER II

EUROPEAN POLITICS—1924

Behind the new outlook in Europe is a changed political situation. It is not so much that new policies have been introduced as that the objectives of the old policies have been stated with greater frankness and pursued with a wholly different spirit. The most apparent fact of the first five years of the peace is that settlement can never be accomplished along the old lines of reactionary politics, represented in terms of exaggerated nationalism based upon suspicion and fear and backed by force. The outstanding achievement of that period is the development during the last eighteen months of a new political atmosphere in which it has become possible to make common approach to a cooperative solution of those problems of reconstruction which heretofore have been left to the arbitrament of coercion.

A small incident will indicate something of this changed political atmosphere. When Ramsay MacDonald and Edouard Herriot, late in June, 1924, met at Chequers to make preliminary arrangements for the London Conference, a small army of photographers was on hand. They plied their trade whenever the two statesmen ap-

peared. One photograph, in particular, was broadcast throughout France and caused nation-wide merriment.

The picture is taken on top of Cymbeline's Mount in the grounds at Chequers. The two Premiers, dressed like a pair of amateur golfers, are seated on the grass; Herriot with the inevitable pipe, MacDonald with the inevitable cigarette. They are grinning broadly. There is not the slightest hint of political dignity, but a good deal of schoolboy friendliness. The French people chuckled when they saw the picture. And the French papers called it the "Nouvelle Entente Cordiale." That, to be sure, is rather intangible evidence that a new chapter in Europe's postwar history has begun. After five years of experience with diplomatic pilgrimages and cheery diplomatic interchanges which produced scarcely anything of importance, it was unusual that the prospects opened up by this rather uncertain indication of good will between Herriot and MacDonald seemed to be taken at their face value without even a grain of salt.

I was in southern France when the Chequers meeting concluded. Even there in the provinces, and later in London and Paris and Berlin, one heard and read of the international situation in terms of "before Chequers" and "since Chequers." At Chequers, a French paper of the Savoy declared, "the face of France has reappeared. It is an amiable face, friendly, loving, desiring, above

all, to have justice and peace. M. Herriot will secure our just reparation, but he will secure what is much more—priceless peace."

Ramsay MacDonald and Edouard Herriot at Chequers merely reflected a widespread determination in France and England to place the problem of European settlement in new hands. The new methods and, more important, the new spirit, which were introduced as a result, have already been too firmly established to be easily shaken, however short the tenure of office of MacDonald and Herriot, or however conservative their successors.

The turn toward this changed situation began when in January, 1924, King George summoned Ramsay MacDonald to Buckingham Palace and asked him to form Great Britain's first Labor government. Labor frankly represented Socialism. There were prophets of gloom who thought they foresaw, in a Labor Cabinet, the red inundation of England. But to the credit of its vision, Labor, with the exception of the small, vociferous, and frequently embarrassing Left Wing of the party, realized that its rise to power in Britain was not an indorsement of Socialism. Conservatives and Liberals alike, however, professed consternation that Labor in power appeared unwilling to stand by the Socialist doctrines for which so long it had fought. I asked a pioneer member of the Labor party of this apparent inconsistency between Labor in doctrine

and in office. His answer reflects, I believe, the attitude of Labor leaders and the British public generally. "Europe," he said, "needs settling. Labor is in a unique position to help toward settlement. Our spokesmen have none of the embarrassments of other party leaders, who have established prejudices and precedents, by their past contact with the international situation, which are an initial handicap to any negotiations they may undertake. Labor, therefore, is looked to as an agency for settlement and not for the introduction of Socialism. We know what is expected of us. That is the job we are trying to do."

This declaration is significant. It accounts to a very great degree for the success of Labor's foreign policy. It accounts in some measure also for the overthrow of the Labor government in the 1924 general election. The Labor leader quoted above made it plain that "when we have done what we can, on our present program of European restoration, the next election will be fought less on the basis of foreign policy than upon that of Socialism. Our next step, following the success of our policy abroad, will be an initial application of the Socialist policies at home, probably beginning with a program for the nationalization of mines and railways, for which the party stands."

British elevation of Labor to office, therefore, cannot be regarded as an indorsement of Social-

ism. Rather it was an expression of this determination for constructive and permanent European adjustments. The defeat of Labor at the 1924 election cannot be interpreted, on the other hand, as a repudiation of Labor's successes in the international field, but, rather, as a refusal to support those socialistic measures which would have been the next step in the development of the party's program. For the purposes of our study it was important that Ramsay MacDonald's government was maintained in power not six weeks or three months, but nine months—a period which proved long enough to alter fundamentally the entire European outlook.

Not only was the west European outlook fundamentally altered but the attitude toward Russia was considerably softened during the MacDonald tenure of office. It is important too that although the Conservatives have rejected the Anglo-Soviet treaty negotiated by the Labor government, they have declared their purpose to do nothing which will interfere with the full resumption of the diplomatic relations which Labor's recognition of the Soviet brought about.

There has been, of course, a widespread misinterpretation of the results of the overwhelming victory of the Conservative Party in the fall of 1924. The General Election which turned Ramsay MacDonald's government out of office was less of a defeat for Labor than appears at first glance. Conservatives, especially in the United

States, where an inability for critical analysis is even more a characteristic of reaction than in many countries, have hailed the event as an unqualified repudiation of liberal policies and the expression of an unexampled popular determination to return to the satisfying shelters of Conservatism.

But Labor in England and Labor's friends in the United States have pointed out after an analysis of the situation that such rejoicing is a bit premature.

In the first place, it must be borne in mind that British Labor is still in its political infancy. In 1892 the Independent Labor party in Great Britain was formed as the first indication of the determination of the English Socialists and the leaders of the Trade Unionist Movement to employ, henceforth, political methods in the realization of their purposes. Prior to that time Trade Unionism had contented itself with an effort to secure adequate justice for labor within the capitalistic system. A series of unsuccessful strikes at the opening of the present century, however, made it apparent that political methods must be relied upon to supplement industrial methods. In February, 1900, therefore, the Labor Representation Committee was called into being by joint action of the Socialists and Trade Unionists. In 1906 the Labor Representation Committee became the British Labor Party. With a history, therefore, of less than twenty years of

active participation in British politics, the rise of the Labor Party is an unparalleled political phenomenon.[1]

Even in the face of so overwhelming a defeat at the polls in the 1924 election the position of the British Labor Party at the opening of 1925 is far in advance of the rosiest hopes of its most sanguine supporters of five or even two years ago. And from two further points of view, the last election was nothing short of a significant Labor victory.

It is true, of course, that the number of Labor's seats in the House of Commons was diminished by 47, the alignment after the election giving the Conservatives 401, Labor 145 and the Liberals 40; as compared with: Conservatives 257, Liberals 158, and Labor 192 after the election of December, 1923. But these figures only tell part of the story. Labor's popular vote at the election of 1924 increased by approximately 1,500,000 over its vote at the previous election. That this vote was so distributed that it failed to return more seats is a matter of disappointment for Labor leaders. But the evidence of increased

[1] The rise of the British Labor Party is represented by the following table of increased vote and representation in the House of Commons. This table was prepared by the Editorial Research Reports, January 14, 1924:

	Number Elected	Total Labor Vote
1900	9	118,003
1906	54	448,808
1910 (January)	40	532,807
1910 (December)	42	381,024
1918	61	1,754,133
1922	142	4,247,800
1923	192	4,358,045

popular approval which the vote itself indicates cannot be disregarded.

Then, as a more important development, Labor, in the last election, succeeded to the place of Liberalism as England's second party. Heretofore Labor has been a third—usually a poor third—in the British political alignment. Henceforth, from all indications, Labor not only succeeds to the power of the Liberal Party but it will occupy the position of Liberalism as the exponent of progressive politics. The political lines in England, therefore, seem to be drawn between the Conservatives on the Right and Labor on the Left, with the Liberals an uncertain center party. The fact that Labor is out of office is a political incident. The fact that Labor apparently has established itself in the position formerly held by Liberalism is of paramount and permanent importance.

When he came to power Ramsay McDonald, as I have mentioned above, recognized clearly the major task committed to his government. He refused to be stampeded by the radical Left Wing of his own party or to heed the scorn with which the Opposition dared him to practice the Socialism he had preached. To bring settlement was the job for which he was called to power, and to that problem he at once turned his attention.

But the Continental situation was anything but auspicious for MacDonald's enterprise. To understand the significance of the developments of 1924 it is necessary to recall the outstanding

features of the situation toward the end of 1923. Nationalism, then, rode high in the governments of Europe. Negotiations regarding the problems at issue between the states of Europe had degenerated into little better than a political game—with those engaged interested more in the game itself than in the stakes involved.

The Fascisti government of Italy was ultra-nationalistic, ultra-reactionary, and often in methods ultra-mediæval. Fascismo was born out of the political and economic disorders that threatened to disrupt the national life of postwar Italy. In haste to condemn the Fascisti, one is apt to ignore the fact that it was a very real peril which Mussolini and his black-shirted followers organized to repel. Red agitation, under various guises, made rapid headway in Italy even before the disastrous defeat of the Italian army at the Caporetto. There were riots in many cities —notably in Turin and Milan. By January, 1919, Bolshevist propaganda was well organized on a nation-wide scale. Politically and economically the country was thoroughly disorganized. Realizing the danger of further chaos, Benito Mussolini, himself a former Socialist, a war veteran and member of the Chamber of Deputies, organized in Milan, the first of the "Fasci Italiani di Combattimento."

When in June, 1919, the government of Orlando was succeeded by that of Francesco Nitti, the situation appeared to many patriotic Italians to be

beyond the control of the ordinary methods of democratic governments. Conditions failed to improve. In November of the following year occurred the uprising in Bologna. During the disorders the minority members of the city's municipal council were shot. And suddenly there appeared for the first time the embattled Fascisti-Black Shirts, bent on restoring order. They were a hot-blooded lot, most of them ex-soldiers, intensely patriotic and daring. They employed Red tactics against the Reds. There was a clean sweep of the Communists in Bologna. And within a few weeks Fascismo was a force to be reckoned with in almost every town in Italy. Governmental impotence continued despite these activities until in October, 1922, a force of one hundred thousand Fascisti marched on Rome, a Fascisti government was proclaimed to succeed that of Luigi Facta, and Benito Mussolini established himself as Premier.

Domestic order was restored under the first two years of Mussolini's government. The most recent budget indicates that a deficit of 3,000,000 lire in 1922–23 has been reduced to one seventh of that sum for 1923–24. The internal debt has been reduced by 500,000,000 lire. The import-export trade of the country has increased by 4,000,000,000 lire and 100,000,000 lire of foreign debts has been paid, and early in 1925 an American loan of approximately 50,000,000 lire will be redeemed. These achievements are at-

tributable to the fact that Mussolini injected efficiency into the government and set in order the confused domestic conditions that he found upon assuming office.

But the methods by which the Fascisti government accomplished its ends were hardly those of constitutional government. They resembled, rather, the methods of the Russian Soviets. Mussolini's philosophy of action, in fact, is not dissimilar from that of Lenin. Law to both was an incidental matter, if order were preserved. And of order, in the Fascismo code, there was but one sort—that decreed by Mussolini and his blackshirted supporters.

And Mussolini's ruthlessness, however much it accomplished toward the restoration of domestic stability, was a bull in the china shop when it came to international affairs. The unjustified bombardment and occupation of the Greek island of Corfu, which I will discuss in more detail in another connection, furnishes a good example of Mussolini abroad. MacDonald clearly enough could expect little support for a program of moderation from so great an international plunger as Mussolini.

In Spain as well as in Italy reaction was in the saddle. Primo de Rivera's *coup* in September, 1923, was precipitated by Spanish military reverses in Morocco and by the apparent necessity of vigorous action against mismanagement and corruption in the national government. De

Rivera proceeded Mussolini-fashion. A military revolt put him in power as Dictator. Constitutional methods were his least concern. Democracy was relegated cellarward, as it had been relegated in Italy. However worthy the program of De Rivera, his methods put Spain in line with those forces which appeared bent upon the destruction of the machinery of democratic government in Europe.

And in Germany, during 1923, democracy and the life of the republic were more seriously threatened than at any time since the Armistice. It was in the fall of 1922 that Adolf Hitler, employing black-jack adaptations of the methods of Mussolini, first attracted attention as the organizer of the "Hakenkreuzlers"—so-called German Fascisti. To oust the Socialists and eventually to overthrow the republic were the joint aims of Hitler's forces. To these were added rampant militarism and a furious agitation against the Jews. Bavaria, a hotbed of monarchical reaction, was the center of the new organization. Back of it were such notorious representatives of anti-republican ideals as General Eric von Ludendorff and a host of lesser militarists.

Under the joint direction of Hitler and von Ludendorff an uprising was engineered in Bavaria in November, 1923. The purpose was to inflame Bavaria, march from Munich to Berlin, and there reestablish a monarchy. The "putsch" was a ridiculous fizzle. The fact, however, that it was

attempted and that the Berlin government was in a too uncertain position to adopt stern measures against it, served notice upon Europe that Germany, as yet, was far from under the safe control of its democratic elements.

More important, however, for MacDonald's program of settlement than conditions in Spain, Italy, or Germany was the situation in France. The most important question before Europe, perhaps before the world, when MacDonald came to power, was whether the Entente Cordiale between England and France could be restored. Since the triumphant diplomatic tours of Mr. Lloyd George through the vacation cities of Europe, the gulf between the British and the French points of view had been widening. France during the ascendancy of Lloyd George was left to play second fiddle. Successive French statesmen were unable to match the nimble Welshman.

But after Genoa, Raymond Poincaré was called to power and the tables turned. With the Bloc Nationale in power common ground between the two former allies was more difficult to find. In England, to be sure, there was a singular lack of appreciation of the real French situation, and a general disregard of the very real problem of French security. In France, on the other hand, England was mistrusted and the serious problems of Great Britain's economic depression and unemployment were only lightly considered.

As a result of mutual misunderstanding, there-

fore, a cooperative solution of the questions at issue between the two states in 1923 seemed remote. Poincaré can hardly be called a tractable statesman, but it must be said that the pin-prick diplomacy of Viscount Curzon, as Foreign Minister in the Stanley Baldwin Cabinet of 1923, contributed much to the increase of bad feeling.

There can be no avoiding the fact that French security is at the crux of any consideration of the problems of European settlement. It is easy enough in England—easier in the United States—to regard this problem as one bred of the temperamentalism of the French. This easy dismissal of the question has prevented a general understanding of the real forces at work in Europe, as it has prevented solution of Europe's major difficulties. Germany, greater in natural resources and in man-power than France, must remain a menace to the French until means for protection are devised or a Franco-German Entente Cordiale is developed.

It is only a partial answer to French fears to point to the reservoir of man-power in the French Empire in North Africa. Were actual numerical strength the only fact to be considered, France, with her North African territories, would have no concern for the threat of Germany's greater population. But it is difficult to place reliance for the maintenance of national security upon the support of colonial troops, however admirably they acquitted themselves in the World War.

It is true, also, that the French are less ready to trust paper agreements and the rather intangible assets of good will than the English. It remains a fact, I believe, that the most certain security for France is to be found in the maintenance of friendly international relationships. And French security was never so seriously menaced, since the war, as during the period, now at an end, when the policies of Poincaré turned popular opinion temporarily against France both in Great Britain and in the United States. The French themselves have greatly underestimated the importance of this factor. But it is necessary to reassert the fact that glib critics who decry the determination of European statesmen to include specific methods for peace enforcement in every peace scheme, simply blink at the practical facts of the European situation. To ignore these facts is the most certain way to block, immediately, any hope of conciliatory agreement.

But after one recognizes the absolute necessity of finding a solution for the problem of French security, it still must be said that France, since the Armistice, has been led by her fears into policies which can only serve in the end to bring disaster. No students of the European situation really believed that France could effectively destroy Germany—as French policy, for a time, seemed bent upon doing. Neither could the French hope permanently to keep Germany in bondage. The one definite result of such tactics

was the establishment in Germany of a reservoir of hate, the floodgates of which only waited for release upon this certain return of German strength. Revenge had proved itself poor business in Great Britain. Revenge, by the end of 1923, should have proved itself poor security in France.

It has been necessary to make this detour to indicate that the general European situation was dominated by reaction when, at the beginning of 1924, Ramsay MacDonald's Labor Cabinet assumed office. More particularly it has been necessary to indicate the impasse which existed in Anglo-French relationships and something of the basis of that deadlock.

Mr. MacDonald, however, discarded the diplomatic tactics of his predecessors. More important, he discarded their spirit. His first notes to France astonished Europe out of its sullenness. On February 21, 1924, disregarding the circuitous methods of diplomacy, the British Prime Minister sent an open letter to Raymond Poincaré. In it he canvassed with amazing candor the fact of the justice of the claims of France and the attitude of the British public toward the policies which France had pursued. The following two paragraphs from the letter of Mr. MacDonald indicate this frankness. After reviewing the state of Anglo-French public opinion he declared:

"Such popular sentiments, erroneous though they may be, are factors which both you and I are

bound to take into consideration. In my judgment, it is these states of opinion which have vitiated our relations in the past and have often induced our two governments to indulge in altercations regarding the symptoms of the malady without endeavoring with clarity and good sense to investigate the causes."

"It is a thoroughly unhealthy condition which gives me much concern and which I venture to believe disturbs you too. I am heartily anxious that you and I together should try and give both these sections of French and British opinion some sense of confidence that the basis of their fears and resentments is being removed. It is not, however, my present purpose to enter at any length into such questions as the Ruhr and Rhineland occupation or the Palatinate beyond saying that no one who has to observe British opinion to-day can afford to overlook the urgent necessity for coming to arrangements regarding them without delay."

MacDonald's spirit of good will, his recognition of the very real problems confronting France; his desertion of the mistrusted and frequently misused methods of diplomacy could not be denied. The general tension of Europe was noticeably relieved.

"Mr. MacDonald's method," wrote Sisley Huddleston, Paris correspondent of The Christian Science Monitor, "delights everybody. It is frank, it is honest, it is pointed enough but it does

not hurt. There is such obvious sincerity that Raymond Poincaré cannot do otherwise than reply with equal sincerity. . . . It is not expected that immediate practical results will be apparent, but at any rate many misunderstandings born in the channel of fog will be dissipated in the clear light of this correspondence."

This feeling was reflected not alone in Great Britain but also in Germany, where a leading Berlin paper expressed the general opinion of the moderate German groups in the declaration that "for the first time a leading statesman of the Entente thoroughly and frankly investigates all the political questions which hang over Europe like a cloud of poison. It is a novel way in which Mr. MacDonald's diplomacy, despising the secretiveness of chancellories, treads."

But after the flurry of friendly notes between MacDonald and Poincaré the general situation became overcast again. Poincaré seemed not at all disposed to alter his fundamentals of policy, to indicate his willingness to consider the question of the evacuation of the Ruhr and the Rhineland, or to evidence any greater eagerness to abide by the finding of the committee of experts. It was still as much a question as ever whether Poincaré was determined, as a minimum guarantee of French security, to attempt further to crush Germany.

These facts and others made MacDonald's course uncertain. France was on the eve of an

election. Poincaré's position was wavering. By-elections had gone against him. The decline of the franc and stop-gap taxation measures brought increased disfavor upon his government. The Bloc National was in a precarious position. This fact could hardly have been displeasing to the Labor government. If Poincaré fell, a more liberal government was certain to succeed him. To do nothing to impede that fall, which MacDonald must have hoped for, required astute diplomacy. A decisive break between England and France on the eve of French elections would react most certainly in favor of Poincaré. France, isolated, would more readily rally to the nationalistic banners of the Bloc National. In order, therefore, to prevent even the appearance of a break between himself and Poincaré, MacDonald was obliged to mark time, in friendly fashion, until the verdict of the French electorate was given.

That verdict brought about the most important political overturn in postwar Europe. Raymond Poincaré and his Bloc National were smashed. France put itself on record—and there was no mistaking the decisiveness of the decision—against jingoism, against extreme nationalism, and for a peace of reconciliation. Royalists like Leon Daudet were ignominiously defeated. Extreme nationalists like Andre Tardieu and Andre LeFevre were snowed under. A new Chamber was elected and intrusted by the voters of France with

the major job of bringing settlement. Edouard Herriot, for many years Socialist mayor of Lyons, came to power backed by the Bloc de Gauches and committed to a program of cooperation in a situation that had failed to respond to coercion.

Between the new French Premier and Ramsay MacDonald there existed a bond of understanding that exerted an important influence upon subsequent developments. Both were Socialists. Their outlook, therefore, was distinctly international and pacific. Confronted with a problem that was fundamentally the same in both countries, their most natural approach to its solution lay over the same road.

Developments following the election in France were immediate. In the French Chamber Herriot declared, "At home and abroad this government will have only one aim—to give this country by labor and progress the peace which it has so nobly deserved." Strangely enough, France—and Europe—appeared to take the new Premier at his word. When, a little later, he declared in no uncertain terms that he was prepared to back the democratic elements in Germany as he was ready to fight the German militarists, there was a spontaneous expression of approval in Germany quite different from the customary reaction of the press of that country to the statements of previous French Premiers.

No other result of Herriot's rise to power is

more important in fact than this establishment of greater Franco-German friendliness. As I have indicated above, the Republican forces in Germany were hard driven by the Nationalists. On almost every Sunday some "Deutsch Tageor" dedication of war memorials called forth a new militaristic demonstration. The reactionaries plainly were getting out of control and the government of Raymond Poincaré played directly into the hands of this group. So long as the French were in the Ruhr and the Poincaré spirit dominated the European situation ample evidence was at hand with which the anti-Republican propaganda of the German monarchists might be bolstered up.

The Herriot policy, however, changed the face of things in Germany. Henceforth France failed to lend comfort to the Ludendorff-Hitler elements. For the first time it was apparent, in Germany, that the overthrow of the republic was the real purpose of these forces, a purpose which heretofore they had attempted to hide beneath the anti-French agitation. The German political situation was considerably clarified. The issue was drawn straight between the Republicans and the anti-Republicans. On the basis of that line-up the German elections of December, 1924, were fought. Had Poincaré remained in power, it is exceedingly unlikely that the Republicans in Germany could have rallied a support of sufficient strength to insure the support for the Dawes

plan which the results of those elections seem to guarantee.

In another and less important direction the policy of Herriot worked for effective settlement. On behalf of the French nation the Premier has submitted to the arbitration of the World Court the question of the "free zones" on the Swiss border. France, it will be recalled, was committed to an irritating tariff system on the border near Geneva. The customs posts there were well back of the frontier itself, and in the border zone Swiss products were received free. The Treaty of Versailles suggested that this system was not satisfactory and asked for settlement. France, under Poincaré, had insisted upon complete control of the neutral zone, and when the Swiss refused to consent to the abrogation of the treaty terms Poincaré took the matter into his own hands and moved the customs posts up to the Swiss border. Against these high-handed methods the Swiss made repeated protest, but to no avail. Upon the accession of Herriot, however, the matter was submitted to arbitration and a conciliatory and honorable settlement reached. Again the policy of international good faith was vindicated.

The practical outworking of this program of Edouard Herriot can best be seen at the London Conference, where the Dawes report was given official sanction, and where, at last, politics gave way to economics as the dominant factor in the

reparations issue. The Conference itself will be considered in the following chapter. It is only necessary to indicate here that the new government in France, standing with the Labor government of Great Britain, furnished a further and unmistakable indication that the international politics of Europe had turned the corner. Prophets of gloom for many months past had pictured the receding tides of European democracy and the rising tides of almost everything undesirable. But developments during the summer and fall of 1924 appear to have robbed the prophecies of any immediate prospect of fulfillment. Ramsay MacDonald fell and Edouard Herriot, as I write, is having serious difficulties of his own. But domestic rather than major foreign questions have snared these statesmen. In the field of international politics the first evidence has appeared of the bankruptcy of reaction.

"It seemed hardly possible," writes Sisley Huddleston, "that there could be a speedy reversal, that France in a few months could recover her old position as one of the moral leaders of mankind."

Mr. Huddleston is a close personal friend of M. Poincaré and his enthusiasm for Poincaré led him to view Herriot's accession to office with skepticism. After Herriot's few months in office, however, Mr. Huddleston could declare: "But the miracle has happened. It happened much more quickly than anybody could have anticipated. The bitter feelings that had been

engendered between France and England were swept away as if by magic; the reparation problem was—at least provisionally—solved by the acceptance and application of the Dawes report; there was a promise to abandon the Ruhr within a stated period of time; more normal peaceful relations between France and Germany were fostered; and the two countries began to hammer out economic and commercial accords; the League of Nations, which had been scoffed at from its earliest days, was suddenly rediscovered, and was foremost in promoting a Protocol that, with all its defects, may at any rate lead to general disarmament. The stigma which had been placed upon France was removed; no longer was she represented to be a militarist country, bellicose and aggressive, ungenerous and unimaginative, immorally taking advantage of her victory; she was now recognized to be peace-loving, inspired by high ideals, striving for the general good.

"That this extraordinary transformation should be brought about in a few months may well appear to be one of the most surprising facts of modern history."[2]

The fact of the bankruptcy of reaction finds support in the results of the German election of December, 1924. In the elections of the spring of 1924 the swing was to the extreme right or left. Now the radical forces, both of the Right and Left, lost heavily. Von Ludendorff suffered a

[2] Atlantic Monthly, January, 1925.

virtual political eclipse. The Socialists, most pacific of Germany's parties, were the heaviest gainers. The anti-Republicans, to be sure, polled a vote of 10,000,000 out of a total vote of approximately 25,000,000; but the increase in the strength of the Center parties is significant of a widespread determination in Germany not only to maintain the machinery of democracy, but to play the game—severe though its requirements may be—with the nations of Europe which are seeking settlement.[3]

Elsewhere in Europe the politics of reaction is being called into question. In Spain the dictatorship of De Rivera is wavering toward collapse. The uproar against Mussolini that followed the murder of the Italian Opposition Deputy Matteoti, in the summer of 1924, has been only partially quieted. The Liberal Opposition in Italy has learned significant lessons from the methods of Mussolini. The present attack on the Italian dictator, which is seriously threatening his political throne, is organized after an aggressive fashion characteristic of Mussolini's own black-

[3] The election of Field Marshal von Hindenburg to the presidency of the German Republic has been widely hailed, particularly in France, as an indication of Germany's drift toward the old nationalism. The significance of Hindenburg's election, however, may be very easily exaggerated. When it is realized, that while Hindenburg was a Protestant, Marx, his opponent, was a Roman Catholic, it becomes apparent that more than political considerations entered into the election. Further, Hindenburg has consistently opposed all efforts to undermine the Republic. At the time of Ludendorff's political escapades, Hindenburg issued public proclamations urging the people to resist such attempts. The Nationalists in Germany, doubtless, rejoice at Hindenburg's election, and the Nationalists in France propose to make political capital of it. In the end, however, it will probably become plain that Hindenburg, himself, will take orders from no one, but will stand as defender of the Republican government under which he was elected.

shirts—though with less of an addiction to the use of violence. The present situation, however, is significant because it affords certain indication that democracy, driven underground by the forces of the Fascisti, has once again dared to show its head and assert its old convictions.

Political futures in Europe are hazardous to forecast. Individual politicians and their parties flit back and forth with confusing rapidity. But so far at any rate as international relationships are concerned the liberal forces of democracy appear now, for the first time since the Armistice, to be definitely in the ascendancy. Ramsay MacDonald leads an opposition party. Edouard Herriot has been succeeded by a government of his own political faith. But a tide has been set going by these two statesmen which their successors will not turn back. Stanley Baldwin, at the head of a Conservative government, has proposed but little alteration save in the Geneva Protocol, MacDonald's foreign policy. Paul Painlevé, who is the successor to Herriot, is committed to policies that are similarly based.

A Labor government in Great Britain and the government of the Bloc des Gauches in France were called to power because Englishmen and Frenchmen wanted peace, not merely a continuance of the war with different weapons. Peace for the first time since 1919 has appeared on the political horizon. There will be difficulties and disagreements and set-back, but no permanent

turning back to the old tactics and the old imbroglios. Europe's major problems have not been solved, but the nations of Europe have clambered out of the political morasses through which for five years they wandered. The first postwar period is ended, and to supplant the chaos that dominated it new methods and a new spirit appear to have brought into being some promise of an ordered and reconstructed Europe.

CHAPTER III

ECONOMIC SETTLEMENT BY COMMON SENSE

Economics and economists, if they had any consideration during the peace conference, were almost wholly ignored thereafter. Political maneuverings, moves and countermoves, a ceaseless playing for position rather completely eliminated common sense, either economic or political, as a factor in Europe from 1919 to 1923. At the end of 1923, however, there were indications that Europe might shake free from some of its political shackles. The failure of those statesmen who rejected any other methods of adjustment than political was patent. Particularly in France and England events were moving toward a fundamental change of policy. How this change came about and its significance I have outlined in the preceding chapter. It is necessary in the present chapter to trace the effect of this new situation upon the major economic problems confronting Europe.

Once politics was dethroned as the arbitrating factor in the task of European settlement, the economic nature of the questions at issue became more than ever apparent. A fundamental diver-

gence of economic outlook, as I have already indicated, lay at the basis of the inability of France and Great Britain to agree upon a common policy. The importance of this fact can scarcely be overestimated. France justly laid claim to reparations and security. To England neither reparations nor security was so vital a question. A considerable body of opinion in England, in fact, looked with favor upon a complete elimination of the German debt in the interest of restored conditions on the Continent, and the revived markets that would result. England's crippled industries constituted her devastated area—less appealing, perhaps, but no less real than that of northern France. An army of unemployed called for a constant outflow of money from the British Treasury—to the total up to 1924 of not less than £400,000,000.

France has called attention to her expenditures —estimated at some ninety billions of francs— for the restoration of the north. But there have been few to assert the sacrifices which Britain has been called upon to make for reconstruction. And between the sums paid out in doles by Britain and the loans of France for rebuilding there is a very vital difference. The loans of France to the north were an investment—an investment that will repay the nation many times over. England's doles, on the other hand, constituted an outgo from which no return can be expected.

In France, of course, the conviction was thor-

oughly established that reparations on a colossal scale could be collected. There was no such conviction in England, however, where the chief interest centered in the speediest possible restoration of normal trade conditions. It has been pointed out (Sisley Huddleston, Atlantic Monthly, January, 1925) that the essential difference lay in the fact that, whereas France was in a serious financial situation, Great Britain's difficulties were chiefly economic. The economic situation in France probably was never more favorable than during these postwar years. Industries were revived, and there was no unemployment problem. But financially, France, having borrowed heavily in the war against Germany's "promise to pay," had fallen upon bad days. Budget balances were fictitiously arrived at. The franc went into a serious slump. The credit of the nation was imperiled.

England, in economic distress, had reestablished her financial situation. While the war was on, England more fully than any other nation met current expenditures from current receipts. And for three years now she has balanced her budget from the national revenue, and that without borrowing. The English people simply buckled up their belts and taxed themselves out of chaos. Three months out of every twelve, the average Englishman's income goes to the state. While the British depended upon themselves, the French, with less hard-headedness and a more fervent

faith in ideal justice, relied upon the Treaty of Versailles.

England, therefore, interested in a speedy restoration of trade conditions on the Continent, appeared to the French to have deserted the Entente because successive British spokesmen refused to press for a reparations settlement which threatened further to disrupt those conditions.

When it came to the question of the occupation of the Ruhr the divergence between the French and British points of view was more than ever apparent. There can hardly be any denying the fact of frequent German defaults in regard to payments stipulated under the Versailles Treaty. The justice of those terms or the actual ability of Germany to meet them is another question. As early as 1920 the fact of the German defaults was recognized by the Allies. At the San Remo conference it was declared—and both Lloyd George and Francesco Nitti are signatories to the document—that "Germany has not complied with her obligations, either as regards the destruction of her war material or the reduction of her forces. Neither in the matter of deliveries of coal, nor in the matter of reparations, or the costs of the armies of occupation."

In July of the same year the Allies advanced the German government 392,000,000 gold marks, with the understanding that Germany was to deliver coal at the rate of two million tons a

month within the next three months. These terms the Germans did not meet, and in February, 1921, the German towns of Düsseldorf, Ruhrort, and Duisburg were occupied by the Allies. In May of the same year the total amount of the German debt was fixed at 132,000,000,000 gold marks, and the German Chancellor, under the threat of an immediate occupation of the Ruhr, accepted the schedule of payments outlined at the London Conference.

Further defaults and the collapse of the mark, however, convinced the French that Germany was deliberately slipping out from under the terms imposed by the Treaty. It was widely believed that German industrialists, operating on the basis of a depreciated currency, were rapidly securing their prewar markets by underselling their competitors, and that the profits of this trade were stored beyond the borders of Germany, safely out of the reach of the Reparation Commission.

This belief has been conclusively disproved by the reports of the McKenna committee. German wealth outside Germany is estimated, in the McKenna report, as 6,750,000,000 gold marks ($1,687,500,000), as compared with the prewar wealth of Germany abroad of 28,000,000,000 gold marks (about $7,000,000,000). But the conviction that German wealth was escaping taxes by fleeing the country increased the demand in France for drastic action.

At the beginning of 1923, after the Reparation Commission recorded a series of fresh defaults, and following the inability of Mr. Bonar Law to secure a four-year moratorium for Germany, France and Belgium marched into the Ruhr. England refused to participate in this enterprise, believing, first, that it was illegal under the terms of the Treaty, and second that military measures were self-defeating as a means for collecting reparations.

France, in possession of the Ruhr, strengthened her position in two important respects. A permanent separation of the Ruhr from Germany settled with considerable finality the question of French security. Germany without the Ruhr would be impotent to threaten France. Further, France in the Ruhr came into possession of the means with which to strengthen her own economic and eventually her own financial situation. It is easy enough to say that German defaults drove France, unwillingly, into the Ruhr. But it is not difficult to contend that the advance of the French was less in the interest of punishing a recalcitrant foe than for the purpose of completely establishing French supremacy on the Continent. The latter appeared the only possible purpose that the occupation of the Ruhr could further.

From the German viewpoint the occupation of the Ruhr was a question of economic survival. Within the Rhineland and the Ruhr there is to

be found a greater proportion of the wealth-producing organization of the country than in all of Germany outside these areas. According to the reports of the British Department of Overseas Trade (Living Age, July 26, 1924), "of Germany's coal reserves 90 per cent are in the occupied territory, 85 per cent of her coal production, 90 per cent of her coke, 77 per cent of her pig iron, 82 per cent of her raw steel, 80 per cent of her rolled goods. The figures relating to the movement of goods in Germany also show the close interrelation between the two areas. In 1920, the last year for which statistics are available, nearly 70 per cent of the goods sent out of the occupied territory went to unoccupied Germany, while over 75 per cent of the goods received by the occupied territory came from the unoccupied territory. The occupied territories which, with the Saar and the Ruhr, comprise 34,600 square kilometers and a population of 11,700,000 representing nearly one fifth of the total and one quarter of the industrial population of Germany, were a very important and a reliable market for many products of the unoccupied portion of Germany."

Recognizing the significance of the occupation of the Ruhr for the general problem of European settlement, England refused to advance with France. This fact gave encouragement to the Germans. The German industrialists, when the first French forces entered the occupied territory,

indicated a willingness, in every way, to facilitate the French in their task. But cooperation soon succeeded to a policy of passive resistance, the whole territory was thrown into a state of violent disorder, and the occupation speedily became more military than industrial in its nature.

Meanwhile forces were at work to lift the whole reparations question out of the field of politics in order that an entirely new approach might be made to it over the road of economics. According to Mr. Lloyd George in a speech in the House of Commons (London Times, January 16, 1924), a proposal to appoint a committee of economic experts to attempt a settlement of the problem was made "in October, 1922, by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, first of all to France. France turned it down. It was then communicated to our Ambassadors by the Secretary of State. He made a speech in December, 1922. . . . He made that speech because nobody took any notice of his communications. He made that in despair. I was under the impression that that was his way of making the offer to Europe, and I thought, frankly, that it was not a very good way of doing it. Then I discovered that Mr. Secretary Hughes communicated it formally to the governments and no notice was taken of it at all."

It was the New Haven speech of Mr. Hughes that brought the question of an Experts' Com-

mission squarely to the forefront of European attention. A year, however, was lost in international bickerings. M. Poincaré was unfriendly to any proposal that appeared to threaten the authority of the Reparation Commission, dominated as it was by the French. And this opposition to the idea of an impartial investigation very definitely injured the cause of France before the world. If France was right, why should an investigation be feared? If the purposes of M. Poincaré were as honest as he professed them to be, what possible objection could he have to the verdict of an impartial commission? The friends of France were at a loss to know how to answer these questions. And M. Poincaré himself was finally forced to accede to the popular demand for an experts' inquiry.

A combination of circumstances served to make that decision inescapable. These might be listed as follows:

1. The complete collapse in the value of German currency.

2. The untenable position of both France and Germany in the Ruhr.

3. The changing political situation in France, England, and Germany, but particularly in France, where the franc was falling, and uncertain financial measures, designed to bolster it, aroused popular disapproval.

4. The certainty that the United States would look with unofficial favor upon such an investiga-

tion and would approve the cooperation of Americans on the committees.

5. The success of the League of Nations plan for the reconstruction of Austria.

Thus on November 30, by a motion of the French, the Reparation Commission unanimously voted the following resolution:

"With a view to studying in accordance with the provisions of Art. 234 of the Treaty of Versailles, the resources as well as the capacity of Germany, and after having given representatives of the country an equitable right of being heard, the Reparation Commission decided to constitute two committees of experts belonging to the Allies and Associated countries.

"One would be charged with seeking methods of balancing the budget and the measures to be taken to stabilize the money.

"The other would have to seek the methods of valuing the return to Germany of the escaped capital."

The United States was invited, both by the Reparation Commission and the German government, to participate in the consideration of the first committee—an invitation which, officially, was not accepted, although the project was given the unofficial benediction of the government. The committees were appointed in December, 1923, with General Charles G. Dawes as chairman of the first and the Rt. Hon. Reginald McKenna, formerly Chancellor of the British Exchequer, as

chairman of the second. The work of the experts was officially undertaken in January, 1924, and their reports made public in the following April.[1]

There was nothing simple about the task that confronted the Dawes Committee. Five years of bickering and blunders had wound the economic situation into an unbelievable tangle. Suspicions and prejudices, fears and hates added psychological perils of a very real sort to the job of untangling the situation. The charter of their rights, contained in the recommendations of the Reparation Commission, was exceedingly vague. And at every turn there were the limitations imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. That with such handicaps the experts evolved so sound a plan is a significant achievement. That it was possible, at the same time and without outraging the feelings of those concerned, to set forth a common-sense statement of the general situation is an equally striking tribute to the resourcefulness of the Committee, and an indication that Europe has traveled some distance from the passions of a few months before.

To General Dawes, certainly, must go a considerable share of the credit for driving through to this achievement. He stated the situation

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[1] Members of the First Committee (World Peace Foundation, Vol. VI, No. 5).
United States: General Charles G. Dawes, Owen D. Young.
Great Britain: Sir Robert Molesworth Kindersley, Sir Josiah Charles Stamp.
France: Jean Parmentier, M. Allix.
Italy: Dr. Alberto Pierlli, Professor Federico Flora.
Belgium: Baron Maurice Houtart, Emile Francqui.

squarely when, on January 14, 1924, he accepted the presidency of the first Committee:

"What is the question to-day? Upon what does the success of this Committee depend—upon the powers of persuasion? Primarily, no. Upon honesty and ability? No. It depends chiefly upon whether in the public mind and conscience of the Allies and of the world there is an adequate conception of the great disaster which faces each ally and Europe unless common sense is crowned king. . . .

"This is no time to mince words. What to-day, at the inception of this work of this Committee, have we found? In the first place we see an impenetrable and colossal fog bank of economic opinion based upon premises of fact which have changed so rapidly as to make the bulk of them worthless, even if they were in agreement. With all due respect to the great ability of these experts who wandered through this gloomy labyrinth, they could not have failed to come out in opposite directions. They were confronted with the necessity of finding stable conclusions where no conditions were stable. . . .

"Now that we are members of a Committee having a definite and authoritatively defined object in view, we are less concerned for the moment with the present capacity of Germany to pay than with the present capacity and courage of this Committee to act. What is the use of deferring plain statement or for this Committee to

waste time in formalities and meaningless courtesies and conventionalities?"

The two phases of the report of the Dawes Committee must be considered separately. First, there are those sections wherein the Committee, without argument, presents an analysis of the fundamental economic situation for the consideration of the Allies and of Germany. From the matter-of-fact impartiality of this analysis one quickly sees that the old revenge psychology had gone into the discard so far as the experts were concerned. "We have approached our task," their report begins, "as business men anxious to obtain effective results. We have been concerned with the technical, not the political, aspects of the problem presented to us." But though there is no discussion of German guilt or of German responsibility, it is recognized that "it is no ordinary debt with which we deal, for Germany suffered inappreciable damage to her territory and her material equipment, and her primary moral obligation is toward those who have suffered so severely through the war."

Nor can German responsibility for assuming a just share of the burdens of European rebuilding be shirked on the plea that the nation is unable to bear them. Attention is called to "Germany's growing and industrious population, her great technical skill, the wealth of her material resources, the development of her agriculture on progressive lines, her eminence in industrial sci-

ence. The railroads are in excellent condition; telephone and telegraph services have been steadily improved, harbors and canals developed, and the industrial organization of the country expanded."

Germany can pay—that the committee found. But the myth of Germany's ability to pay unlimited sums is exploded. Even the total of 132,000,000,000 gold marks, fixed at the London schedule in 1921, is recognized as an impossible figure. To meet the interest and sinking fund on such a debt would require that Germany furnish an annual export balance of $1,900,000,000. The export balance of the United States before the war with fourteen times the area of Germany, with a 50 per cent greater population and average per capita income two and one third times that of Germany, was only $500,000,000. Neither now nor in the distant future will Germany's trade balance mount to so great a sum as that involved in the terms of the London agreement. The annual payments, therefore, are fixed at figures ranging from 1,000,000,000 to 250,000,000,000 gold marks ($238,000,000 to $600,000,000).

It was not within the province of the Dawes Committee to fix a total reparation sum. But it is not difficult to calculate that the principal sum from the annuity of $600,000,000 at five per cent interest and one per cent sinking fund is approximately $10,000,000,000—the sum, apparently, which the Dawes Committee would have named

had it been asked to set a total reparations figure. And $10,000,000,000, it will be recalled, is less than one third of the sum of $32,000,000,000 fixed at the earlier London Conference.

Thus the experts on the one hand dealt with the question of Germany's responsibility, and on the other hand swept aside the mass of economic fiction which through five years had accumulated around the question of Germany's ability to pay.

There were other common-sense declarations in the report. From France as well as from Germany definite concessions were called for. First, there is a recommendation—no less definite because it is indirect—for the evacuation of the Ruhr. The report bases its proposals, among other things, upon "the assumption that the fiscal and economic unity of the Reich will be restored."

Again, the report makes it plain that France cannot delay the setting in order of its own finances until payments are received. Ever since the Armistice French spokesmen have insisted that a balanced budget waited only upon a paying Germany. But a paying Germany under the Dawes plan will not soon put funds at the disposal of the French government. During 1924 and through 1926 the sums collected must be spent "almost exclusively within Germany." And when funds for transfer to the Allies are finally available, the responsibility for making that transfer is wholly upon the creditor nations and not upon Germany. The Dawes Committee had

no authority to inquire into ways and means for setting aright the financial situation of France. And that certainly is one of the most serious problems confronting Europe. The proposals of the experts helped toward its solution.

Having set forth an analysis of the economic situation so far as it related to the question of reparation settlement, the report continues with its specific proposals.

The plan in general involves two principal features. First, Germany is to raise revenue for reparations, provided this revenue can be secured from taxation and from other sources without threatening the financial system of the country. If, at any time, Germany is found to be unable to raise the stipulated amounts, adjustments are to be made accordingly.

As a second feature, the funds thus raised are to be transferred to the Allies, providing such transfer can be made without disturbing the financial stability of Germany, or without working injury to the interests of the creditor nations themselves. When it develops that the transfer of wealth cannot be successfully accomplished collection will be suspended.

As a prerequisite to the operation of this plan the currency of Germany must be maintained stable. To insure the status of the currency a new bank of issue has been established, with reserves in gold, foreign bills of exchange, and deposits in foreign banks. The capital of the new

bank is set at 400,000,000 gold marks, one fourth of which will come from the absorbed Reichsbank and three fourths from the new capital subscribed by German and foreign investors. Although the bank is to be under a German president and managing board, a general board of seven Germans and seven foreigners will share the authority of its control. This bank of issue will redeem the old paper-mark currency of Germany at the rate of a trillion to one. Although the funds of the German government as well as the deposits to the Reparation Account will be intrusted to this bank all loans and advances are carefully safeguarded.

To simplify the more detailed consideration of this plan I will make use of a figure employed by Mr. J. Henry Scattergood in an analysis of the Dawes report in the Annals of the American Academy. Mr. Scattergood likens the reparation account in the German bank to the credit of the Reparation Agent to a tank. The two processes referred to above are the filling of the tank by the Germans and the emptying of the tank by the Reparation Agent for the benefit of the creditor nations.

The tank is filled through three pipes; taxes or budget, railways and industry. The flow through these three pipes begins gradually and attains its full volume only after five years, when it will reach 2,500,000,000 gold marks or approximately $600,000,000 a year. The total flow will be increased beyond that amount if the prosperity

index provided for indicates that Germany is able to pay an increased sum.

Now, for a consideration of the inflow. Through the first pipe—taxes and budget—no money will pass for the first two years except in so far as the budget can be helped by foreign moneys secured by loans, or by the sale of preferred railway stock. In the third year, only $27,500,000 will flow through this pipe; $125,000,000 in the fourth year; and in the fifth year $300,000,000, or one half of the total flow through all pipes combined.

The total reparations for the first year is $250,000,000, a sum which Germany is unable to raise but which has been procured through the $200,000,000 loan which has already been floated.

The second pipe, that of the railways, is fed in two ways: first, by the direct earnings of the railways, themselves, and, second, by the transport tax now laid against all tickets and freights. At present the income from the second source goes to the support of the budget. The railways are government-owned. According to the appraisals of the Dawes Committee, which are based on the currency collapse, they are free from debt. For a period of fifty years the report proposes that they shall be in the hands of a foreign trustee; that they shall be recapitalized on the basis of a new mortgage of eleven gold marks, 2,000,000,000 gold marks new pre-

ferred stock and 13,000,000,000 gold marks new common stock. This new mortgage will bear an interest of five per cent and a one per cent sinking fund, and is to be turned over to the reparation to hold and collect the interest or to sell, if in the future that may be possible. The preferred stock is to be sold within two years in the open market and one fourth of the proceeds will be turned over to the budget, the balance to be used for the railways themselves. The common stock is to be owned by the German government. The first earnings, therefore, of the German railways will, henceforth, flow into the reparations tank through the second pipe.

There remains the third pipe—German industries. These, like the railways, are held to be free from debt. The first earnings of all German industry, through a new bonding amounting to 5,000,000,000 gold marks ($1,250,000,000) is to form the flow through the third pipe. Agriculture only is exempted from this industrial levy.

If the flow is interrupted in any unexpected way, there is an emergency pipe through which any decreased flow in the other pipes may be compensated for. These funds in an emergency would be guaranteed by direct taxation receipts from customs, sugar, tobacco, beer, and alcohol. Thus the annual total of $600,000,000 is made doubly sure.

There is still to be considered the more serious problem of emptying the tank. The tank filled

with gold marks must be emptied in other values. German responsibility ends when the tank is filled with marks. But the Allies do not want payment in terms of marks, and it is therefore their responsibility to convert the sums paid into the tank into acceptable values. The Reparation Agent, aided by a board of experts, is charged with this task, a task which must be carried through without injuring the financial stability of Germany or threatening that of the creditors. To draw out marks from the tank, unless the sum withdrawn is represented by an excess of German exports over imports, would finally involve another collapse of German currency. Thus, in general, it is only by the creation of a favorable balance of German trade that the tank can be emptied in safety. Of course German trade shows no such favorable balance. How that balance will be created the Dawes plan does not specify.

If, of course, the tank cannot be emptied, then there will be an overflow. So a float valve has been provided, by means of which when a certain amount (2,000,000,000 gold marks) has been paid into the tank any further amounts must not flow into the tank itself but be invested by the Reparation Agent in German bonds or loans. Further, if the amount invested reached 2,000,000,000 marks, and the amount in the tank reached 3,000,000,000, payments from all sources will be stopped until the tank can be drawn off. So much for the filling and the emptying of the tank: the

paying by the Germans and the receipt of payment by the Allies.

Now, the entire structure of the Dawes plan depends upon an initial support from outside Germany. The loan of $200,000,000 has already been floated. On the basis of this loan the first year's payments will be made. In addition $75,000,000—the capital of the bank set up under the plan—has also to be floated by foreign investors. At a later time it will be necessary to subscribe $500,000,000 of the new preferred stock in German railways. Thus the initial success of the Dawes plan is dependent, not only upon the willingness of Germany but also upon the confidence of the world's investors in the future of Germany.

There are other conditions to be met if the proposals of the experts' committee are to lead to a solution of the reparation problem. In fact, the widely prevalent idea that the Dawes plan contains within itself the magic for dissolving the reparations difficulties should by now be dispelled. The experts' committee helped Europe to face the facts of the situation. Their greatest achievement perhaps was not the specific proposals advanced, but the success with which they lifted the reparation question out of the realm of politics and gave it a wholesome economic airing. As for the actual payment of reparation by Germany to the Allies, the plan of the experts is hedged about with innumerable "ifs" and "buts." This, of course, was inevitable once the facts of the situa-

tion were squarely faced. But it is plain that the solution of the reparations problem is still some distance in the future, if by solution is meant the payment to France by Germany of sums sufficient to reimburse the French for the amounts expended for the reconstruction of the north.

As we have seen, German payments depend—or, rather, the transfer of those payments, depends—upon a favorable balance of trade. But Germany's present trade position is not altogether promising. In the first place the European markets where, before the war, Germany disposed of seventy-six per cent of her goods sold abroad have been considerably curtailed. In Central Europe only Czecho-Slovakia presents a possible field for German trade expansion. In Western Europe drastic measures of national economy have made it necessary to reduce to a minimum the quantity of goods purchased abroad. Beyond the borders of Europe—in South America and in Asia—trade disorganization makes very unlikely a rapid German advance in the near future. As for the United States a high tariff wall constitutes a barrier to all comers.

Another fact is important in connection with this question of Germany's trade future. According to H. G. Moulton, of the Institute of Economics in Washington, D. C., the lines in which Germany is most efficient and, therefore, best able to compete are iron and steel products, machinery, textiles, chemicals and dyes, leather and leather

articles. But it is in exactly these same lines, Mr. Moulton points out, that the other industrial nations are best fitted to meet the present and potential demands of the world market. That these nations will welcome the rise of German competition in their own pet lines is exceedingly unlikely.

Only in Russia Germany appears to have the start of other nations. But unless Russia makes more rapid progress toward economic stability than is being registered at present that field must remain for some time to come merely a potential source of German trade expansion.

If the payment of reparation to the Allies is dependent upon the establishment of a favorable German trade balance, it is still to be ascertained where the necessary markets will be found. And which of the creditor nations will willingly buy from Germany enough more than is sold to Germany to allow for this transfer of reparation? And what particular industries of their own will the creditor nations suppress in order to leave the market for the products of those industries free for German development?

It is true too that the advent of the rentenmark which gave Germany a stable currency worked considerable temporary disadvantage upon the economic life of the country. Business which had boomed when the mark was sliding has fallen into a slump now that it is necessary to operate on a normal basis. The task which confronted the Germans of pulling themselves over-

night back from the inflation period into this era of normal exchange was no easy undertaking. And the increased prices seriously disturbed the nation's markets and increased unemployment.

These reactions, however, were chiefly temporary. With the end of the inflation there was a speedy return of confidence among the people themselves. The future could be faced with a degree of assurance that was lacking during the inflation. And economic conditions soon reflected this returned confidence. Bank deposits in Berlin for the first eight months of 1924 give barometric evidence of the improved situation (published in the Nation, New York, December 17, 1924).

	Long term deposits		Short term deposits
January	1,300,000	gold marks	12,800,000
February	2,000,000	" "	14,900,000
March	2,850,000	" "	24,000,000
April	3,400,000	" "	19,000,000
May	4,700,000	" "	25,000,000
June	5,700,000	" "	29,000,000
July	6,500,000	" "	27,000,000
August	7,400,000	" "	28,000,000

Writing to the New York Times on December 21, 1924, Ernest H. Newfield pointed out that at the present time "German export carrying trade and re-export have created for the first time since the war an active trade balance. The increase in Germany's requirements in foreign food and foreign-born raw material payable in foreign currencies, is balanced by the proceeds from the export, re-export and carrying trade, which rather

tends to harden the price of the gold mark than to influence it adversely. The more so as all restrictions in trading of foreign exchange have been removed."

"The preparedness of the German industry to react instantaneously to better money conditions is best exemplified by the fact that within four weeks the index figures for wholesale prices show a reduction of from 133.7, in October, to 126.6, in November, 1924. Steel bars have already declined from 121 gold marks per ton to 110 gold marks; unemployment from 473,000 in October to 435,000. The German cotton mills working sixty hours per week operating in October with 58 per cent efficiency are working in November with 97 per cent efficiency.

"Resulting therefrom are the increased port clearings. Hamburg cleared in October, 1924, 1,482,000 tons, against 1,181,000 in September. The capacity of German production instantaneously to react to currency betterment is due to the up-to-dateness and excellency of its equipment, one of the results of the flight of the mark into material values."

But there are other unsolved problems than that of German markets left by the experts. Technically, at any rate, the sum of 132,000,000,000 gold marks, fixed in the London agreement, still stands as the total to be paid by Germany. The experts did not alter—they had no authority to alter—that total. The annual payments, how-

ever, as I have already indicated, are based upon the assumption of a total debt only about one third of the London figure. Sooner or later, if the Dawes plan is to continue in operation, the sum fixed at the London conference of 1921 must be scaled down or a definite period must be set during which the payments under that plan are to run.

Then again the experts' report did not determine how much the Germans have already paid on the reparations account. There are various estimates. The Reparation Commission sets the figure at 8,000,000,000 gold marks. Germany, on the other hand, claims to have paid on reparations and in the fulfillment of other treaty obligations a total of 56,000,000,000 gold marks. The Institute of Economics, however, accepts the middle position and estimates that up to September 30, 1922, Germany had paid a total of between 25,000,000,000 and 26,000,000,000 gold marks. No final solution can be reached on the reparations question until another commission of experts has ascertained, with some degree of accuracy, the amount that Germany—up to the initiation of the Dawes plan—has paid.

The success of the Dawes plan is further conditioned on the restoration of the economic unity of the Reich. This, of course, involved the evacuation of the Ruhr and the restoration to German control of the railroads. After prolonged negotiations an agreement was reached on this issue

following the London Conference in the summer of 1924. As a proof of good faith the French immediately withdrew from the two Baden cities of Offenbourg and Appenweir. On August 30 Dortmund and certain other cities outside the Ruhr, not occupied in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, were evacuated. The agreement itself, dated August 18, 1924, pledges Belgium and France that "provided the agreements of London are freely entered into and are applied in the spirit of loyalty and pacification which has inspired the deliberations of the conference they will proceed to military evacuation of the Ruhr territory, in the maximum period of one year dating from to-day."

Despite the difficulties that still remain to be met in the reparation settlement, the plan set up at the London Conference and ratified almost immediately by a vote of the German Reichstag is the most tangible evidence that Europe has entered a new postwar period. Three weeks after signing the London agreement Germany made a first payment to the Reparation Agent. Before November 20, the total German payments up to August 31, 1925, were in the hands of the Reparation Agent. In less than one month after the London Conference, approximately 50 per cent of the occupied Ruhr territory was free from foreign troops. Railroad and telegraph control was similarly relinquished. Political prisoners were freed. There was widespread rejoicing in

Germany and a marked decrease in anti-French agitation. For the first time serious and friendly consideration was given both in Germany and the Allied nations to the question of German membership in the League of Nations. On October 15, the $200,000,000 loan to Germany, provided for under the Dawes plan, was quickly oversubscribed, England absorbing its quota of the total in less than three hours and the bankers of the United States selling their portion in approximately twelve minutes. Business, apparently, had put the seal of its confidence upon the restoration of Europe.

The Dawes plan has been viewed with a certain amount of exaggerated optimism. In the United States, particularly, a proprietary interest has led to a general belief in the economic infallibility of its proposals. That the plan has definite limitations we have pointed out. A willingness to ignore these limitations either in the United States or in Europe will, most certainly, defeat the purpose for which this new machinery of settlement has been set up.

But after recognizing these facts and giving them due consideration, the Dawes plan still remains the economic Magna Charta for postwar Europe. With it the first postwar period is at an end. The second period has begun. The political and economic fallacies of the Treaty of Versailles will no longer determine the relations between Germany and the Allied nations. A new

document, dictated not by the blinding passions of the war but by calm judgment and common sense, has supplemented—one can almost say supplanted—the Treaty of Versailles as the basis for European economic settlement. And for the first time since the war the victor and the vanquished are met together in good faith and in cooperation upon a common plan for the rebuilding of Europe.

CHAPTER IV

THE NEW CENTRAL EUROPE

Most of the crises in the history of modern Europe seem to have found their origin in Central or Eastern Europe. And the situation in this territory after the war appeared to offer scant hope that in the future it would be any less of a trouble breeder. To Central Europe those prophets of gloom who looked for another cataclysm out of the settlements of the war turned with greatest confidence. Disintegration, conceivably, might not come in Western Europe. In Eastern Europe, however, it could not fail. And every superficial contact with this section of the Continent was rather sure to establish one more firmly in that conviction.

To travel across Central and Eastern Europe, in fact, is much like journeying over some vast patchwork quilt: it is a bewildering experience. A trip from Boston to Denver, with a customs examination at every State line and a different language, different coinage, and a different train in every State would be comparable—except that the States of the American Middle West are many times the size of most of these Central European nations. In the course of one twenty-four hour

period, en route to Russia in the summer of 1924, I paid for my breakfast in German marks, my lunch in Lithuanian lits, dinner in Latvian lats, and the next morning was traveling on Russian roubles. During the entire journey through Europe I was obliged to submit to thirty-three customs examinations. It is difficult, in the face of such evidence, to dissipate the belief that a general collapse in this part of the world is inevitable.

And there are many indications below these surface experiences to lead to the conclusion that the new states of Central and Eastern Europe were carved out of the prewar empires established there, with very little regard for the future. To indicate the problems to which the peace gave rise throughout this territory will require a general review of the terms of settlement. It will be my purpose, in the present chapter, to give such a general review; to state the major issues still outstanding between these nations, and to indicate, as I have done in the two preceding chapters in regard to the nations of Western Europe, that the general political and economic situation has entered upon a new period, and that this period holds out the promise of a cooperative international settlement of many of those problems which heretofore have been regarded as certain harbingers of conflict.

The states included in this survey stretch from the Baltic to the Adriatic, and from the eastern

boundaries of Germany to the Black Sea. Here a number of new nations were called into being from the Central and Eastern European territory of the empires of Germany, Russia, and Austria-Hungary. Here also a number of prewar nations were refounded and their territory increased or decreased on the basis of their alignment for or against the victors.

Of the three empires that shared the prewar control of this territory, Austria-Hungary was the most completely dismembered in the peace. The collapse of Austria came in 1918, followed by the establishment of the Austrian republic and the creation out of territory formerly controlled by Austria, of a North Slav kingdom, Czecho-Slovakia, and a South Slav kingdom, Jugo-Slavia. To complete this dismemberment—later confirmed by the peace conferences—the Rumanian portion of Transylvania broke away to form a part of the Greater Rumania, and Galicia was incorporated within the boundaries of Poland (Isaiah Bowman, *The New World,* p. 206).

Austrian territory was reduced from 116,000 to 32,000 square miles and its population from 28,-500,000 (exclusive of Hungary) to 6,000,000. With Hungary, Austria controlled some seven hundred miles of the Danube and possessed an outlet on the Adriatic. The empire was a geographical and an economic unit. But the war and the partitions of the peace left Austria a landlocked state. Her richest agricultural sec-

tions were joined to Czecho-Slovakia; the sources of raw materials for her industries were likewise lopped off for the benefit of the new states. Practically the sole advantages left to the republic were an unlimited supply of water power, and a geographical location at the hub of Central Europe, where the international lines of commerce seem to meet.

Hungary, in the peace settlements, fared even worse than Austria. Those who have sought for evidence to prove that the treaties of peace served, chiefly, to sow the seeds of war turned more often to Hungary than to any other European state save Germany. That at one time there was some basis for these conclusions cannot be altogether denied. To understand the present situation it is necessary to recount in brief the chaos through which this country has come.

Following the armistice the government of Hungary was overthrown and a new government, represented to be in harmony with the ideals of the Allies, was formed. It was hoped that by this political transformation the nation might escape a harsh peace settlement. It was soon apparent, however, that the Allied powers were unwilling to treat with the new government in any manner different from the other defeated powers. The Hungarian dictators, therefore, resorted to threats to better their position. The country was turned over to a group of Bolshevists, largely imported. For four months (in 1919) the Com-

munists reigned in Budapest. And during four months the stock of Hungary before the world continued rapidly to decline. Then to set the Communist chaos right the Rumanians, in defiance of the Allies, entered the country. What the Reds did not do the Rumanians rather completely accomplished. They occupied Hungary nine months, and when they left, the country was stripped of much of its negotiable property.

Jugo-Slavia and Czecho-Slovakia were equally impatient to have a hand in the pie-carving. The Jugo-Slavs, without any official sanction, occupied certain Hungarian coal fields. The Czechs, before authorization was given at Paris, seized Hungarian territory not awarded as yet to the new Bohemian state. The joint military occupation of Hungary by these three nations was not ended until the Allies brought pressure to bear upon them in the summer of 1920.

These disorders, of course, delayed the peace settlement. And meanwhile Hungary came to be regarded in Europe, and particularly in the neighboring states, as the continent's greatest immediate threat to peace. Consequently, when the time finally came to negotiate terms of settlement there were very few moderating influences present at the peace table to plead for the Hungarians.

As a result the country was reduced from a prewar area of 125,000 square miles to 35,000 square miles, and from a population of 20,900,000 to

7,500,000. Valuable coal deposits still remain, but four fifths of the iron was lost, as were all of the salt beds, timber lands, and water power and a large strip of the nation's finest farming lands. To further complicate matters each of the nations surrounding Hungary was awarded a Hungarian minority of size sufficient to cause considerable concern.

These lopped-off areas of prewar Austria and Hungary, increased by substantial slices from Germany and Russia, comprise the major portions of the territories of the new and reconstituted states that now dot Central and Eastern Europe. Around the Baltic, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the so-called Baltic states, have been carved almost wholly from Russian territory. Russia, under the aggressive leadership of the Romanoffs, established its supremacy over most of this territory in the eighteenth century. Lithuania, which had extended its boundaries in the fourteenth century from the Baltic to the Black Sea and later formed a close union with Poland, fell under Russian control at the time of the partition of Poland in the latter part of the eighteenth century. The state of Estonia was formed out of the Russian province of Estonia, to which about one half of the province of Livonia was added. Latvia comprises the remaining territory of Livonia and the Province of Courland (Isaiah Bowman, The New World, p. 362).

It is important to bear in mind that of these three Baltic states only one, Lithuania, has an historical claim to independence. In Latvia and Estonia the determination to establish self-governing states is based, primarily, upon the desire of the people of these countries to throw off the yoke of foreign exploitation which for centuries has burdened them. Germans, Swedes, and Russians all, in turn and repeatedly, overran the territory that now comprises these small nations. The country is almost wholly agricultural, and peasants, for many generations, have been subjected to oppression. There is very little mineral wealth in these three Baltic states and very little industrial organization. Agricultural products constitute their chief commercial assets; and to create a favorable trade balance by the production of salable commodities constitutes their most serious economic problem.

It is necessary to remember that the future of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania is unavoidably linked up with Russia. Riga, the capital of Latvia, was an important industrial city before the war. But it was in the vast Russian hinterland that markets were found for the products of Riga's factories. To-day, however, there is no such hinterland. Many factories were pointed out to me in Riga which had been closed down ever since the revolution cut off the country from Russia.

This situation makes a common problem for

all of the Baltic states. From an economic point of view one wonders whether they will ever be able to establish prosperity without some sort of working commercial alliance with Russia. At present, however, no such prospect is on the horizon. Nothing, in fact, could be further from the expressed intentions of the politicians of these countries, although, in private, one hears it frequently said that the future is certain to see an Entente of Baltic states with Russia for commercial if for no other purposes.

However serious the problems of survival that confront Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, they can hardly be compared to those of the new Poland. Geography, which has always been at the roots of the tragedy of Polish history, still threatens the nation's stability. The country has never known any of the advantages of natural frontiers. The boundaries fixed since the war offer no more protection than those of the old Poland. And within these boundaries, to further complicate the situation, Poles of differing background are mixed with non-Poles in a hopeless tangle. To understand this confusion it is necessary to know something of the history of Poland itself.

Ancient Poland was first welded into the semblance of a state out of a group of Slavic tribes that had migrated in the sixth century into the valleys and plains between Germany and Russia, which are drained by the Vistula River. To stem

this Slavic advance the Teutons, in the tenth century, organized an advance of their own—a *Drang nach Osten.* It was to stand against the eastward rush of the Germans that the Slavic hordes were organized, under a dynasty of powerful chieftains who ruled in what is now the province of Posen. The stand of these united tribes was successful. The Teutons were halted. The Polish state was born and rapidly grew in strength.

The history of Poland from that time down to the eighteenth century is one of successive invasions and constant struggles, with Tatars, Germans, and Russians. In 1772 there came the first partition, followed in 1793 and 1795 by two further partitions which ended the existence of Poland as an independent state.

For a century and a half the three great powers controlling Europe east of the Rhine each ruled a part of Poland. During the same period three rival religions, disputing for supremacy, each held in its faith a section of the Polish people and made of Poland its battleground. Approximately one half of the Poles were under the rule of imperial Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church; one third comprised a portion of the Roman Catholic Austrian Empire; and the remaining one sixth were under the control of Protestant Germany. And as between political and religious tyranny there was little to choose.

Not only were the Poles divided thus horizon-

tally between three empires and three religions; they were divided vertically into four distinct classes: the peasants, the laborers, the middle class, and the landed gentry. The peasants did not differ greatly from those of other East-European nations, save, perhaps, that they had even less in common with similar groups in Western Europe. The laborers were more western in their outlook and inclined toward radicalism. The middle class represented the merchants and traders, of whom by far the majority were Jews. Highest in the scale stood the landed gentry—aristocrats who boasted town houses and country estates and whose actual service to the nation has frequently been called into question. These four classes in Poland were and are mutually exclusive to a degree not easily understood in the West.

In the face of these divisions, however, the intense national consciousness of the Polish people survived. It survived because it was kept alive among the youth of Poland. From the mystic faith of Polish youth there developed, during the early part of the nineteenth century, a belief in the Messianic mission of the Polish people. In the divine economy the Poles believed that to every nation—and particularly to Poland—some great world mission had been intrusted.

When, after a last futile revolt against Russia in 1863, independence seemed so remote as to be impossible, this faith in the mission of Poland

was badly shaken. But during the period of spiritual depression that followed, two Polish patriots arose to conserve the ideals of Polish nationalism. Sienkiewicz, who told the story of the ultimate triumph of Christianity in *Quo Vadis*, wrote three historical novels picturing the greatness of Poland in the seventeenth century and calling upon Polish youth to uphold that greatness in the face of apparent disaster. The second great personality, Matejko, is Poland's Michelangelo. After forty years' study of Polish history he painted fifteen great canvases immortalizing the greatest events of Polish history. The achievements of these two men served to kindle anew the fires of national spirit among the youth of Poland, and it is to the reconstructive possibilities of this spirit—unorganized and poorly expressed, perhaps—that one must look for the assurance of a united, progressive and tolerant republic.

Neighbor to the new Polish state and linked with it by the ties of a common race, is Czecho-Slovakia. Czecho-Slovakia since the war has served—and admirably—as a balance wheel in the ill-fitting political mechanism which the peace treaties set up in Central Europe. More completely perhaps than any other Central European state, with the exception of Hungary, the survival of Czecho-Slovakia depends upon its international relations. To international relations, therefore, the extraordinary statesmen of the new

Bohemia turned their attention, and with significant results. To the leadership of Thomas G. Masaryk, President, and Edouard Benes, Foreign Minister of Czecho-Slovakia, the world must credit the considerable strides which have been made toward the establishment of economic and political understanding in Central Europe. To this contribution I will return. Here it is necessary to review in brief something of the historical background out of which Czecho-Slovakia has come.

"Dark clouds seem to surround the future of Bohemia." This was the concluding sentence of the last edition of Count Lützow's famous history of Bohemia, written about 1909. For four hundred years the record of Bohemia, which Count Lützow relates, is a story of continual oppression under foreign rulers. Since 1526 this people, who had loved and fought for freedom and liberty in religious and political life, were held in subjection. After the catastrophe at the battle of White Mountain, November 8, 1620, every semblance of Bohemian freedom was destroyed by the combined attack of the troops of Roman Catholic countries sent out to overthrow a state that had followed the leadership of John Huss away from the fold of strict orthodoxy.

The story of the centuries that intervene since the conclusion of the Thirty Years' War is one of the greatest tragedies and at the same time one of the great romances of history. There were

attempted restorations during this period, attempts that were always thwarted. During the nineteenth century a liberal movement swept Bohemia and Czech patriots revived the nationalism of the people in much the same manner that the spirit of the Poles was revived by the writings of Sienkiewicz and the paintings of Matejko. But the great chance did not come until after 1914. Unwillingly forced to fight in the armies of Austria, the Czechs seized the first opportunity to strike, this time successfully, for their freedom, and out of their struggle has come this new Bohemia.

It is impossible to overestimate the strategic importance of Czecho-Slovakia. A glance at the map will indicate how the new republic lies athwart the very center of Central Europe. The Czechs are the most westerly located of all Slav peoples. They are stationed amidst a vast Germanic population that bears upon them from Germany to the north and west and from Austria in the south. The republic borders on five states —Germany, Austria, Hungary, Rumania, and Poland—all of them at one time or another hostile.

The direct railway communications on the routes London-Belgrade-Constantinople, Paris-Warsaw-Moscow, as well as those between Berlin and Vienna or Budapest, on the Constantinople-Salonica line, and the communications between Leningrad-Warsaw-Vienna, and Southern Europe

and the Adriatic all pass through Prague and Czecho-Slovakia. Next to Vienna, therefore, Prague is the most important railway center in Central Europe.

The new state is both agricultural and industrial. It produces food sufficient to supply the nation nine months out of every year. If the ground now used for sugar beets could be utilized for growing grain, the country would be entirely independent of imported foodstuffs. The export of sugar, however, which in 1912 and 1913 amounted to 180,000,000 crowns, more than compensates for the consequent import of grain. Over one half of the total area of Czecho-Slovakia is arable land and only four per cent of this is non-productive. Forty-one per cent of the population of Czecho-Slovakia is engaged in agricultural pursuits.

Although in mineral wealth Czecho-Slovakia is not so generously supplied as some of the neighboring states, there are considerable deposits of coal and iron ore. And it is from the standpoint of industrial development that Czecho-Slovakia derives the greatest economic importance. More than any other Central European nation this is an industrial state. According to statistics compiled in 1913, the present Czech territories contained seventy-two per cent of all the industrial establishments of Austria and sixty-six per cent of the total number of workmen. In the same way the greater part of the industries of the

former Hungary were in the territory of Slovakia. In the fields of domestic economy the great achievement of the founders of the nation has been the reconstruction of this vast industrial machine. That Czecho-Slovakia has been able to assert and maintain a leadership in the task of settling Central Europe is a consequence of the country's ability first to set its own house in order.

Bound by race both to Poland and to Czecho-Slovakia is the state of the South Slavs—Jugo-Slavia. The territory now comprising Jugo-Slavia was first populated by the ancestors of its present inhabitants during the same migrations that in the sixth century populated Poland. Other Slavic peoples, notably the modern Bulgarians and the Slovenes, following these settlements, developed distinctive types different from the parent Slavic type. The chief group of the South Slavs, however, maintained a fundamental unity both of language and of customs. But for one fact they doubtless would have remained a united people. The tribes which settled the territories bordering on the Adriatic—the Dalmatian Coast—accepted Christianity from Rome and with it Western ideas. The Slavs of the interior—Serbia—accepted the Christianity and the civilization that came out of the East. The former people, therefore, the present-day Croats, became Roman Catholics, with a Western viewpoint. The modern Serbs, on the other hand, became Orthodox Greek

Christians with a viewpoint that was distinctly East European.

The powerful empire of the Serbs, built up under the leadership of Emperor Stephen Dushan, collapsed in the fourteenth century, and shortly thereafter the whole territory fell under the rule of the Turks. Croatia, alone, escaped this fate by coming under the rule of the Austrian house of Hapsburg. During this period of Turkish oppression the Serbs maintained their Greek Orthodox faith, but a considerable portion of the population of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina embraced Mohammedanism and thus effectively cut the ties of race that previously united them with neighboring Slavic peoples.

The modern Serbian state was established in 1830, after an extended conflict with Turkey. More than one half the Serbs, however, remained under Turkish rule, and a dream of a union of all South Slav peoples which arose during the nineteenth century, created a new race-consciousness among the Slavs themselves and considerable uneasiness among the statesmen of Austria-Hungary. The Jugo-Slav question was precipitated upon the stage of European politics when, in 1908, Austria officially annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Henceforth Serbia, backed by Russia, boasted openly that the South Slavs would be united at the expense of Austria. And Austria, backed by Germany, made no secret of her intention to crush the Serbs. When the Serbians

emerged victorious from the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 the determination of Austria to destroy this rising power was more than ever fixed. The stage was all set therefore, and in Bosnia, in 1914, the catastrophe was precipitated.

The new state of the South Slavs comprises the old kingdom of Serbia, to which have been added Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia, a bit of western Bulgaria, and also a section of the Banat of Temesvar. Inside this territory the population is exceedingly heterogeneous. There are altogether some 12,000,000 inhabitants of the new state, of whom 6,000,000 are Serbs; 2,500,000 Croats; 1,000,000 Slovenes; 550,000 Macedonians; 450,000 Magyars; 250,000 Albanians; 625,000 Mohammedan Serbs; 150,000 Rumanians; 450,000 Germans, and odds and ends to the extent of 175,000 (Bowman, p. 253).

While the country is chiefly agricultural, its territory contains considerable mineral wealth, although the country is very poor in coal. There are valuable deposits of iron and manganese as well as silver and gold. The country has access to the sea and ample means for water transportation. Railway communications, however, are poorly developed and the general industrial development of the country waits upon the arrival of capital and the leadership of trained industrial technicians.

The political difficulties confronting the new

state arise from a number of causes. The boundaries of Jugo-Slavia save for a few miles along the Greek frontier, skirt unfriendly territory. So generously were the frontiers of the new state marked out that its stability is seriously menaced by the elements over which it is obliged to maintain control. The most serious internal political threat is in the peculiar distribution of the ethnic elements of the Slav state, whereby peninsulas of Slav population interlock with those of other nationalities in a way that makes it impossible to divide the territory without leaving both sides resentful. This refers particularly to the inclusion of Magyars in the north, Bulgars in the east, and Montenegrans and Albanians in the west.

But more serious than this apparent violation of racial and geographical considerations is the political organization of the state itself. The Pact of Corfu, which laid the basis for the national organization of Jugo-Slavia in 1917, declares, among other things, that "The kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes shall be a democratic, constitutional, and parliamentary monarchy under the Karageorgevichs, whose three conational parts shall have a single allegiance."

Under the actual government set up and, during most of the last six years, directed by the extraordinary statesman, Nicholas Pashitch, this cooperation has existed only in theory. Pashitch, himself a Serb of the Serbs, has directed an all-Serb government. The other elements in the

political life of the new state were without governmental representation. During the recent ministry of Davidovitch, which has since succeeded to Pashitch, the first attempt was made to create a genuinely national government. The Slovenians, the Croats, and Mohammedans and other groups previously not included in the cabinets were given portfolios along with the Serbs. Even Steppan Raditch, the recalcitrant leader of the Croatian peasants, expressed, temporarily, a willingness to join with the government of Davidovitch. Now that Pashitch has returned to power, Raditch and the seventy members who follow him have withdrawn their support, and once again are boycotting the government. It must be said that the tendency, under Davidovitch, and the purpose behind the actions of Raditch is to further the establishment in Jugo-Slavia of a federated state in which local autonomy will be granted to the various political units.

A word needs to be added here regarding the creation of the greater Rumania. The Rumanians threw in their lot with the Allies in 1916. The conquest of the country by a German army under General von Mackensen speedily followed. At Bucharest, in 1918, a treaty of settlement with the Central Powers, depriving Rumania of considerable territory of great value, was drawn up but never signed. Then by the terms of the Armistice of November 11, 1918, Germany renounced the Treaty of Bucharest. The treaties

which followed the Allied victory not only restored the territory which the Central Powers had threatened to cut off but added generous extensions to the country's boundary lines on both the eastern and western frontiers.

Sections of Transylvania, inhabited chiefly by Hungarians with a culture higher than that of their rulers, are placed under Rumanian control. Similarly, in Bukovina, Bessarabia, and the eastern section of the Banat of Temesvar minority groups have been unwillingly incorporated in the Greater Rumania. In Bukovina only 275,000 out of the total population of 800,000 are Rumanian, the remainder being Ruthenians and Germans. In Bessarabia there are approximately 1,000,000 Rumanians out of a population of 2,700,000. In addition the Rumanians are in possession of the Dobrudja, which gives the country a direct frontage on the Black Sea. The southern part of this territory is inhabited by an almost exclusively Bulgarian population. In the Dobrudja, Rumania, if it is to preserve order throughout its territory, has a very considerable task.

The new Rumania, its population increased from 8,000,000 to 16,000,000 and its territory widely extended, is a power of more than ordinary importance in the European balance. The country is very rich in minerals and in farm lands. There is oil in the foothills of the Carpathians. The industrial life of the country has scarcely

been organized. But with port cities on the Danube and the Black Sea the commercial importance of the country is developing rapidly.

It can be seen from this hasty survey that the new boundary lines of Central and Eastern Europe were drawn as victors in war have drawn frontiers from time immemorial. A greater effort doubtless was made to consider the facts of ethnology and of economics than in some of the settlements of previous periods. But the new states that arose in these territories were nationalistic in the extreme. Peoples who had been the oppressed were inclined quickly to turn the oppressor when power was within their reach. To make each of the new states as great as possible involved ignoring of the rights of the older, if enemy states. The same purpose involved also the failure to foresee that all of these nations, old and new, would be obliged for some time to come to live side by side with the alternatives of conflict and disintegration or cooperation and development.

Since I have reviewed, in general, the settlements of the war in Central and Eastern Europe, it will be necessary to enumerate here a number of the major specific problems left unsolved which contain a threat to European peace.

1. The Polish Boundaries. Germany is more than temporarily dissatisfied with the settlement in regard to the Polish Corridor to the Baltic, which included a great German population in the

new Polish state. Nor will Lithuania soon forgive the Poles their occupation of the former Lithuanian capital of Vilna. The Polish frontiers, moreover, are drawn to include some 5,000,000 Russians. Across the border from these Russians their kinsmen are organized into White Russian and Ukrainian national states, with the power of the Soviet behind them. It is a real problem for the Poles to devise some means and administer them wisely enough to keep this Russian population willingly subject to the rule of Poland.

2. The minority problems of Czecho-Slovakia, where of the 14,000,000 population 35 per cent are of different race or language, the 4,000,000 Germans constituting the most serious difficulty.

3. The boundaries of Austria and Hungary, where large populations of highly cultured, intensely nationalistic people have been arbitrarily denationalized by their inclusion within the frontiers of new—and unfriendly—states.

4. The internal political disunity of Jugo-Slavia, complicated by the previously mentioned fact that considerable portions of the new state are populated by Germans and Magyars who have little in common with their new overlords and desire only a reunion with either Austria or Hungary.

5. Rumanian possession of Bessarabia, which stands as a permanent irritant to Russia; and, further, the Rumanian occupation of the Bul-

garian section of the Dobrudja situated on the Black Sea.[1]

To go into detail, of course, would require a considerable extension of these five general sources of international difficulty in Central and Eastern Europe. It is plain enough without such detailed statement that the treaties of peace did not bring permanent settlement in this part of Europe. Having given due consideration, however, to the serious issues left by the war, it still remains true that national and racial justice is more nearly established by these postwar settlements than by the prewar imperial organization of Central and Eastern Europe.

There are oppressed minorities now to be sure. But their numbers are fewer and there are positive indications that their lot has fallen in more pleasant places than the lot of the minorities of prewar Europe. There are national unities which have been violently torn because of the territorial settlements. But the boundary lines, none the less, are certainly drawn much more in accordance with the just aspirations of peoples who had historical claims to independence than the prewar frontiers of this part of the world.

[1] To these there must be added the Bulgarian land problem. The civil strife in Bulgaria, although popularly attributed to the Soviet propaganda, actually has its basis in the inadequate solution of Bulgaria's peasant-land problem. A solution was undertaken by the peasant government under Stamboulisky, but when that government was overthrown the new government represented the bourgeois classes—less than ten per cent of the population—and Stamboulisky's reform measures were promptly scrapped. Discontent with the ruthlessness with which peasant unrest was put down gave rise to the present trouble in Bulgaria and gives promise of continued difficulties until a government more representative of the peasant population—and the peasants comprise ninety per cent of the total—is established.

I have no desire to minimize the seriousness of the problems that remain unsolved. The very fact that an effort has been made to give autonomy to many peoples that were held under the iron control of an empire makes the situation more complex even though fundamental justice has been more directly served. But it is essential to any understanding of postwar Europe to realize that with all the shortcomings of the treaties, to which the partisans of disaster refer with such gloomy eloquence, there is less of fundamental injustice in the postwar than in the prewar organization, and fewer of those violations of human rights, which stand as a permanent threat to peace.

In the face, however, of the very real problems that still remain unsolved the peoples of these new states have had the alternative of two courses open to them. Either they could sullenly refuse to be content short of a wholesale redrafting of the terms of peace, or they could set about to make cooperative approach to these problems in order that, insofar as possible, peaceful solutions might be found without waiting for a redraft of the treaties.

The opponents of the treaties, of course, have asserted that only the first course could avail. And there are many and powerful groups in these new states which are wholly committed to no cooperation until there are new settlements. I recall that I met one spokesman of this "No-order-but-the-old" program on a train bound

from Budapest to Belgrade. He was a Hungarian and formerly a member of the Hungarian Cabinet. We were traveling through the valley of the Danube in that rich section of northern Jugo-Slavia which formerly constituted the most fertile farming section of Hungary. I was having my first experience with the currency of Jugo-Slavia and was uncertain of its value.

"How much," I asked him, "is this money worth in American dollars?" showing him Jugo-Slav notes of different denominations.

He looked at the bills I held out.

"I don't know," he said; "I don't care to know. This is my first trip across this part of Hungary" —he continually referred to the territory as Hungary—"since the war, and I am not familiar with what is going on here."

"You don't think much, then, of the League of Nations plan for Hungarian reconstruction."

"I only think," he replied, "that it is no plan at all."

He pointed out of the carriage window off across the wide stretch of well-cultivated fields to the blue hills beyond the Danube.

"Do you think," he asked, "that there can be any reconstruction which leaves all this out of account? Back there in Budapest politicians are temporarily deceiving themselves that by helping the country's finances they are reconstructing the nation. But it takes more than a stable currency to make a nation."

He looked out of the window again, and then turned to me and there was fire in his eyes.

"You remember this: that an old man, who remembers a greater Hungary, told you that a day of reconstructing will come—a day in which other problems than those of the price of the country's coin will be solved."

That sort of recalcitrance is not uncommon in Europe. It finds support even in the United States. But it is significant that during the last two years political control has very largely passed from this group into the hands of those who are determined to follow a different course; who see the rather apparent fact that the peace treaties will not soon be rewritten and that there is an immediate obligation to bring order out of the chaos left by the war and the peace; and that this order cannot and need not wait indefinitely upon a redrawing of the boundary lines.

It was Bismarck who remarked that if Austria-Hungary did not exist, it would be necessary, for economic and political reasons, to create an Austria-Hungary. Bismarck's outlook did not include the possibility that the races included within this territory could ever, by their own cooperation, maintain economic and political order. But the developments since the war indicate that, by voluntary union, these small succession states propose to carry on the functions formerly performed by the government of the Hapsburgs.

Most definite of the indications that this co-operative policy is in the ascendancy is the development of the Little Entente, which was organized in 1920 under the leadership of Czecho-Slovakia and comprised Rumania, Jugo-Slavia, and Czecho-Slovakia. The foremost purpose of this union, when organized, was to provide defense against Hungary, whose intransigence for a time was a serious threat to peace. But the Hungarian "menace" passed and more constructive purposes entered into the plans of the Little Entente. Poland, sharing similar problems with the three states already allied, was admitted to the organization in 1922. The Quadruple Alliance, thus constituted, comprises a total population of nearly 70,000,000 and under a wise leadership has been a factor of tremendous influence in the maintenance of political and economic unity. Treaties of commerce were concluded not only between the members but also with Austria to the end of re-establishing something of the economic unity that had existed in the Austrian Empire.

In the Russian succession states a similar policy was followed. As I have already indicated, the nations that skirt the Baltic—Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Finland—share common problems. Their economic and political status depends in large measure upon their own interrelation and their relations with other neighbors, notably with Russia. In 1920, therefore, a Baltic Entente was formed including in its membership Lithuania,

Latvia, and Estonia. This too at the outset was a defensive arrangement, designed to guard against the unsettled conditions in Russia and in Poland. But a year later this first union was followed by the organization, under the direction of Poland, of a Baltic League, which included in addition to Poland, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland. Lithuania remained aloof because of hostility to Poland. Thus, through Poland, the members of the Baltic League are linked with those of the Little Entente.

During all of this period the one nation most definitely beyond the pale of this cooperative effort was Hungary. Hungary, following the disorders of the Red regime, was looked upon with disfavor and with considerable fear by the other states of this part of Europe. As I have stated, the Little Entente had as its first purpose a union to assure that the Hungarian threat to peace and to the postwar settlements did not gain headway.

Now, it is significant of the changed atmosphere in this Central European situation that the states of the Little Entente at the present moment are the chief supporters of the League of Nations plan that is actually working the reconstruction of Hungary. It had become plain enough that the economic unity of this section could not be restored without Hungary. It had become evident also that Hungary had passed from the grip of nationalists bent upon revenge to the con-

trol of moderate statesmen such as Count Bethlen, whose program looked to cooperative reconstruction of the state.

It was in April, 1923, that Hungary, its finances in hopeless disorder, appealed to the League of Nations for help. Immediately the representatives of the Little Entente met with Count Bethlen to discuss plans for dealing with the Hungarian problem. It must be remembered that the relations between the Little Entente and Hungary had not been friendly. There were still many questions outstanding between them. In a series of private conferences at Geneva, however, these questions were either settled or put in the way of settlement, and it was possible for the representatives of these states to sit down at the same table and agree upon a plan for reconstruction. And when that plan finally was put into operation those very states that had organized an Entente against Hungary floated among themselves a major portion of the initial Hungarian loan.

And this spirit of cooperation is having a direct effect upon economic conditions. Remedy for the economic blunders of the treaties, as I have pointed out, waited upon a period of international economic cooperation. That period, apparently, is at hand. Hungarian factories, which were closing because they were cut off from supplies of raw materials by the new frontiers, are opening again. Raw materials are coming in across

the boundaries. The flour mills of Budapest—second only to those of Minneapolis—were in difficult straits when the peace treaties assigned much of the wheat lands to other nations which refused to utilize the mills of Hungary. But that situation is improving and the wheat of Jugo-Slavia is beginning to flow toward the mills of Budapest. Trade is rapidly increasing among all of these states.

In one instance a policy of redrafting by force was followed with disastrous consequences. The Turkish resurgence in Southeastern Europe swept the Greeks out of Eastern Thrace and resulted in a realignment of boundaries—a high-handed method of treaty repairing that finds few advocates. In spite of an episode of this nature, and the liability of the recurrence of such episodes in the Balkan theater, there is no question about the fact that the hopes placed in the new economic policy have far greater prospect of coming to fulfillment than those placed in the possibility of a redrafting of treaties.

Thus political and economic cooperation is emerging in Central Europe. It is not too much to predict that the emergence of this policy indicates the establishment of an international union, which without postponing reconstruction until the treaties are redrawn will bring about the adjustment of whatever unwise terms are contained in them. Neither the more powerful among the small states nor the Great Powers themselves will

soon be ready to consider a redrafting of the treaties. There appears, therefore, to be no immediate alternative other than conflict to the further development of this cooperative effort. It is exceedingly unlikely that the conflict-alternative will be accepted, for the constructive accomplishments to the credit of the policy of cooperation are already too apparent and of too great significance. And though there may be no immediate prospect of a United States of Central Europe the road toward that achievement unquestionably has been opened up by the unity of outlook and of action already reached by these postwar states.

CHAPTER V

THE RUSSIAN RIDDLE

THERE is no understanding of Russia under the Soviets short of an understanding of Russia before the revolution. The world has been appalled by the reported atrocities of the "Reds." Governments have washed their hands of all dealings with a political establishment so ruthless. And in all of this bitterness against the present regime the older regime has come to be, in the minds of exiled Russians and those who harken to their interpretations, a sort of golden age to which the country must return if ever it is to be saved. The exact nature of that old regime is scarcely ever questioned. Russian history, which is extraordinarily revealing, is very little read. So the fact is wholly overlooked that, good or bad, the Soviet government is a result of actual conditions which existed in prewar Russia, which made the Russian revolution as inevitable as similar conditions throughout history have made other revolutions inevitable.

It is necessary to dwell upon this fact because of the widespread conviction that the revolution and Soviet rule are less the result of definite forces which were operating generations before the World War than a reflection of the total depravity of a minority group in Russia who were

clever enough at the right moment to swing into power, which they have since exercised as ruthless opportunists. If even a fraction of the consideration were given to a study of the historical background of the Russian revolution which is given to anathematizing the Soviets and all their works, there would be fewer unthinking assaults upon the present Russian government and more of that understanding of the good and the evil in the present regime which must come before constructive help can be extended to the Russian people.

Woodrow Wilson, writing in the Atlantic Monthly on "The Road Away from Revolution," gave a solemn warning to those who superficially ignore the forces that have made and are making for revolution. "There must be," he writes, "some real ground for the universal unrest and perturbation. . . . It probably lies deep in the sources of the spiritual life of our time. It leads to revolution; and perhaps if we take the case of the Russian Revolution, the outstanding event of its kind in our age, we may find a good deal of instruction for our judgment of present critical situations and circumstances.

"What gave rise to the Russian Revolution? The answer can only be that it was the product of a whole social system. . . . It was due to the systematic denial of the great body of Russians of the rights and privileges which all normal men desire."

It is a tribute to the effectiveness of propa-

ganda, however, that the real character of "the whole social system" which Mr. Wilson declared at the basis of the Russian revolution has been generously obscured by those who have persistently painted its virtues.

To call to mind a few of these historical facts in regard to prewar Russia may make it apparent that, whatever other changes must come in present-day Russia, a return to the old order can never be accepted as an alternative that is either probable or to be desired.

Lord Bryce (*Modern Democracies,* Vol. II, p. 540, by courtesy The Macmillan Co.) describes Russia, "where venal bureaucracies worked the ruin of both countries, creating habits which it may take generations to cure and destroying the respect of the nation for the sovereigns who tolerated it."

More specifically, H. G. Wells in his *Outline of History* (p. 1025, by courtesy The Macmillan Co.), asserts that "while all the world to the west of her was changing rapidly, Russia throughout the nineteenth century changed very slowly indeed. At the end of the nineteenth century, as at its beginning, she was still a grand monarchy of the later seventeenth-century type. Standing on a basis of barbarism, she was still at a stage where court intrigues and imperial favorites could control her international relations."

Of the government prior to the revolution, Professor Carleton J. H. Hayes (*The Political and*

Social History of Modern Europe, p. 809, by courtesy of The Macmillan Co.) writes:

"Nicholas II might have won undying fame and glory if he had had the farsighted genius to fulfill the expectations of his subjects. Unfortunately, he was narrow and stubborn. Surrounded by reactionary nobles, priests, and bureaucrats, he perceived in the popular enthusiasm for the Great War merely a favorable opportunity for extending Russia's boundaries and for strengthening autocracy within his dominions. He granted no practical favor to any subject nationality. He took counsel with no leader of any radical party. He persistently refused to broaden the suffrage or to make the ministry responsible to the Duma or to consent to any other democratic reform. He similarly gave no heed to the demands for social and economic reform."

Hutton Webster in his *World History* (p. 528) comments similarly:

"The accession of Nicholas II brought no change in the political situation. . . . The young man was amiable and well meaning but as much an autocrat as any of his predecessors. The reactionaries surrounding him now redoubled their efforts to keep Russia 'frozen.' Teachers, students, journalists, professional men, in fact, everyone who dared think aloud suffered under the iron regime.

"No person was secure from arbitrary arrest,

imprisonment, exile or execution. . . . When the World War broke out, the corrupt and inefficient autocracy seemed to be as firmly seated as ever in Russia."

Further evidence of this sort is presented by Isaiah Bowman in *The New World* (pp. 382-83, The World Book Co.), who declares:

"While Russia before the World War was a big, rich country, the Czar was a weak ruler surrounded by selfish and reactionary advisers. The real rulers were the Grand Dukes, the high government officials, and the nobility in general who numbered about one hundred and forty thousand families. It was this group who put into motion schemes for robbing the people, for exiling to Siberia leaders who manifested any independence of political thought; and it was they who were responsible for the bad management of the war when, through graft and inefficiency, millions of Russians were obliged to fight under every sort of handicap. . . .

"In short the Czar and his advisers and the thousands of nobility learned that the strength of their system lay in the ignorance of the peasant; their wealth and privilege were gained at the expense of the misery of the peasant. When the masses also learned this they were not long in seeking a remedy, however drastic. Of immediate importance to them was the fact that the old regime had to go; the only question was the manner of its going."

Before the Station in the city of Leningrad there stands the huge monument to the Emperor Alexander III. It would be difficult to imagine a more striking representation of insolent autocracy—sneering, intolerant, cruel. When Petrograd, in the November Revolution of 1917, passed from the control of the Romanoffs to that of the Revolutionaries, the Bolshevist leaders did not destroy this statue. Instead they placed under it this significant inscription: "My father and son during their lifetime paid the price of tyranny (both were assassinated), while I stand here as a miserable scarecrow to warn all nations of the sin of autocracy."

There is more than crudity in that inscription. There is a rather definite reflection of the facts of Russian history, facts worthy of the most serious consideration because of their wider import. Those facts cannot be shunned by those who seek to understand the Russia of to-day any more than they can be overlooked by those who seek to interpret the world significance of the Revolution.

The spirit of revolt was spreading rapidly in Russia in 1916. The conduct of the war aroused the most patriotic among the officers to make protests to the authorities. But the protests went unheeded. There was an ominous stirring among nationalities held by force under the Czarist domination. The middle-class Russians themselves openly criticized the government. The

peasants were rebellious. An extraordinarily severe winter made country life even more unendurable than usual.

Early in 1917, on March 11 in fact, the hand of the Czars made a last attempt to stay the rising tide of rebellion. The members of the Duma, sitting in futile session, were ordered to their homes. The workingmen of the city of Petrograd, leaders in the expressions of unrest, were ordered to return to work, to discontinue permanently their strifes and their protests to the authorities. These decrees were issued with all of the old flamboyancy of autocracy in the heyday of its powers. But they were only the hollow echoes of authority among a people who had suddenly come to consciousness. They precipitated the revolution.

The Holy One of the Russias—returning to Petrograd by special train—was held up by railway employees. Workingmen in the city formed an alliance with a considerable force of the military garrison. The first "Soviet"—the "soldiers and workingmen's" council—was immediately organized to carry on the functions of local government. The Duma remained in session and petitioned the Czar to appoint a new and liberal ministry to effect a compromise with the forces of revolt.

But "liberalism"—from the Czars—had too often in the past served as a cloak to cover the ruthlessness of an autocracy that was merely bid-

ing its time. Now, however, there could be no compromise.

The Czar followed the only course open to him. On the 15th of March he abdicated in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael. But the day of the Romanoffs was ended, and the Grand Duke was too aware of that fact to assume the imperial robes and titles. A Provisional Government was set up with the Duma and the Soviet in a working alliance. Prince George Lovov, a liberal member of the nobility, was made president and associated with him were eight other members of the Constitutional Democratic Party, three members of the Octobrists—a more conservative faction—and Alexander Kerensky, a Social Revolutionary and representative of the Petrograd Soviet. This was a liberal government when compared to the government it supplanted, but it was exceedingly conservative when compared to the government that succeeded it. Reliance for the success of democracy in Russia was placed primarily upon the business and professional groups—highly respectable, bourgeois elements. The peasants and the workers were given only secondary and incidental consideration at this stage.

The Provisional Government, however, immediately instituted liberal reforms—freedom of the press, of religion, and of associations. It liberated political prisoners, conferred the right of self-determination to Finland, and promised the same privilege to Poland. It announced that the

limits of suffrage would soon be extended, and at the same time every effort was made to stimulate a genuinely patriotic support for the war against Germany.

But the Provisional Government, admirable though it was in its expressed purposes, was in no position to cope with the rising tide of class-conscious workingmen and peasants. The new officials were linked with the Duma. The Duma was under the cloud of too close association with the Czar. Nor were the members of the government truly representative of the Russian people themselves. They knew little of the new hopes and determinations that were stirring among the masses. The peasants could not be enthusiastically enlisted in further support of the war. They did not hate the Germans. The war was not their making, nor did a victory appear to promise anything of positive good to them. They wanted, above all else, to return to their homes, to secure possession of the land and be left in peace.

As a consequence, following the revolution in the spring of 1917, there were frequent uprisings in the rural districts. Peasants refused to pay taxes. They organized Soviets of workingmen, soldiers, and peasants—modeled on the Petrograd plan. The Soviet power spread to the army. Discipline declined. Active fighting ceased in many places. To the furtherance of this end German agents were busy supporting everything

that aimed to end hostilities. And during all of this time exiled revolutionaries—men and women who found scant satisfaction in the middle-of-the-road government of Prince Lovov—were returning to Russia to aid in the agitation.

Finally, in May, 1917, the Provisional Government was reconstituted with Alexander Kerensky at its head. But Kerensky was in an impossible situation. Had he been a genius of the type of Napoleon or Mussolini or Lenin, he might have stemmed the tide that rose against him. But he was not a genius. He was torn between the conservatism of the Constitutional Democrats and the radicalism of the Bolshevists. The Allies refused to agree to his proposals for a peace with "no annexations and no indemnities," and without assurances of that kind of a peace he was unable to maintain a fighting front. And during all of this time the Bolshevists, reenforced by the return of their fugitive leaders, were growing in power with the Soviets.

In November, 1917, the Kerensky regime, toppling through several weeks, collapsed. The Bolshevists, on the night of November 6, occupied the public buildings of Petrograd. The members of the Provisional Government were soon after placed under arrest—Kerensky alone managing to escape. Middle-class reformers were imprisoned or put to rout. The Bolshevists were supreme. And they proceeded forthwith to destroy the remnants of the old Russian social structure

in preparation for their promised proletarian rebuilding.

At the head of the Bolshevist government was Nickolai Lenin, a member by birth of the Russian nobility. In his youth Lenin fell under the influence of the writings of Karl Marx. His own experience at the hands of the Czarist emissaries; his presence at the summary execution of his brother all combined to prepare him for leadership in the ranks of the revolutionists. For an almost continuous period since 1900 Lenin had lived in exile. But his genius for leadership expressed itself through his writings, and the workers and peasants of Russia—those who were class conscious—looked more and more to him as the Messiah of the revolution.

It is too soon to pass historical judgment on Lenin. It can be said, however, that contemporaneous opinions of revolutionary leaders almost without exception prove, when their history is written, to have been the exaggerated expression of prejudice rather than the sound conclusion of an objective study. This doubtless will be more than ordinarily true of Lenin. Of no other character in world history—with the possible exception of the German Kaiser—have the agencies of modern propaganda, with no more regard than usual for the facts, established a more definite, popular conviction. The real Lenin has yet to be appraised. To revolutionists in Russia and out Lenin is the Great Deliverer.

To most nonrevolutionists he is the personification of brute atrociousness, with brains. The revolutionary opinion has the advantage of a greater degree of familiarity with the man himself and with his achievements. But neither opinion can be accepted as accurate. It can be said, with definiteness, however, that Lenin was and is—even since his death—the genius of the Revolution. He was an ardent Communist, but he was also a political and an economic realist. In these latter qualifications there was hope that, had he lived, the political and economic evolution of Russia would have gone forward more rapidly, through compromises, toward the establishment of a sounder government. Of those who remained powerful in the party at his death only Trotsky shared his foresight and his realism. And now that Trotsky, temporarily at least, is at odds with the party, the triumvirate of Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kameneff stands prepared to block any save those concessions which are absolutely essential to the country's salvation.

It was a Communistic state which Lenin, Trotsky, and those allied with them set out to establish. That Communism, even in Russia, has not had adequate trial will be maintained by all of those, even Russians, who hold to Communist doctrines. But that Communism is and will continue to be an issue in Europe and throughout the world cannot be denied. And the most serious aspect of the so-called Communist menace is not the

propaganda activities of its paid agents but the deliberate refusal of intelligent people to study it.

Lord Bryce described the Communist state as one "in which private property has disappeared, every man working for the community only, while the community, allotting to him the particular work which he is to do, gives him in return a due provision of food, lodging, and clothing for the daily needs of himself and family" (*Modern Democracies*, Vol. II, p. 587, by courtesy of The Macmillan Company).

The great prophet of theoretical Communism was Karl Marx, as Lenin was the prophet of practical Communism. It cannot be said that the ideas of Marx were wholly original, but he imparted to the movement the fire of prophecy. Henceforth it was a great crusade. In the Communism of to-day it is less the teachings of Marx than his spirit that survives.

The doctrines of Marx aimed, of course, at the complete destruction of the capitalist system. The evils of the world, he asserted, found their source in capitalism—war, economic slavery, poverty, ignorance. In the Communist Manifesto, written in 1847, Marxism is given concentrated expression. The industrial era, he declared, ushered in the rule of bourgeoisie, who first assumed social and economic power when they revolted against the landed aristocracy. The rule of the bourgeoisie witnessed increased production, the desocializing of industrial life, the increase of working-

men's discontent. To save themselves the laborers organized. They are met with bitter opposition from the bourgeois capitalists. The revolution thus becomes inevitable. The strength of labor increases until it is irresistible and, as a final revolutionary act, Capitalism is overthrown and the Communist state established to supplant it.

It is significant that Marx recognized the necessity for the use of both political and revolutionary methods. He advocated violence and revealed a faith in politics. He has been hailed as a friend of both constitutional and nonconstitutional programs (Ramsay MacDonald, *Socialism Critical and Constructive*, p. 56, Bobbs-Merrill Co.).

Present-day Communists, in their adaptation of Marxian teachings, have as their aim the ending, by violent methods, of the period of "capitalistic exploitation." They define exploitation as the gathering by one man of the fruits of another man's labor. Since there appears no way whereby without strife groups of laborers can own their own machinery and operate their own factories, the Communists propose that all of the instruments of production shall be in the hands of the state.

No distinction is made, in Communist economics, between landowners and factory owners. Both are to be summarily got rid of. Factory owners growing fat from the labor of their employees are as disgusting a spectacle as landowners lolling in wealth which peasant labor has

accumulated. The laborers themselves in factories and on farms are to assume full control of all of the machinery and products of their toil.

Now, it is necessary that the distinction between Socialism and Communism be clearly maintained. Present-day Communists argue that there is no hope in political means for the overthrow of capitalism. Democracy is held to be inherently under the control of the capitalists and, therefore, can never develop, from its own materials, any other system than capitalism. Communism, therefore, is founded upon the necessity for revolutionary methods. There must be, according to Communist theory, a period of violence, a period which will inaugurate the dictatorship of the proletariat. During the dictatorship of the proletariat the influence of the bourgeois element will be completely destroyed and the proletariat will be trained to administer for themselves the affairs of the Communist state.

The Socialists, though the system they hope to establish may not differ greatly from that of the Communists, are committed to a wholly different method. The Socialists deny that democracy is inherently capitalistic. They assert their allegiance to parliamentary procedure, and to the establishment through a process of political and economic evolution of the Socialist state, wherein will be developed "the organization of the material economic forces of society and their control by the human forces" (MacDonald, p. 43).

Neither the Communists nor the Socialists, by virtue of their belief that capitalism must be supplanted, deserve to be outlawed. Nor are the Socialist and Communist arguments met when Socialists and Communists are branded with unintelligent epithets. "To assume," write the Webbs, "as our capitalist statesmen and their journalists commonly do, that the proletarian combatants must know themselves to be criminals, and are mere looters of society without any conscientious sanction, can only lead to a most perilous undervaluation of the strength and persistence of the revolutionary forces at work in the world" (*The Decay of Capitalist Civilization*, p. 221, quoted by Edward Alsworth Ross, *The Russian Soviet Republic*, p. 6).

The Constitution of the Bolshevist state incorporated the fundamentals of Communist doctrines. Franchise was extended only to those citizens of both sexes who were eighteen years of age and "who obtain their means of livelihood by productive and socially useful labor, as well as persons engaged in housekeeping which enables the former to do productive work, that is, laborers and employees of all classes." The right to vote, however, is not forfeited when the individual, for one cause or another, is incapacitated for "productive or socially useful labor."

Those who are refused the right of franchise comprise five classes (Ross, p. 318):

1. Persons employing hired labor for profit.

2. Persons who have an income without doing any work, such as interest from capital, rentals from property, etc.

3. Private merchants, traders, and commercial brokers.

4. Monks and clergy of all denominations.

5. Employees and agents of the former police, the gendarme corps and the Czar's secret service.

The exercise of political authority is through industrial units rather than geographical units. The village commune is at the base of the Soviet political hierarchy. All workers in this unit unite to elect their officers, to determine matters of local government and to appoint representatives to the township Soviet, the Volost, where matters of wider concern are considered and delegates, in turn elected to the county Soviet—the Uyezd, a representative being chosen for every one thousand inhabitants. Next in the scale comes the provincial Congress of Soviets, where the peasant representatives meet with the representatives from the workingmen's units of those towns which do not exceed a population of 10,000. Here delegates are chosen to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets which convenes in Moscow twice each year. To the All-Russian Congress—the national legislative body of Russia—come the representatives of both the provincial Congresses and the city Soviets; the provincial bodies having one delegate for every 125,000 inhabitants, and the cities one delegate for every 25,000 inhabitants.

Now, the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in its turn, elects a Central Executive Committee. The Central Committee is, in reality, the governing body of Russia. The All-Russian Congress is composed of several thousand delegates. It meets but a few days out of every year. Its members, many of them, possess very few of the rudiments of political education. The business it transacts, therefore, is of a most general nature, the actual administration of affairs being left almost wholly in the hands of the Central Executive Committee.

From its own number the Central Executive Committee elects the Council of the People's Commissars. The Commissars constitute what might be termed the Cabinet of the Soviet government. They are the executive agents of the Central Executive Committee. The Commissars elect a president and a vice-president and the heads of the sixteen Commissariats as follows: Foreign Affairs, Army and Navy, Foreign Trade, Transportation, Posts and Telegraph, Labor, Food, Finance, Workmen-Peasant Inspection, People's Economy, Agriculture, Health, Justice, Education, Internal Affairs, and Social Welfare.

The Federation of Soviet Socialists Republics is composed of eleven autonomous Socialist Soviet Republics, of which seven are in European and four in Asiatic Russia. The administration within these autonomous republics is based upon the Soviet organization with a hierarchy of local

Soviets, Congresses and Central Committees and Central Executive Committees. Certain administrative departments, such as Food, Finance, and Labor, are under the jurisdiction of the Moscow Departments. In the Departments of Justice, Education, Health, Agriculture, Internal Affairs, and Social Welfare a certain degree of administrative independence has been granted.

It is significant to note that in the Soviet political organization the city is much more powerful than the country. The peasants, so those in authority maintain, are not in a position as yet to exercise the same political authority as the worker. Consequently, through the system of percentage representation that has been worked out, and because the urban citizen can elect delegates at the same time both to the county and provincial or to the provincial and national Congresses, the city worker is vested with approximately four times as much political power as the peasant.

In theory, the political organization, from the village commune to the Central Executive Committee and the Council of the People's Commissars, functions as a democracy. "Power," says the Soviet Declaration of Rights, "must be now wholly and exclusively in the hands of the toiling masses and of their representative organs—the Soviets of Workmen, Soldiers and Peasant Deputies." In keeping with this conception the village becomes a Town Meeting; the Provincial

Congress a State Legislature, and the All-Russian Congress, a National Legislature.

But the actual practice of Government in Russia, despite this theoretical basis of democracy, is not democratic. There are approximately 700,000 members of the Communist Party in Russia. There are doubtless many thousand of Communist supporters outside the party in Russia. It is an interesting fact, in this connection, that in New York, in 1920, although there were but 12,000 Socialist Party members, there were 176,000 Socialist Party voters; and that in Vladivostock in 1918, although there were but 300 Communist Party members, there were 12,000 Communist Party voters (A. R. Williams, *Through the Russian Revolution*, p. 178, footnote).

It is not easy to gain access to the Russian Communist Party. Only those are accepted whose loyalty and ability has been severely tried. An ever-vigilant watch is maintained, particularly upon new members, and periodically there are "cleansings" when hundreds, and even thousands, of those whose loyalty to the Communist principles or the Communist standard of living have been questioned are read out of the party. Following controversy with Trotsky early in 1924, 70,000 Trotsky sympathizers were expelled.

It can be further said that the Soviet courts deal with Communist offenders with much greater severity than with non-Communists. A recent

and most striking illustration of this is found in the trial of the former president of the Far Eastern Republic of Siberia, and at the time of the trial of the president of the State Bank of Moscow. No accusation was sustained against this man save that he had used his office for profit and with the wealth acquired had violated the Communist standards of living. Where the party stood for simplicity he had lived luxuriously. Where the party urged moderation in all things he had dissipated. The result was a verdict of "guilty" and a sentence of six years in prison.

Thus the party discipline and morale are maintained. It is doubtful if in any nonmilitary organization in the world there is a higher *esprit de corps* than that existing among the members of the Russian Communist Party. And in the last analysis the whole of the political organization of the Soviets is based upon this loyalty of the individual party members. Scattered throughout Russia, represented in every village commune and in every factory Soviet, the party members are the spokesmen of Moscow. They are the right arm of the Kremlin, and the Central Executive Committee stretched out into the remotest section of the Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics. Upon their discipline and faithfulness the whole structure of the Soviet government is based. And through their activities the working of democracy in Soviet Russia is thwarted.

Thus, when the village Commune is convened,

the party members, living in that particular community, or sent into it temporarily, are the virtual dictators of affairs. There is, to be sure, much more freedom of discussion than under the prewar government of Russia, but when it comes down to the brass tacks of definite action, the party members step in with their own—the Moscow—program. For the election of delegates to the Volost, or to the provincial party Congress, the Communists have, in advance, a slate of acceptable candidates. From that list the voters of the community are obliged to choose their representatives, and thus the election of delegates favorable to the central authority is assured.

I heard of one village Soviet—somewhere in Georgia—that rose in revolt; tossed out the Communist dictators together with their slate of candidates; and proceeded to settle their own problems and elect their own candidates. Whether these candidates ever reached the party Congress to which they were elected is exceedingly doubtful.

The workings of the machinery of Soviet democracy can be seen at close range in the ingenious scheme which has been devised for the municipal management of houses in Moscow. The Moscow Soviet owns all—or practically all—of the houses. There are few small houses in the city, most of them being of the apartment-house type. In each house, therefore, the government has set up a house committee—the agent for the demo-

cratic administration of house affairs. Members of this committee are chosen by the citizen residents of the house; that is, by those who are "engaged in productive or socially useful occupations." But here the alloy of autocracy enters in. Previous to the voting for the committee, the Communist Party members resident in the house frame up the list of acceptable candidates. The voting is confined to this selected list. Here too there have been some revolts. But the housing shortage is altogether too acute to lead the average non-Communist to risk his allotted space by a vote against the party nominees.

The loyalty of the party members is much less an intangible basis for the Soviet political organization than, at first sight, appears. To the Communists the program for which the party stands represents world emancipation as it has meant their own personal emancipation. To the workers in particular Communism represents the millennium. Loyalty to the Communist program is no mere lip service. Their world began with the Revolution. An eight-hour day, decent living quarters, school for the children, a place and time to play, a part in politics—all this and more the Revolution means to the workers in Russia's factories.

At almost any gathering of Communists one sees this spirit reflected. I stood one night on the platform of the State Opera House in Moscow when the Moscow Trades Unions entertained

the visiting delegates of the Red Trade Unions' International. From the platform one looked out upon a wide panorama of red and gold—a setting for gatherings of a different sort. Five tiers of balconies ran out from the stage, like heavy slips of carved gold bands against red velvet. Silver lights circled the room and a silver chandelier, hung with laced crystal, swung from the ceiling. The auditorium, from the first row to the topmost box, was filled with Trade-Unionists.

I could not agree with the sentiments expressed by the speakers that night, but their devotion to the ideals which they upheld could not be questioned. And they sang the "International" with religious fervor. Most of those near me were young people. When the song began they straightened up like soldiers standing at attention, and everyone sang as only Russians can sing. Not only the voices but the eyes of these workers were in the song. To them, however deluded they may be, it was a song of deliverance. And four thousand men and women workers, standing there in that dazzling circle of red and gold, sang it that way. For "the cause" which represents the establishment of the principles of the "International" these workers stood ready to make any sacrifice.

But the peasant is a problem of another sort. He lives on the outskirts of the things that happen. The tumult and the shouting, the flag-waving spectacles, and the oratory that fan the

flames of the workers' devotion are not seen or heard in Russia's villages where four fifths of the people live. Now, very much as before the war, life for the peasant is a weary plodding to the field, a weary day's work, and a weary plodding home again when the day is done. He neither feels himself nor is a part of "the workers' and peasants' government." He is just a tiller of the soil, who up to now has found that crops need just as much cultivation—and burn as quickly when there is no rain—under Communism as under the Czar.

The peasants do not want a return of the Czar or of his family, however distantly connected. The voice of the peasant was heard in no uncertain terms when the "White" armies invaded Russia. In certain sections there was at first a welcome for "Russia's deliverers," since the Communists had confiscated crops and dealt with the farmers in too extreme a fashion to arouse any genuine affection for the regime. But this welcome was quickly turned to opposition that became extremely militant when it was found that the "Whites" brought greater evils than those from which the peasants had sought escape. If peasant opposition to Moscow finds frequent expression in the Soviet press, there is little enough encouragement in that fact for the Russian émigrés who look upon every criticism of the government within as an indication of impending revolution.

However dissatisfied the peasants may be with their present situation—which in many ways is worse probably than before the war—there is very little indication that a peasants' revolt is in the offing in Russia. A great hullaballoo was raised in the press of the Western world over the recent "Georgian Revolution." Newspaper men who were on the ground at the time and whose reports are, just now, appearing, testify to the gross misrepresentation of the situation filed from Warsaw, Riga, Berlin, and Paris. Some cities, notably Baku, where rebellion was reported—in extensive reports from these outside-of-Russia sources—to be in full swing, had not even a surface disturbance. There is unrest in Russia—that cannot be denied, nor could it be avoided after all that the country has passed through in the last ten years, regardless of the government in charge. But it is safe enough to subject extra-Russian reports of rebellion to at least a seventy-five per cent discount.

But peasant discontent is making itself felt nevertheless. And in an effort to allay that discontent the Soviets will find difficulty stopping short of significant modifications of their Communistic program. That serious efforts are being made to meet the increasingly articulate dissatisfaction among Russia's land workers is undeniable. The papers of Moscow contain almost every day letters of complaint from peasants—letters which receive often the most careful edito-

rial consideration. Party Congresses devote more time to peasant than to any other problems. There is in Moscow a peasant's house, to which the peasants may come and find aid in laying their complaints before the government. This house is no propaganda institution designed to make the peasants satisfied with things as they are. It is a practical means for furthering peasant expression on matters of governmental administration. And the peasants make constant use of it. There is, moreover, a governmental department devoted to the solution of peasants' problems—a department that is making genuine efforts to better the agricultural situation.

The peasants, insofar as they come into touch with the national government, recognize the determination of the government to help them. Insofar as they think in political terms at all, it is safe to say, I believe, that the peasants recognize the potentialities of the present regime. But just how long they will be willing to accept this hopeful outlook as a substitute for more fundamental returns in the here and now is a question, the most serious question confronting the Soviets.

For, after all, the peasant is not a Communist. The Communist Revolution gave him the land—and for that achievement he doubtless feels grateful if he ever considers the matter at all. But landowning and Communism are not easily reconcilable. And the further the landowning class is removed from the Revolution the more difficult

it will be to demand loyalty to the principles involved as the price of ownership.

Thus when this new drought came on, one of the first steps which Moscow took was to send into the country several thousands of city Communists to bolster up the peasant morale in the affected districts and to keep a careful watch for possible counter-revolutionary activities. This propaganda division was followed up by help of a more practical sort. Extra supplies of seed, to insure next year's planting, were shipped out from the national storehouses. Arrangements were made to transport grain quickly from one section to another. A searching inquiry was begun to discover whether or not the government might take steps to make famines less likely in the future. But, first of all, the government took precautionary measures against peasant outbreaks.

The prosperity of the peasant, in the long run, is dependent upon the success of Russia's dealings with capitalistic nations. If Russian agriculture and industry could be restored and maintained by the Russian people themselves, Communism might be reestablished and continue indefinitely. But Russian reconstruction cannot be accomplished by Russians alone. Markets and loans must come from abroad, and markets and loans—especially loans—are the key to the restoration of the country.

Peasant unrest, accentuated by the present

crop failure, is making it imperative that the job of restoration be speeded up at whatever cost. But before capitalistic nations will come to the aid of Russia certain modifications will be demanded in the Communistic program of the Russian government. If there were no pressure at home, those modifications might be refused. But capital must be secured, for it is becoming increasingly difficult to satisfy the peasants with unfulfilled promises. And the 1924 crop failure may so increase the insistency of peasant pressure as to alter completely the tone with which Soviet representatives conduct their negotiations in the policies of the government at home.

It is, in fact, to the pressure of economic necessity rather than to political or revolutionary action that one is obliged to turn for evidence that the basis of the present government will be reconstituted. A consideration of the present economic situation in the country and the tendencies which that situation has inaugurated will indicate the significance of that statement.

Under the present economic organization of Russia the Soviets are not in business, they are business. The butcher, the baker, the candlestick maker, not to mention almost everyone else, are government employees. One rides in government trains, eats in a government diner—good food, too—buys at a government store, patronizes a government barber, lives in a government house, heated with government fuel, and watched over

by a government agent, whose task it is to scrutinize one's housekeeping.

This, it must be said, is not Communism. There were days—idyllic, Communist days shortly after the Revolution—when workers rode free on the trams and the trains, when barter, and exchange, and such capitalistic creations as the middleman were temporarily done away with. But the Soviets have been since then endeavoring diligently to atone for the economic excesses of the period. One illustration will indicate how business sense has supplanted the practice, if not the theory of Communism.

I visited during August the famous Russian fair at Nishni-Novgorod, in the Volga Valley—perhaps the most famous fair in the world. Before the war and the Revolution the East and the West and the ancient states between sent representatives to Nishni. The products of the world were sold in its booths and strange people in strange costumes thronged the long narrow lanes between its shops. In 1910 the value of the goods brought to Nishni amounted to 250,000,000 gold rubles, and the number of visitors, before the war, totaled nearly 500,000 annually. It was a picturesque institution and a significant tribute to the world-wide ties of trade.

During the war, however, there were no traders to come from the East and few to trade had they come. When the war was followed by the Revolution, Nishni's prospects for revival did not

improve. The advent of Communism was looked upon as the death knell of those business dealings that had made Nishni known by traders from the Baltic to the China Seas. Traders and the counters over which they traded were a part of a regime that had ended. In the heyday of the Revolution, therefore, many of the buildings at Nishni were destroyed and their materials used for firewood. The place fell into ruins, as did many such relics of capitalism.

But since those days economic necessity has taken a hand. The new Communism—which isn't Communism at all, but a state Socialistic adaptation of Marx—is seeking to restore Nishni, as it is seeking to restore other temples of capitalistic enterprise. The director of the fair is a Communist, but, more important, he is a successful business man trained in the business of prewar Russia. He has secured a substantial money appropriation. The buildings have been restored and the floor space considerably increased. New buildings have been erected, and a modern lighting system installed. The whole country has been placarded with great posters setting forth the desirability of restoring the fair. This year many more buildings have been rented than last, although out of 286 firms represented 123 are state institutions or cooperatives, 89 are private firms, and 70 Eastern concerns. Incidentally there is nothing Communistic in the prices that one pays at Nishni.

Despite this return to capitalism—under whatever name you choose to call it—there is not the same freedom for private enterprise in Russia at present that existed up to about a year ago. The greatest modification of Communism came with Lenin's New Economic Policy. The NEP was a matter-of-fact admission, with all sorts of excuses, of course, that Communism would not work. Under the NEP fully eighty per cent of the retail trade of Russia returned to private hands. A new class of capitalistic profiteers arose—the Nep-men. While some six hundred thousand Communists preached the end of all such enterprise, this rather large group of capitalists grew up overnight and made fortunes out of a situation that Communism could not meet.

With the passing of Lenin, however, reaction set in. The Nep-men too obviously were becoming a powerful "new bourgeoisie." Better less business than so much capitalism. So a drive was begun against them. The stabilization of the currency offered an opportunity to increase taxes and to favor government cooperatives, which, accordingly, undersold private concerns and gradually drove them out of business. The Nep-men during the past eight months have one by one closed up shop and drifted out of the picture. To-day practically all of the retail trade of the country is in the hands of the government or government cooperatives.

The Soviets, however, have not confined their

business ventures to retail trade. They have, for instance, gone into housekeeping. Moscow, I suppose, is the most overcrowded city in Europe —and that is saying a good deal. The removal of the capital from Leningrad and the constant centralization of Russian administrative life in Moscow attracted many thousands of new inhabitants to the city. The foreigner who arrives in the city will find one good hotel—the Savoy. The Savoy, however, is almost always crowded with correspondents, hopeful business men, and diplomatic scouts sent to spy out the land. The Savoy's prices, moreover, are beyond the reach of the average traveler. To find quarters anywhere else is, however, an almost impossible task unless one is fortunate enough to have friends in one of the relief missions.

The houses of Moscow are all owned by the Moscow Soviet. A certain amount of floor space is allotted to each inhabitant. Those who are engaged in the "productive or socially useful" occupations, on the basis of which Communistic citizenship is granted, are favored with more room in better surroundings, and such individuals cannot be ejected from their homes. Professional people, those who can lay claim to the necessity for a "study," are also granted additional space. The left-overs of the bourgeois class are not so fortunate.

The house committee to which I have already referred collects the rents, keeps the building in

repair, ejects tenants who are unfit, and pays whatever taxes are due.

Despite all this interference by the government in enterprises that normally are carried on by private concerns there is an increasing demand in Russia for capitalistic investment. A prominent Soviet economist told me in Moscow that "we might be able, eventually, to restore the state without outside help," but it would be a long and very difficult process. Capital from abroad must be secured to speed up restoration.

When I asked why it was that capitalists seemed unwilling to take the risks involved in doing business with a government that on economic questions was, to say the least, highly erratic, he said: "Foreign business men who have sought trade here have come to make a commercial colony of Russia. They have insisted on a fifty per cent or a sixty per cent return on their investment, and we are unwilling to go in for that kind of exploitation. We will give every sort of guaranty to business interests that are out for a reasonable return on their investments, and we are willing to wait for help until business interests of that sort come to Russia."

Then, again, it was pointed out that the Russians are not eager to buy manufactured products—agricultural equipment, railroad supplies, etc.—abroad. They are anxious, however, that the concerns which manufacture these needed articles establish factories in Russia. Thus they

are in search of business concerns that will accept certain concessions in forest land in the country and establish a paper mill in Russia. In the same way they are looking for help for their textile industry.

Meanwhile, of course, industrial life is only limping along. There is a woeful shortage of technicians. The technicians who are already in Russia are hampered by Communistic restrictions. Thus in many factories the manager comes from the old Russia and is not a Communist. He is utilized, however, because there are no Communists trained to do his work. But beside him stands a Communist who checks over his every act and prevents exploitation and evasion of government regulations.

The textile school in Moscow which I visited is crowded with young Communists who are being prepared in what is one of the finest textile schools in the world to take over the actual management of the cotton industry. Other technical institutions are similarly crowded. When young Communists are trained to take over the management of industry the economic life of the country will move forward with less difficulty. In the meantime, however, politics is a serious hindrance to economic development.

The gradual withdrawal of this political influence from the economic life of the country is almost certain to come as the only condition upon which the financiaal interests of capitalistic na-

tions will venture into Russia. And there are indications that, despite the reaction following the death of Lenin, the Soviets are ready to make many of the necessary concessions to private trade.

CHAPTER VI

THE RUSSIAN RIDDLE
(Continued)

It is not only in the fields of politics and economics that the Soviets are seeking to mold the life of Russia. The pressure of immediate necessity has brought economic and political considerations to the fore. But the Soviet program, in theory at any rate, is equally concerned with the development, along carefully laid out lines, of the cultural life of the country. This is particularly apparent when one considers the Soviet policy in regard to education and religion.

On paper Russia has an educational program as ambitious as that of any European nation. In practice, however, that program makes only a very halting progress. It is hampered at every hand by inadequate funds, inexperienced teachers, and an ever-increasing mob of youth who demand that they be trained immediately. But despite all its shortcomings the educational system of the Soviets is one of the most hopeful aspects of the present government. There is no denying the failures of the system. Nor—and this is the significant fact—is there any denying the determination of those who direct the affairs

of Russia to make that system a success to the end that the illiteracy of the country may be totally liquidated.

Immediately following the revolution a most intensive educational drive was begun under the direction of Lunacharsky, Commissar for Education. The fact that the percentage of illiteracy in Russia before the war was greater than among other people of the white race indicates something of the handicap under which the drive was undertaken. But, by means of special primary readers, which were issued in vast numbers, and with the help of a great staff of hastily enrolled and often inadequately prepared teachers, the fight on illiteracy was carried forward. It was estimated that up to 1921, 5,000,000 persons were taught the rudiments of reading and writing. The famine in 1921, however, made it necessary to divert all of the nation's resources to meet the economic demands, and the educational campaign suffered in consequence.

At the present time the educational program of Russia can be studied to greatest advantage in the higher schools. There an aggressive effort is being made to train sufficient numbers of the youth of Russia to man the country's secondary schools and to develop technicians fitted to assume the direction of its industrial life. The cry is for results. Scant attention is paid to the theory side of education. The demand is for an educational system that provides mass production.

In the words of one of the directors of the Department of Education three distinct aims are ascribed to the Soviet higher schools:

1. "To create a staff of specialists in different branches of practical activity.

2. "To prepare scientific workers for supplying scientific, scientifically technical and industrial institutions and the higher schools of the republic with teachers.

3. "To spread scientific knowledge among the wide masses of the proletarian and peasant populations, the interests of which must be in the foreground of all of the activities of the Soviet republics."

There are between 150,000 and 200,000 students in the higher schools of Russia at the present time. An increasing number of the university students are from the Rabfacs, or Workers' Faculties. The Rabfacs constitute perhaps the most interesting phenomenon in the Soviet educational system. They are the proletarian schools. Immediately after the October Revolution the Soviet authorities announced as one of their main purposes "knowledge for the people." The higher schools, and in many places the secondary schools, were practically closed to the workers and peasants of prewar Russia. The Soviets turned the educational tables. They made as their first emphasis the education of the masses—giving only an incidental second thought to the education of the children of the bourgeoisie.

But since educational advantages for the masses had been few, it was necessary to introduce a practical preparatory course. This course is provided by the Rabfacs. Their purpose is to prepare the workers and peasants for the higher schools. Any worker or peasant over eighteen years of age who knows the four rules of arithmetic, is able to read and write fluently and has taken part for three consecutive years in industry or agricultural work by performing physical labor, may be admitted to the Rabfacs.

Individuals desiring to enter the Rabfacs are sent up either from their industrial union or from the rural organization to which they may belong. All Rabfac students receive a government stipend and educational supplies free of charge. In 1922 and 1923 the Rabfacs counted 30,000 students, and this number has been increased during the year 1923–24. In the academic year of 1922 and 1923 about 3,000 students passed from the Rabfacs into the higher schools.

There are two classes of Rabfac students: those who have given up their work and are devoting all of their time to study and those who are still carrying on in the factory or other employment. The first group meets in morning classes. Evening classes are provided for those of the second group who are obliged, by economic necessity, to work during the day.

Upon entering a Rabfac the student is directed toward one of several possible courses. During

the first year the inclination and adaptability of the student is closely watched by his teachers and at the end of that time a definite choice is made of the particular course that the student wishes to take in the higher school. There are four general classifications of courses: 1. Scientific-Natural. 2. Pedagogical. 3. Technical. 4. Social, that is, Humanitarian. Those students electing the first course are directed, in the higher school, toward medicine or natural science; the second course leads to the teaching profession; the third to the technical school; and the fourth to the field of economics, politics, and law.

The proletarian element—that is, the workers and peasants—in the higher schools is rapidly increasing. During the year 1922 and 1923 the trade unions alone sent up to the higher schools—universities and technical schools—some 12,000 students. Due to the recent "cleansing" of the universities of Russia many of the remaining bourgeoisie students were expelled and, more than ever, the student bodies of the country's universities are proletarian.

Despite the fact that these institutions are thronged with students who are inadequately prepared for university study, the standard of work has been maintained at its prewar level. I talked, at some length, with the head of the department of mathematics and physics in Moscow University, a professor of distinguished achievements who had held his position under the Czar.

"We have not lowered our standard one iota," he declared. "The pressure brought to bear upon all the faculties has been to emphasize the practical and turn out, as rapidly as possible, a horde of young people with a smattering of knowledge. We have refused to yield to that pressure. Consequently, if you will come here during the school session you will find, often, one thousand students in line waiting their turn at the laboratory. It will require two years for all of the students who have finished their lectures and are now on my waiting list to complete their laboratory work for a degree."

Later I visited the Higher Technical School in Moscow. This institution doubtless is one of the finest of its kind in Europe. The administration of the school, as in other such institutions, is in the hands of a students' and workers' committee. Our guide, a student, was a member of this committee. Before the war he had worked in a Leningrad factory with no prospect for education. Now he is taking the fullest advantage of the opportunity which the Revolution brought him. Eighty-five per cent of the three thousand students in this institution come directly from the factories, and most of them will return to positions of responsibility in the factories when their work is completed.

The school system of Soviet Russia with its program for the "liquidation of illiteracy" is looked upon by the Communists as the source

from which will come the country's new leadership. In their curricula they are making every effort to insure that such leadership is trained in the beliefs and allegiances of Communism. Frequent "cleansings" are necessary to purge from the school those students of doubtful loyalty.

Meanwhile it is impossible to say how long the extreme position of the Soviets can be maintained in the face of the increasing contacts with a capitalistic world that is making genuine progress, on the one hand, and an increasingly intelligent and scientifically trained citizenship on the other hand. Sooner or later questions will arise, as they have already arisen, concerning the Communistic program, which cannot be satisfactorily answered by the expulsion of the questioner from the school or the party.

A significant feature of the educational system of Soviet Russia exists outside the school organization. The Soviets have given careful consideration to the problem of organizing, along Communistic lines, of the youth of the country. Three national youth organizations have the official backing of the government itself. The first of these, the League of Communist Youth, has a membership of 800,000 young men and young women, from the ages of sixteen to twenty-three. The second is the Young Pioneers—now the Young Leninists—with a membership of about 600,000 and of ages ranging from about ten to sixteen. The third, the Young Wolves, is the Com-

munist kindergarten, and is composed of about 450,000 boys and girls, ages six to ten. Through these organizations the Soviet government proposes to plant the feet of the youth of Russia in the paths of Communism.

The League of Communist Youth is a particularly powerful organization. It is the Communist Party, Junior, and exerts a real influence, not only upon governmental policies but also upon the life of the various communities in which it is organized. The moral and ethical standards of these youths is very high. The campaign against drink in Russia was largely sponsored by members of this League. Not so long a campaign against smoking was carried on among the youth of Russia. While I was in Russia the leaders of the League of Communist Youth completed a study of the dance situation. It was found that the introduction of certain types of dancing was having a demoralizing effect upon the social life of many communities. Consequently, the League instituted a nation-wide boycott to reform the dance.

Also through these youth organizations the Soviets are teaching the Russian people how to play. I have attended classes in playground work conducted in Moscow by an American recreation director. Groups of young men and women are sent up from the various factories to take this instruction. Upon their return to the factories they organize recreational activities. As a re-

sult of the encouragement of the government intersectional sport contests have been organized. Compulsory athletics have been introduced in many schools. During last summer the government purchased ten thousand pairs of skiis in order to promote winter sports. Across Russia football fields have been laid out and recreational centers established. The work of teaching the Russian people to play is very largely carried on by the youth of Russia through these youth organizations.

It is through these same organizations that the Soviets are carrying forward their policy in regard to religion. Because of the significance of that policy for Russia as well as for the Western world, it is necessary to consider it here in some detail.

The Marxian text, on which the Soviets base their program of aggressive atheism, brands religion as "the opiate of the people." To the end that "the drug" may be stamped out, Russia has been generously placarded with that declaration. It is posted conspicuously, near the shrines and churches. It is blazoned on the wall of a building across a narrow street before the Shrine of the Iberian Virgin near the Kremlin. Yet through the day this Holy Place is thronged with worshipers. Beggars clutter its little square. Passers-by, pausing before it, cross themselves devoutly. For six years atheism has been officially enthroned in the Kremlin. But the people of

Moscow still go, as they have always gone, to the city's shrines, and neither heed nor care how Karl Marx regarded their faith.

And the Soviets themselves, now that the frenzied period of the Revolution is past, tolerate the faithful. They even take some pride in insisting that the guaranty of "full freedom for religious and anti-religious propaganda," contained in the Soviet Constitution, is upheld. This tolerance obviously is dictated, not by a friendliness toward religion but by a recognition of the fact that the vast majority of the Russian people—the non-Communists—are deeply religious, and that religious persecution in Russia throws serious obstacles in the path of the advances of Chicherin and the Soviet Foreign Office to the Christian nations of the West.

But passive tolerance, however much it may characterize the attitude of the Soviets toward Russia's religious elder generation, cannot be said to describe their policy toward the youth of the nation. If the youth can be won to atheism, it is of no importance that their elders die in the faith. Religion in Russia, it is confidently predicted, will pass with the passing of its elder devotees. And the government certainly is sparing no effort to make sure that a new generation of believers does not arise to perpetuate it.

That the Communists are master propagandists is indicated by the fact that the methods of this attack on religion are not merely negative and

destructive. The destructive methods, of course, are the more spectacular, and in consequence have served to furnish most of the material for those who have sought to describe the anti-religious activities of the Soviets. The fact that the direction of this phase of the campaign is in the hands largely of turncoat priests accounts for the unusual degree of plausible familiarity with the history and sacred rites of the church that it reveals, and the extraordinary blasphemy that characterizes it.

The Russian clergy has been divided into two classes, the "Whites" and the "Blacks." From the Black Order—composed entirely of monks—the higher clergy, the bishops, and officials of the church were chosen. The White Order was composed of the village priests, the pastors. Between the two orders there have been frequent and most bitter feuds. It is from the White Order largely that the Communists have recruited their clerical support. For the "village popes," as they have been called, were almost always very poor; their work was confined to the routine of prescribed services; their education, frequently, was little better than that of their illiterate congregations. Many of them lost all touch with the world beyond the village, and fell into ways of ignorance and sloth. They were often in secret sympathy with the advocates of revolution and in touch with the underground organization that fostered it. They were of immediate value to the

Communists when the Revolution toppled the throne of the Czars.

These priests edit *Without God*—the slander sheet of anti-religion. They furnish the material for many of the pamphlets that are spread among the youth of the nation. Cartoons and songs and anti-religious slogans are frequently of their inspiring. Without them the Soviet campaign against religion would be carried forward with much less show of success.

I have seen the handiwork of these elder atheists in many places. For instance, every clubroom of the League of Communist Youth—the organization through which the atheistic regeneration of the youth of Russia is to be carried out—has an "Anti-religious Corner." Displayed in that corner are pictorial representations of religion as it appears to the young Communists—representations obviously inspired elsewhere. Many of the posters are as ingenious as they are blasphemous. One in particular—a crucifixion cartoon—is very popular. In it Christ is represented ascending Calvary. He walks alone, and behind him the cross is borne by the toiling masses. Astride the cross, grinning triumphantly, sits the capitalist, weighted down with moneybags.

In these clubrooms too the members of the League of Communist Youth gather for their religious "sings." The music of the ancient hymns and chants of the church is adapted for use with

new and mocking words. I have seen groups of youths, under the leadership of a designated "priest," go through a mock church service, every part of which was a carefully calculated caricature of religion.

This, as I have indicated, represents the destructive aspect of the anti-religious program of the Soviets. Ridicule and slander are used to popularize atheism. Although there has been no apparent modification of the Communists' determination to uproot every vestige of religion in Russia, there has been a rather widespread revulsion against the employment of these methods toward that end. A greater emphasis is being laid at the present moment, therefore, upon what might be termed constructive atheism. Religion, we are told, may still persist indefinitely, even though it is ridiculed and its adherents persecuted. It is necessary, therefore, that religion be supplanted, since, apparently, it cannot be crushed. The Soviets, in consequence, have set about it to provide substitutes for religious faith.

Consequently, instead of decrying the Christian holy days, the Soviets have organized substitute celebrations of their own. Sunday, for example, is observed by the Communists, particularly by the Communist Youth and Young Pioneers—the Communist Boy Scouts—with hikes and concerts, with classes in nature study and great festivals of sport. The value of Sunday is readily admitted, but every effort is made to organize

the day in such a way as to insure a decreasing interest in the prescribed church observances of it. Thus too at Christmas the effigy celebrations that were very popular find less favor, and the holiday among Communists is observed to commemorate the achievements of their own leaders. Easter, explained as the Christian myth of spring, is likewise celebrated, not only with broadcast denials of the resurrection of Christ but with popularized accounts of the scientific laws of life and growth that spring typifies.

A pamphlet entitled *Christ Did Not Rise* was given to me by a member of the League of Communist Youth. "This," he said, "is our Easter Message to the youth of Russia."

The cover, in striking colors, shows a youthful Russian, dressed in the hiking outfit of the young Communists. "We've done with devils and gods!" he shouts, as he kicks high into the air an Easter egg, the sacred symbol of Russia's Easter celebrations.

Chapter one of this pamphlet describes Easter as "A Holiday of Suppression and Deception," and chapter two outlines the "Origin of the Tale of the Resurrection of the Son of God."

"The tale of Easter," so the Communist story goes, "runs back two thousand years, but its origin is much earlier. It had its beginning when men first began to realize the significance of spring—with new life appearing after the long death of the winter. To the world, living then

in superstition, this new life seemed like the revelation of a great God who was giving humanity its chance to live. To-day, of course, we know better. Now our young people have learned of astronomy, of the influence of the sun, and of the laws of growth. Science has taken the place of the God of Easter."

Chapter three recounts how "Jews and Slaves Created the Tale of the Resurrection of Christ." The hope that Easter represents was born of the despair of oppressed peoples, we are told. "Mysterious tales about the miracles of Christ were circulated and finally believed. But Christ never existed. No one of the ancient scientists or historians saw him. Few old books mention him. The information upon which religious people base their proof of his life was created by priests who saw in the story the hope of profit. Christ, therefore, is only an imaginary being."

And Easter, the pamphlet points out, "has been, since then, at the service of the landlords and the capitalists. At Easter the priests walked about among the people, saying that Christ had suffered and that, in consequence, they should be willing to suffer. 'All power,' said the priests, 'comes from God. Therefore do not turn against the landlord. If he smites you on one cheek, turn to him the other. Love your enemies. Forgive your landlords!' Thus the representatives of the landlord's Easter went about, in white robes, to quiet the people with superstitions."

"But now," the concluding chapter declares, "there is 'The Resurrection of Suppressed Humanity.' When the Revolution took away the treasures from some of the churches the old priests began to yell. They attempted to ring the church bells. 'Christ is risen!' they said. But the people answered, 'Enough of this, my gentlemen. You've had a fine time doing that, but we are through with your myths.'

"And there is a new Easter. It is a very sad Easter for the priests and those who oppose the Revolution. It is seven years now since the capitalists have gone. Soon the revolutionary thunder will be rolling into the West. Religion, the snake that suppressed the people, is dying in anger. The proletariat hears the church bells ringing the funeral of the dying old world. The springtime now has become the humanity holiday. Oppressed peoples are fighting for the future. Looking back on the burning remains of the slave world that has been damned, they are asking: 'Is the suppressed world risen?' And the answer, already, has come: 'Yes, it is really risen.' This is Easter."

"There is no God but science," a prominent Communist declared to me, and science-worship, clearly, is the cult with which the Soviets propose to supplant Christianity. Darwin shares with Marx the homage of the devotees of this new faith; the *Origin of Species* and *Kapital* jointly provide their Bible. In pamphlets without num-

ber the Soviets have sought to make scientific refutation of every important Christian doctrine. They have done more than pamphleteer. The destruction of the straw-stuffed "bodies of the saints" in some of the peasant churches was carried on, not so much as an act of ruthlessness, but as a scientific experiment to prove that, regardless of the incantations of the priests, the bodies of the saints did not and could not possess the magic they were declared to have. From Genesis to Revelation, the anti-religionists are seeking to demonstrate their ability as destructive higher critics. When they set out to destroy the religious worth of the Bible they make a clean sweep of it. Their attack is based almost exclusively upon the extra-religious element in the Bible literature. But their conclusions are in conformity with those Fundamentalists who assert that, if one jot or tittle is questioned, the significance of the whole is destroyed.

That there can be any reconciliation between science and religion is, of course, bitterly denied by the Communists. Such a proposal, in fact, would be viewed with the utmost suspicion and hostility. Exactly as the efforts of capitalistic nations for improving the condition of the working classes are regarded by the Soviets as means for the further enslavement of the masses, so the reconciliation between science and religion would be regarded, as a fine cloak beneath which all of the old and ragged superstitions were hidden.

The religious situation in Soviet Russia cannot be understood unless it is made clear that this anti-religious wrath, however blasphemous, was stored up by the church itself against this day of reckoning. It is not necessary to go into a long account of the extent to which religion in Russia was the instrument of political oppression. The period just prior to the Revolution is typical. For nearly twenty-five years the procurator of the Holy Synod of the Russian Church was Pobiedonostsev, a layman and a worthy exponent of tyranny. His hatred of democracy and his scorn of the cherished hopes of the proletariat were unbounded. His religious policy was that of the mailed fist and his persecutions were relentless against all sects. His aim was to drive from Russia all faiths save that which he represented. The record of Constantine Pobiedonostsev furnishes unlimited material for those in Russia who seek to prove religion the tool of autocracy.

Pobiedonostsev was succeeded by a German who took the name of Deviatkovsky. The policies by which the faith was protected did not change with procurators. The masses of the Russian people, however pious personally, began to look upon the representatives of religion with mistrust. Many thousands grew to hate the church with a bitter hatred, as they hated the police and Cossack emissaries sent out to do their bidding. The ranks of revolution were thus increased, and

the fate of the church in Russia became linked inseparably with the fate of the Czarist government.

And while the people were kept in line by force, the doctrines preached were those of Christian humility, submission, patient suffering here that one might merit reward in the hereafter. Such preaching, strengthened by superstition, was a powerful antidote for whatever poisons of unrest threatened to infect the people.

But now the Soviets, so they declare, have stamped out the last vestiges of priestly tyranny. They have thrown open the windows and doors of Russia so that the old darkness may be dispelled before a flood of light. Religion is to be exposed as a colossal fraud, and not a shadow of it allowed longer to remain in any corner of the land.

But religion in Russia is neither dead nor dying. Nor is the church greatly weakened, though it has endured, through six years, the most bitter attacks without resisting. The Soviets have followed the same policy of hostility toward religion that the Powers have followed toward the Soviets. The results in both cases have been the same. The authority of Communism has been prolonged because it has become a martyr cause; and for the same reason the hold of the church upon many thousands of the people has been strengthened.

"Not less than ninety-five per cent of the whole

population in our country believe in God, in various ways," declared a Communist at a party meeting recently. And that, I suppose, is not an exaggerated statement. During the recent "cleansing" of the universities, when from thirty thousand to fifty thousand students for one cause or another were dismissed from their studies, considerable concern was expressed among Communist officials that so large a number of the most intelligent students examined confessed and defended their religious faith.

The support of religion, of course, varies greatly between the cities and the country. Practically the sole remaining strength of the church in the cities comes from the old bourgeois class—the remaining remnants of it. Persecution only served to increase the loyalty of these people to all that the church stands for. The churches and the ancient ceremonies of worship constitute the strongest remaining link between the impoverished bourgeois of the present and the golden prerevolutionary period. The workers, however, were never so loyal to the church, and their support of it now is negligible.

In the rural districts the peasants were held to the church to a very large degree by superstition. That superstitious hold continues even under the Soviets. There have been efforts to discredit the religious significance of the church ceremonies, and to disprove the efficaciousness of certain of the practices of the church. But these efforts

have had no very widespread influence. The Soviets assert that the complete rout of religion in the rural districts of Russia will come when education has raised the intelligence of the peasants to the point where skepticism is possible. Until then, despite the furious assaults upon religion, the peasant, doubtless, will maintain his loyalty to the church.

And both in the city and in the country many priests with whom I talked declared that their churches, since active religious persecutions had ceased, were more crowded than in prerevolutionary days. Certainly, the reverence of the masses of the people for religion and their religious leaders is very little diminished.

There is hardly any possible denial of the fact, however, that some of the leaders of the church were, in the early days of the Soviet rule, actively engaged in counter-revolutionary propaganda. Since the church was the sole remaining rallying-point for the anti-Communistic, bourgeois element in Russia, it was to be expected that whatever counter-revolutionary activity was carried on would find its leadership, to a certain extent at least, among the churchmen.

Among those most bitterly accused by the Soviets was Tikhon, the Patriarch of the Russian Church, who died in the spring of 1925. Tikhon, who was born in 1865 and educated in the theological schools of Saint Petersburg, was consecrated Bishop of the Aleutian Islands and Alaska

in 1898. He spent several years in the United States, returning to Russia in 1907 as Archbishop of Jaraslau, later becoming Archbishop of Vilna and in 1917 Metropolitan of Moscow. In November, 1917, he was chosen for the Patriarchate, Russia's highest ecclesiastical office.

Tikhon first encountered the hostility of the Russian government when he refused to permit Soviet officials to confiscate certain of the "superfluous" treasures of the church for famine relief. A certain number of these treasures were taken, despite this opposition, but it is noteworthy that impartial investigators have declared that the "despoilers" of the churches, in almost every instance, left untouched the icons, crosses, banners, and other symbols of worship, and confiscated only the gold and precious stones that served as embellishments.

Later developments, however, seem to connect Tikhon more directly with the counter-revolutionists. Certain documents, captured by the Soviets, appeared to indicate his connection with a council of Russian Church leaders at Karlowitz, where plans were definitely discussed for the overthrow of the Communist regime and the reestablishment of the Czarist government. On the basis of this evidence the Patriarch was arrested and the date of his trial was set for April 23, 1923. The summary execution of Monsignor Butkevich, of the Roman Catholic Church, early in 1923, despite the united protests of the Christian world,

appeared to indicate the fate that awaited Tikhon.

But unexpected developments intervened. The Patriarch was held in detention at the Donskoi Monastery on the outskirts of Moscow. A few days before the date set for his trial he was taken violently ill. His friends believed that he had been poisoned, and the Soviet government, unwilling to risk the fate of so distinguished a prisoner, removed him to a Moscow prison. What took place there can only be surmised. Tikhon had already been unfrocked by the All-Russian Church Congress—the Congress of the Living or "Red" Church Movement. His influence with the people, so far as the government officials could estimate it, was on the wane. Pressure was brought to bear upon him, doubtless, to recant and agree to live at peace with the Soviets. This he did in a confession published in Moscow on June 27, 1923. His release followed immediately.

The imprisonment and subsequent confession and release of Patriarch Tikhon aroused the believers of the Russian Church as did no other event during the Revolution. His confession, to be sure, aroused widespread bewilderment among those who had remained loyal to the church. The church, it appeared, was succumbing to the influence of the Soviets. But this bewilderment was of short duration. It was quickly recognized that the church, if it survived at all, must maintain a wholly extra-political position. And at

whatever price Tikhon purchased his freedom he was soon acclaimed, again, as the rightful head of the church.

When I met him Tikhon occupied two low vaulted rooms on the wall of the Donskoi Monastery. To reach his audience chamber one followed a guide up a narrow stone staircase into a ramshackle room that was evidently built as a storehouse. This room, on every audience day—and each day save Sunday was audience day—was always crowded. A motley crowd it was too: peasants from the Caucasus; down-at-the-heel intelligentsia from Kiev; a delegation of Siberian priests; a landed proprietor, who no longer had any land, from a city in the Volga Valley. Day after day religious pilgrims waited in that room to bring their messages of loyalty and to receive the blessing of the Patriarch. When the Patriarch, as he rarely did, went into the city to conduct a service, he was acclaimed on the way by reverent throngs, and the church where he spoke and the streets before it were crowded long before his arrival.

This loyalty to Tikhon and the church was strikingly revealed in the so-called Living Church movement. Two years ago the Living Church movement held out the promise of a genuine religious reformation. Its origin dates from the great famine of 1922, when Bishop Evdokim declared that, contrary to the proclamation of the Patriarch, the church treasuries should be sur-

rendered for famine relief. Immediately many of the more liberal priests rallied to his support, while the old and, in some instances, counter-revolutionary leadership of the church bitterly opposed him.

As the Living Church movement grew it came to represent an earnest effort within the church to liberalize religion and bridge over, without compromising the faith, the gulf between the church and the Revolution, that is, between religion and the new Russia. In the winter of 1923 an All-Russian Church Congress was convened. At this meeting Tikhon was unfrocked on the ground that he did not represent the religious demands of present-day Russia; and the machinery of the church passed into the control of those who led the Living Church movement.

Up to this time there is no question that many of the leaders of the Living Church movement were earnest priests, devoutly seeking to revitalize the church with a message for the new Russia. But at the Congress of 1923 many observers saw the hand of the government. The Living Church, from the Soviet point of view, was an instrument for dividing the Greek Orthodox Church and thereby weakening the hold of religion upon the people. It deserved official support for that reason. And many of the leaders in the new group proved susceptible to political influence. When the All-Russian Congress finally convened it was charged that the government, by refusing

passports to supporters of Tikhon, packed the meeting so as to insure a Living Church victory.

However that may be, the movement, thereafter, was widely discredited among Russian believers. It became known as the "Red" Church. Many of its priests found themselves without congregations. There was a great flocking to the churches of those who had remained loyal to the old leadership. As a result the priests who had deserted, many of them, began to seek a return to the fold. Upon the release of Tikhon the members of the Living Church, more or less en masse, sought reconciliation with him. The Patriarch's influence was enormously strengthened by this surrender of the reformists, and by the demonstration of intense loyalty on the part of the people. Officially, at any rate, the division within the church was closed. The Living Church leaders themselves, such as Krasnitsky, agreed upon the undesirability of developing further church factions.

Meanwhile there has been a remarkable increase in the size and influence of the various Protestant groups in Russia—known as Sectarians. There are over five million members of these various Protestant organizations, and their numbers have increased enormously since the Revolution. The Sectarians commend themselves to Soviet toleration for several reasons. In the first place they represent no centralized organization, no hierarchy that can become threatening. The organ-

ization is very loose and informal and differs in different sections of the country. Then, too, the mode of life of many of the sectarian groups has been organized, through the three hundred years of their history in Russia, along Communal lines. In more recent history the Sectarians—since they are, very largely, pacifists—led in the movement, just prior to the outbreak of the Revolution, against a continuance of the war. But it is safe to say that they will not, in all probability, provide Russia with a new religious leadership of sufficient virility to meet the atheistic advances of the Soviets.

The more closely one studies the religious situation in Russia, the more apparent it becomes that the Greek Orthodox Church, regardless of the fact that its present leadership is said to be inadequate, affords the only available channel through which the stream of Russian religious life may continue to flow. As at present constituted and led, however, there is little enough of promise that the Greek Orthodox Church will soon awaken to its responsibility in the present religious situation.

I asked Tikhon whether or not, in consideration of the present Russia, the church was called upon to bring a new interpretation of Christianity.

"How can there be any change," he replied, "in that which is already wholly true, and all truth?"

When I asked Metropolitan Peter, of Siberia,

the same question, he said: "Neither the people nor the priests want reformation. What all of us want and need is a return to the purer orthodoxy of the Middle Ages."

But that the future of religion in Russia depends very largely upon a widespread reformation in the approach of the church to the people is apparent. The faith of the present generation of Russians is too deeply planted to be destroyed. The faith of the next generation, unless religion finds new prophets in Russia, will be planted less deeply and wither more easily. The church can hardly continue to speak as it has spoken in the past and reach the youth of Russia. A new religious message, however, will require new religious leaders to declare it, for the present leadership of the church, with rare exceptions, is unalterably opposed to reform.

To a small but, I believe, significant extent, that new leadership is developing. The Living Church movement, however far short it fell, released certain forces that are still at work, particularly among the younger priests. Two theological schools—the only two open at the present time in Russia—were organized through the Living Church and supported in large part from American sources. They retain, at the present, the vital elements represented in the Living Church and are not compromised by political commitments.

The students from these schools, several of

whom I met, are preparing themselves to preach and are preaching an intellectually respectable social gospel. Their message takes account of the facts of science upon which is based the Soviet program of constructive atheism; and of the further facts of community welfare, so largely ignored by many of the priests and so insistently advocated by the representatives of the present government.

I have visited their church services. Many of the routine ceremonies are discarded. An evangelical preaching is introduced. There is congregational singing—a revolutionary innovation. One of these young priests has organized and made extraordinarily successful a week-night course in Bible study. And this man explained to me that he has abandoned the dress of his office, save for Sabbath worship, because, as he expressed it, "I am needed as a man with the people, more than as a priest apart from them."

Needless to say, no other gospel than that represented by these young men can make much headway against the Soviets. If their ministry is not suppressed by the vigilant agents of atheism, they have the courage and, I believe, the ability to bring before the Russian people a religion that can prove to be a strong support for every constructive achievement for which the present regime is vigilantly striving.

That religion could be intellectually respectable has never occurred to the average young

Russian student. Thus, when last year an American Protestant bishop spoke to a group of students in Moscow University on "The Factors Making for Human Progress," there was the greatest amazement—an amazement that I heard expressed a year afterward—that a Christian clergyman could speak of "Human Progress."

Incidentally, the professor who invited the bishop to speak lost his job as a punishment for having introduced to his students a type of Christianity which did not correspond to the Communist picture of religion.

Every such increase of friendly contacts between Soviet Russia and the nations of the West is certain to bring a modification of the program of aggressive atheism as it will bring a modification of aggressive Communism. Isolation, more than any other factor in the last five years, has served to strengthen the extremists of the Communist Party. Isolated, the Soviets are martyrs to the concerted hostility of the world. In isolation, moreover, it is not difficult for the government propagandists to maintain the integrity of the illusions concerning capitalistic nations upon which the Communistic program is based. Every friendly negotiation with a Western power and every creditable business transaction, however, makes it more difficult to uphold, among the workers and the peasants of Russia, the conviction that capital and the so-called bourgeois governments are the enemies of the people and that proletarian

justice can be won only through world revolution and Communism. Every negotiation with Russia's government aids the evolution away from Communism. When, in the course of that evolution, a less ruthless period is reached, there will be, I believe, a religious as well as a political open-mindedness; the day of Communism and of atheism will be done, and a new Russia will emerge, fitted to assume, with honor, its place at the council tables of the world.

CHAPTER VII

"THE EVIL THING WITH THE HOLY NAME"

THERE is an old adage to the effect that men do not kick a dead mule. For five years the bitterness of the attacks upon the League of Nations has been one of the most encouraging indications of its vitality. In the United States political specialists, whom a sense of humor might have saved, have solemnly read its obsequies at regular intervals. And between these periodical "last rites" they have been unsparing in their denunciation of "the evil thing with the holy name," which they have laid to rest.

The whole procedure reminds one of the tactics of a certain religious sect—the Premillennialists. That the world is in a state of complete moral and spiritual degeneration is the contention of these individuals. Its end, in consequence, is at hand. Periodically, therefore, during the last century, a definite date for the final curtain has been set. On that date, regardless of how often they have gone through the fiasco before, the faithful repair to their shrines. There they await the end. The end failing to materialize, the millennialists, nothing daunted, set forth in the world

again to preach its total depravity and to prepare another date for its destruction.

Watching these repeated failures of prophecy one's confidence increases in the stability of the cosmic order. And, similarly, as one notes the regularity with which the League of Nations is interred and the fury with which, between rites, it is assailed, one's faith in its power of survival is inclined to grow.

There is no denying that the League has failed, in its first quadrennium, to usher in the millennium. But only its enemies, and for purposes of their opposition, expected any such achievement. And it is necessary to bear in mind one or two considerations before too hasty appraisal of the initial shortcomings of this experiment in world cooperation.

In the first place no other such experiment has ever been undertaken. Other tribunals have been set up but none whose scope compared to this. Consequently, there was no parallel line of procedure, no blue prints to follow. The United States after the Revolution had ample historical examples of the methods of self-government to serve as a chart for its own experiment. The fact that, despite the data at their disposal, the American people were unable to avoid the great blunders of their early history or a Civil War sixty years later can hardly be cited as evidence of the inability of Americans to govern themselves. The League, however, was without precedents, either

good or bad, to guide it. Then, again, this council of nations was conceived and brought forth in a world confused and chaotic after four years of war. The statesmen who evolved the tangle at Versailles supposed that many of the knots, in due time, would be undone in Geneva. Consequently, the League was allowed no time in which to find itself. There was no period of growth, but at birth the new organization was sent out to undertake the settlement of difficulties that might well have taxed it at maturity.

In fact, the League, from the outset, was obliged to carry forward three great tasks, any one of which might have swamped it. In the first place it was obliged to translate the Covenant of the League into a practical working machine. Given a document, a League was called for, and something more than well-worded phrases was needed to call it forth. Secondly, and at the same time, the League was confronted with the task of enlisting world opinion in support of such an organization. If the League was to live, it was obviously necessary that more than the men who sat around the green tables at Paris be convinced of its worth. Prime Ministers and Presidents might come and go but the League was designed to stay on forever. It was necessary therefore to set about it to win a name for itself, not as the pet scheme of some group of statesmen but as the answer to a fundamental demand of world opinion. Then, in the third place, there faced the League

the task for which it was created—that of assisting in the solution of disputes between nations and of bringing about international cooperation on many of the extra-political questions which nations hold in common. It is not strange, therefore, that the League, with these jobs on its hands, has hesitated and blundered and gone on in apparent uncertainty.

During this time the League served its period of apprenticeship. A great variety of odds and ends of jobs was its lot. While Europe's major tasks approached no nearer Geneva than Paris or Genoa, a multitude of minor undertakings—necessary and often significant—were assigned to the workbench of the League. And the League, as an apprentice, did its work creditably. It tinkered here and there with the international machinery, and that machinery in consequence ran more smoothly. The repatriation of the prisoners of war, aid for the Greek refugees, campaigns against disease and against traffic in drugs and the traffic in women and children, the supervision of the administration of the mandated territories, administration of the Saar Basin and the Free City of Danzig, the financial reconstruction of Austria and of Hungary—these are a few of the tasks which the League has undertaken, since, in 1919, it was given a paper set-up and the job of remaking the world.

The Sixth Assembly of the League, however, marks a turning point in its history. The League,

with the Sixth Assembly, completed this period of apprenticeship. The minor, the accessory, aspects of international adjustment doubtless will receive no less attention than they have received during this time when they constituted the League's chief contribution. But henceforth, it is reasonably safe to predict, the questions of primary world concern will more and more be brought to Geneva. And the League of Nations has now the opportunity to prove itself the master craftsman.

Frank H. Simonds, one of the keenest journalistic interpreters of international affairs and never more than a skeptical observer of the activities of the League, writes in the October, 1924, Review of Reviews that the "outstanding circumstance of the last four weeks was not the acceptance and application of the Dawes report, but the opening at Geneva of the greatest and in a sense the first great session of the Assembly of the League of Nations. Last month, however, Geneva for the first time became the meeting place for the premiers of great powers. MacDonald for Britain and Herriot for France were present and made the League the sounding board of the declarations of Britain and France on the great question of the preservation of world peace. Hitherto both Britain and France have extolled the League in speech and ignored it in practice, but now for the first time officially and in fact both countries gave proof of their acceptance

of the League as the most important piece of machinery for international relations in existence.

"The very presence of these premiers in Geneva, together with Benes of Czecho-Slovakia, spokesman of the Little Entente, and of Theunis of Belgium, made Geneva something quite different from what it has been, and beyond cavil added permanently to its prestige. Even more, by their declarations Herriot and MacDonald made it clear that it was their settled conviction that future discussions of the great problems of world peace and disarmament must be conducted under the auspices of the League, that in some fashion the ultimate solution, if there is to be a solution, must be related to the League."

At no point is this emergence of a new League more apparent than among the enemies of the League themselves. That a very fundamental change has come over the League situation is patent from the significant and sudden shift in the tactics of those who oppose it. Anti-League declarations in the press and from the platform no longer assert that the Geneva organization is on the verge of disintegration. As a force in world affairs its existence can no longer be denied —not with the facts so readily accessible to the average man. Consequently, the new line of attack on the Geneva organization proceeds on the assumption that the League has come to stay. Nor are the opponents of the League so free as

formerly with their suggestions as to ways and means for its perfection. Not only is it admitted that the League has come to stay, but the truth, apparently, has slipped home that if fifty-six nations of the earth agree on any one thing touching their common welfare, it may not be wholly right, but the fact of that achievement is of altogether too great significance to be scrapped to suit the whims of the pouting politicians of any one nation, however powerful.

Thus, we find the two new grounds for League opposition are adapted to the two types of the League's opponents: to those who are obliged, by the popular opinion of the time, to hide their jingoism beneath an apparent advocacy of peace; and to those who are sincerely friends of peace by any other method than the League.

To the first—the jingocifists—the League has ceased to be an international weakling. While they have persistently proclaimed its collapse, it has survived and now, so they say, has become the world's greatest menace. One hears no more about the ancient danger of a superstate, as it was conjured up during the first two years of the League's existence. It is no longer necessary to manufacture bogies from between the lines of the Covenant. What the League actually has accomplished furnishes material in ample measure for the purposes of this attack. It is no longer what the League may do, but what the League is doing that stimulates these onsets. This tribute

to the League's development certainly cannot easily be bettered.

Likewise, to those who earnestly desire peace, if it can be won without Geneva, the League has established itself as a growing power. So potent is its influence recognized to be that these opponents go so far as to wish it well—so long as it remains a strictly European enterprise. They are willing, even, to concede that the League may provide—and they devoutly hope will provide—the agency for the settlement of the problem of European peace. But for the United States there must be none of it. Alongside Europe's cellar door another must be set up for the express use of the United States, or America won't play. This too is unimpeachable testimony to the fundamental transformation that has taken place in the status of the League itself.

A number of factors have contributed to bring about this emergence of the League from its period of apprenticeship. First among these must be placed the success which has accompanied the League's efforts at the extra-political jobs which it has undertaken. I have already mentioned some of these. It is doubtful if in any country, outside of Russia and the United States, responsible statesmen could be found to assert that the world could get along without the League. Without considering the major problems of cooperation, the number of minor problems which, in the natural course of events, find their solution

in Geneva is too great to admit of the scrapping of the League machinery. Were that machine scrapped practical necessity would demand that another, designed to do the same things, be immediately set up.

The field of international health work furnishes one of many illustrations of the essential nature of the League's extra-political activities. It is through the League Council that the League of the Red Cross Societies and the Red Cross have been brought together in a joint council in order to prevent overlapping and confusion, and to conduct more effectively the work of succoring the underfed and disease-stricken populations of Central and Eastern Europe. At the request of the Red Cross conference, two years ago, the League set up an Epidemic Commission with headquarters in Warsaw, for the purpose of cooperating with the Polish authorities in their campaign against epidemics. Among other things, in this territory, the Commission delivered fifty complete fifty-bed hospital units.

When the epidemic situation was serious along the Russian border, a conference, under League auspices, met to consider means for meeting conditions. European members of the League were all represented, as were representatives of Germany, Soviet Russia, the Soviet Republic of Ukraine, and Turkey. The plan worked out was followed in the campaign against this epidemic. Similar conditions have called for similar action

from the League in different parts of the world. In the detailed work of the health sections, which is carried forward continuously, plans have been set in operation for the standardization of serums and serological tests, for the purpose of making uniform the various systems of measuring, naming, and testing the strength of antitoxins and for the further standardization of medical nomenclature and measurements.

International cooperation, even in matters of such obvious common concern as health, has not been an easy achievement. World opinion was not accustomed to thinking of these matters in terms of the League. Diplomatists, in many places, had a healthy fear of what the League might do to their own pet propositions if given too free a hand. Too often the League has been a court of last resort. The reconstruction of Austria is a case in point. The European powers concerned refused repeatedly to extend the help which, at an earlier date, would have saved the country from the complete ruin that faced it, when the League was called in. With ruin in sight and when ordinary measures of help clearly could not avail, the problem was handed over to the League. Another illustration is furnished by the Upper Silesian question. Upper Silesia was one of the chief concerns of the treaty-makers at Versailles, and of the conferences that followed that gathering. But when all of these had availed nothing, Upper Silesia was turned over

to the League to do with it what it could—and to shoulder the blame.

The situation has been something like that of a superstitious Chinese who, having remained true to his native doctor until his body is prodded with needles to the point of death, drags himself to the mission surgeon, demanding to be cured and bringing in his train a host of skeptical relatives and friends to curse the surgeon if he isn't.

The second factor, therefore, which has contributed to bring about the emergence of the League from its period of apprenticeship is the conversion of world opinion to League methods.

At first glance the credit for the increase of popular approval behind the League may be accorded to Ramsay MacDonald and Edouard Herriot. And there is no denying the tremendous effect of their evident reliance upon the methods and machinery of the League. Among the men who have directed the postwar governments of France and England they are, with the exception of Aristide Briand, the first who have been the enthusiastic proponents of the Geneva organization.

Parenthetically it may be said that that fact is an argument for rather than against the League. The statesmen of Europe fall into two general groups—those who stand for the reaction, militarism, balance of power methods of diplomacy, and those who stand for the program of settlement by international cooperation. Need-

less to say, the political situation in Europe since the war and up to the accession of MacDonald and Herriot has been dominated by members of the first group. Had these old-order politicians trusted the League, those who believed in the League as an agency to bring peace would have had real grounds for concern. The fact that they refused to rely upon its machinery and methods has been a decided encouragement to those who believed that, through the League, a new sort of international policy may emerge, capable of settling international conflicts without war.

The accession to power of Ramsay MacDonald and Edouard Herriot gave the methods of this new diplomacy their first real trial in postwar Europe. Due to their own leadership the European situation has approached the place where with adequate support the League may function effectively. It is a matter of the utmost significance that MacDonald and Herriot opened a way to the abandonment of the conference-after-conference idea and proposed to carry on with most of the rest of the world through the League.

But the fact of that indorsement does not alone account for the popular support that is helping the new League to emerge. The Geneva pilgrimage of these two statesmen, in fact, is only an indication of the popular authority which increasingly through the past three years has been vested in the League. Ramsay MacDonald and Edouard Herriot, addressing the Sixth Assembly, were not

only contributing to the increase of the League's prestige; they were, quite as much, paying tribute to the prestige which the League itself has built up throughout Europe.

Proof of this authority behind the League is afforded by a study of the personnel of the various delegations to the Sixth Assembly. There was a time, not so long ago, when a government sent to Geneva spokesmen who were qualified to present, if not its official policy, at least a dignified statement of the ideals upon which that policy was based. The real issues seldom were seriously discussed at Geneva, chiefly because the individuals upon whom their solution depended were not there to discuss them.

That situation has been rapidly changing during the two years just past. The things the League has been doing have increased in significance and the nations of the world, in recognition of that fact and of the further fact that confidence in the League method is growing rapidly, are now sending their most gifted statesmen to Geneva. Thus, at the Sixth session the governments of thirteen nations considered the Assembly important enough to send their foreign ministers to head their delegations. In addition, there were nine delegates who held other portfolios than that of foreign minister, and some thirty or forty others who, during their careers, have served as foreign ministers or premiers. The men, therefore, who sit at Geneva are con-

cerned, personally, in arriving at a solution of the problems discussed, and they have, among themselves, authority to work out those solutions.

This annual gathering of the men who are responsible in the governments of Europe has added enormously to the importance of the League in the considerations of European Parliaments. Take, for example, the British House of Commons. Two years ago the League was scarcely on England's parliamentary horizon. Discussion of its activities, or interest in them, was seldom heard on the floor of the House. To-day, however, the situation is altogether changed. Scarcely a debate occurs in which some reference is not made to the League's relation to the subject under discussion. England is seriously at the business of working out a League policy. As a consequence the country's relationship to the League is a question more often discussed in the House than any other international problem.

Similarly, in the small states of Europe the first attitude toward the League was one of either suspicion or distrust. In Poland, for instance, there was open hostility because of certain alleged anti-Polish decisions handed down from Geneva. At the present time, however, Poland has a wholly altered League policy. The best men available are sent to represent Poland at Geneva. The Baltic states reflect this attitude. At a recent conference of these small states—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland—the chief subject under

discussion was the working out of a common League policy on matters affecting their mutual interests. A similar conference of Sweden, Norway, and Denmark accomplished the same end recently for Scandinavia. The Little Entente—under the leadership of Czecho-Slovakia, has consciously shaped a foreign policy along League lines.

It is doubly significant that this new allegiance to the League is appearing among the small states of Europe. These countries, when the League was first organized, were dubious of its possibilities for them. Early developments in the setting up of the machinery of the organization and in some aspects of its operation led to the conclusion that the Covenant and the machinery which it brought into being were to constitute a club with which the larger nations of Europe could work their will with the smaller. It has been amply demonstrated, however, that the League represents an institution upon which the smaller nations of the world can rely to protect their interests.

The Corfu incident between Italy and Greece helped to complete the dissipation of the belief among the smaller states that the League was a tool of the Powers. For Corfu revealed the League of Nations working, with significant success, against the aggression of a great power. A similar situation existed in 1914 when Austria's humiliating terms were sent to Serbia.

There was then no court of appeal and the Austrian ultimatum precipitated the war. In 1923, however, a court of appeal had been established. Greece alone was powerless to refuse to comply with the terms laid down by Italy in recompense for the murder of the Italian members of the Albanian boundary commission. But Greece, standing in the Assembly of the League, was allied with all the small states of Europe. Against that alliance Italy was powerless. It is merely incidental that the League proposals for the settlement of the Corfu affair were transmitted through the Council of Ambassadors. The boundary commission had been sent out by the Council of Ambassadors and it was their authority which had been violated by the atrocity. What is significant, however, is the fact that the League demonstrated its effectiveness as a channel through which the united opinion of small states could exert itself on behalf of justice and the maintenance of peace.

One meets many representatives of minority groups in these nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Members of minority groups are often outspoken in their criticism of the League. But when one suggests the possibility of scrapping the organization they immediately express alarm. The League, they say, may not have worked out all of the complex problems facing the minority groups of Central Europe, but it is recognized as an unmistakable fact that the League machin-

ery represents their only means for securing what they consider to be a fuller measure of justice.

The League has provided new "charters of freedom" for these minorities. Viscount Cecil, in accepting the Woodrow Wilson Award in New York recently, declared, regarding this aspect of the League's work (New York Times, December 29, 1924): "By a number of treaties signed at Paris and since most of the Central European states have come under an international obligation not to discriminate against racial and linguistic minorities within their borders. These treaties constitute a charter of freedom for some forty million people in those countries and its execution is intrusted to the supervision of the League. A delicate question: to judge between a government and a section of its subjects.

"An organization has been created at Geneva which receives complaints, circulates them to the members of the Council and, if indorsed by any member of the League, an inquiry takes place. The object, as always, is a settlement and not victory, and every effort is made to secure an agreement between the parties—sometimes the Court of Justice is called in to advise on any legal points involved. In all cases the government complained of is given the fullest opportunity to deal with the complaint in the first instance. Sometimes a hearing takes place before the Council. In the end in every case some settlement—not satisfying, perhaps, to everyone but approximat-

ing to justice—is arrived at. Not so long ago, as a result of such methods, a state paid over five hundred thousand dollars as compensation to certain farmers of a minority race who had been unjustly expelled from their farms."

Opponents of the League are still heard to maintain that this increased support behind it is not a reflection of popular will, but of the willingness of politicians to use this machinery for their own ends. The old argument that this is a League of governments and not a League of people is still current. But there is ample evidence available to prove that the League of Nations is becoming a League of peoples.

I attended during this last summer the Eighth Assembly of the International Federation of the League of Nations Societies. Representatives from over thirty countries had gathered in a French city to voice the popular opinion of the peoples of these countries in regard to the League organization. There were no governmental strings on the delegates. Whether, as in the case of Argentina, the government is lukewarm in its attitude toward the League, or, as in the case of Germany, is not even a member, the gatherings represented the rising tide of public opinion behind the Geneva organization. The League of Nations' Associations in these various countries have a total membership of over one million, four hundred thousand of whom are in Great Britain.

The members of the League of Nations Asso-

ciations, of course, recognize the fact that any international organization, if it is effective, must be, in a certain sense, a League of governments. Business is conducted through the channels of government, and no other means has yet been devised to substitute for that process. To declaim against the League of Nations because it appears to be a League of Governments is merely to denounce the foundation of national government itself. But through these Associations popular support in a formidable array is being marshaled to stand behind League methods and policy.

It is through the League of Nations Association, in fact, that a new sentiment has been built up behind the League in Germany. There is a persistent conviction among Germans that the League was formed as a victor alliance against the defeated powers. And there was at the outset little enough evidence at hand with which to offset this belief. But even in Germany the League has won a significant measure of popular approval. It is safe to say that Germany's willingness to enter the League without making extraordinary demands is an expression of a changed sentiment in the country.

In fact, I was informed in Berlin last summer that Germany, and not the United States, will one day claim and receive credit for developing, in the modern world, the League idea, and the German people, by virtue of their familiarity with

that idea, will be found its staunchest supporters. A distinguished German professor is authority for the statement. Immanuel Kant, he pointed out, drew up a covenant for a League of Nations, declaring that "the law of nations shall be founded on a Federation of Free States," and Beethoven, I was further informed, set the covenant to music in his "Ninth Symphony," which was written, so this professor asserted, as a prophetic "Song of Songs for a League of Nations."

It is not necessary to dispute these contentions. But they indicate at least that the League is making progress in Germany. Two years ago I talked of the League with this professor, and his assertions concerning it were far from complimentary. But it is indicative of the eminence to which the League, in his opinion, has attained since then that this scholar felt himself under obligation to assert, with a good deal of vehemence, a claim for its German ancestry.

Thus as a second factor which has contributed to bring the League to its new status there is this support from an increasing world-opinion.

A third factor is found in the increasing independence of the League of the United States. As I have pointed out in a previous chapter, one of the reasons that European settlement, during the last eighteen months, has gone forward more rapidly is the realization that the job of rebuilding is a European job to be carried forward,

primarily, by Europeans. This realization has aided the development of the League. The League, with Europe, marked time while American politicians in 1919 and in 1920 made up America's mind. And through the period that has intervened the League's usefulness has been hampered by the fact that the support from the United States, upon which its supporters had so firmly relied, failed to materialize. Not only did the United States refuse to enter the League, but during a considerable period officials of the American government appeared to block, in every possible way, the League's activities. And this served to make the task of developing confidence in and reliance upon the League much more difficult.

Furthermore, the action of the United States Senate gave a serious setback to the development of League opinion throughout the world. This was well illustrated in the case of Japan. Dr. Inaze Nitobe, the Japanese diplomat, expressed to me with what widespread enthusiasm the plan for the League was first heralded in Japan. A League of Nations Union was organized which, according to Doctor Nitobe, included practically all of the prominent people of Japan, from the Prime Minister down the line. A large number of the members of both houses of Parliament also joined and the public opinion of the country was unitedly and whole-heartedly back of the Geneva organization.

Then came the "putsch" of America's irrecon-

cilables. The League was rejected by the Senate of the United States.

"Immediately," declared Doctor Nitobe, "there was a League slump in Japan. Membership in the League of Nations Union dropped off. Fully one half of the force of the League idea was lost in Japan when the United States Senate refused American participation."

It has taken four years, Doctor Nitobe said, to win back the ground which was lost in Japan at that time. "Now the Japanese people are again swinging to the League viewpoint. There has been a recent rapid growth in the League of Nations Union. This time opinion back of the League is more rational than emotional. It is becoming evident to the Orient that in the Geneva organization there is the basis for a genuine League, not of Europe, but of the world. Every act of the United States, such as indorsement of the World Court, which gives further recognition to the League advances immeasurably that ideal of international cooperation."

But it is true that the absence of the United States has ceased to be so serious an obstacle in regard to the League as is the case in regard to the general European situation. Europe now is prepared to go ahead without the United States. And the development of this determination to carry on, in the League, without the United States bids fair to stimulate America to greater cooperation with the League. At any rate cer-

tain problems of settlement and of peace were altogether too pressing to be held in abeyance until the United States deemed itself ready to utilize the League machinery.

The vital consideration in this connection, from the American point of view, is that the period of fluidity and confusion that followed the war is drawing to an end. The world quite visibly is shaping into a League mold. The delay of the United States in entering the League robs her of any considerable share in shaping that mold. It is a serious question whether from such a development America can afford to remain isolated.

It is a certainty, however, that though the development of the League would have gone forward more rapidly with the United States, the difficulties which it has been obliged to overcome have given it a measure of strength which could not have been attained so readily had it depended, at every step, upon the assistance of America.

The final factor which has contributed to the emergence of the League from its apprenticeship is the failure of the anti-League statesmanship to force the nations back into the old rival-alliance diplomacy. There was at one time every indication that the Continent would go back to the old round of armament-competition and certain conflict. In the case of England it was a toss-up whether she would return to the ideal of "splendid isolation," and turning her back upon Europe, develop the empire, or whether she would try to

play her part through the League in consolidating peace. The spokesmen for the isolation point of view were very powerful after Versailles, and have not been wholly silenced even now. But the success of their program has been made exceedingly unlikely.

In the case of France it was a question of alliances. French statesmen might devote themselves to the task of establishing supremacy on the Continent by the old order diplomacy furthered through French alliances with the new states of Eastern Europe. They might seek, as another alternative, to drag England and Italy into the system; or, following another possibility, seek to revive the old Russian alliance. On the other hand the French spokesmen might turn to the League.

Germany was faced with the question of whether the country was to develop, under the influence of the Nationalists, a "Rapallo Policy," that is, an alliance with Russia, or whether she would seek a rapprochement with Western Europe through the channels of the League. In the case of Italy the question was whether the Fascists would turn to the League or attempt to go further on the lines of what may be called the "Corfu Policy," and eventually start a war in the Mediterranean with the object of expansion.

In all these questions the fate of the League was seriously involved. And in the solution of each the League has gained prestige. England

has chosen definitely for the League policy. In France too it has become apparent that on the basis of sheer material strength, upon which the nationalists relied, the nation, sooner or later, must fall into second or third place in the world. It has become equally apparent that by no other means can France secure the support of the Powers and of world opinion save through a peace policy in the League. This conviction has been strengthened in France by the influential group of French liberals who stand now, as they have always stood, for international conciliation.

In Germany the failure of the Rapallo Policy of rapprochement with Russia speeded the German decision to find a basis of agreement with Western Europe and to work through the League for the reestablishment of her place in the world.

Italy, too, has swung definitely away from the first Fascist policy and toward the League. Strong-arm methods, the Italians have found, are not permanently successful either at home or abroad. So recently as the end of 1923 the Italians were denying the jurisdiction of the League on the ground that questions of "honor" and vital interest could not be adjudicated. In 1924 the Italian representatives came to the Sixth Assembly boasting of the fact that they had concluded an arbitration treaty with Switzerland in which *all* questions, without exception, should be submitted to peaceful settlement.

An observer at the Sixth Assembly wrote me

that "listening to the Italian representative holding forth on this subject (the Swiss treaty), I could not help being impressed between this attitude and that of the same man on the Council a year ago, at the time of the Corfu affair. It is interesting that even the Fascisti should have discovered that Italy has more to gain in prestige, prosperity, and everything else by a League policy than by any attempts at Prussianism."

After five years, therefore, a new League of Nations has emerged out of the uncertain organization set up in 1919. Five years ago the Council of the League of Nations held its first meeting in a gloomy room at the Quai d'Orsay in Paris. It had one item on its agenda. Its sessions scarcely caused a ripple in diplomatic circles. During December, 1924, the thirty-second session of the Council convened in Rome. On its agenda were forty items. The ten member nations sent to represent them Prime Ministers and ex-Premiers and Foreign Ministers; such men as Austen Chamberlain, Aristide Briand, Benito Mussolini, Edouard Benes. And the attention of the entire world was directed toward their deliberations.

To-day the League of Nations is well on the road to establishing itself as a universal organization. At the First Assembly, in 1920, there were forty-two member nations, and six states sought admission during that year. In 1921 the three Baltic states were added, and in 1922 Hungary, Germany's war ally. In 1923 Abyssinia

and the Irish Free State were admitted to membership, and in 1924 the Dominican Republic became the League's fifty-fifth member. And at the present moment Germany is making inquiry of Geneva regarding the possibility of German membership. During this entire period there has been but one request for withdrawal from League membership.

It is no ordinary achievement that through the operation of this Geneva organization the habit of international adjustment by conference has been developed.

In 1899 there was widespread rejoicing, particularly in the United States, when the Czar of Russia succeeded, after extended efforts, in bringing together, for the first Hague conference, the representatives of twenty-five nations. Not until 1907 did another such conference meet. The delegates from forty-four nations met in the second Hague conference. To establish the conference habit was declared to be the most significant contribution that could come from the Hague meeting. A third Hague conference was proposed during the period from 1907 to 1915, but efforts to call it were unavailing. Now the conference method—which was the hope of those who met at The Hague—has become a matter of international routine. That fact perhaps constitutes the most significant contribution of the League of Nations during this first period of its development.

Now, behind the standard of open and cooptative international dealing which the League has set up, there has rallied the support of world opinion. The governments of Europe and of the world are acquiring the League mind. The League standard is rapidly becoming the measure by which international situations are appraised and on the basis of which they are met. Commonsense world opinion—in politics and out of politics—is in a fair way to make of the League of Nations a democratic world alliance—an alliance both of governments and of peoples.

CHAPTER VIII

HOW SHALL WE OUTLAW WAR?

To place the brand of outlawry upon war and the whole war system has become the purpose of an increasing number of the advocates of peace both in the United States and in Europe. But this movement—like most progressive undertakings—lacks a united following. Although it originated in the United States the first American supporters of the movement have, up to now, withheld their influence from any but an academic discussion of the problems involved. In Europe, on the other hand, and among certain groups in the United States the principle of the outlawry of war was accepted, in 1924, as the basis for a practical proposal.

Now, there can be no denying the immense service of those who, while determined that war shall be declared an international crime, have resolutely refused to take the immediate steps which are necessary if that declaration is to have even the slightest weight in the chancelleries of the world. Despite their impatience with what are termed "half-way measures," these individuals have made the question an international issue. On countless platforms they have declaimed for

the outlawry of war. They have inaugurated widespread journalistic agitation, both for and against the proposal. Under their leadership many organizations, particularly church organizations, have expressed outspoken approval. These first advocates of the proposition that war be denied the sanctions of legality have performed a necessary prophetic function. They have been the forerunners of a vast and epoch-making international enterprise. Without their pioneering it is exceedingly doubtful if, so soon after the conclusion of the greatest war in history, the foundations could have been laid for a structure which will give effect to the principle they have sponsored.

It is of great importance, however, if the initial popular impetus which this movement gained is not to be lost, that the support behind it be speedily united upon a definite plan. Much of the platform speaking and editorial enthusiasm and many of the expressions in the myriad resolutions which have cried out for the outlawry of war have had no language but a cry. The old peace talk, peace editorials and peace resolutions were clothed in a new—more appealing—garb. But more than the discovery of a new terminology is necessary to conserve the renewed purpose of countless men and women who are determined to have done with the whole war business. A definite plan is required to lift the question out of the realm of purely academic discussion and to vest

it with the means and the machinery for the actual establishment of the principle.

Now, in such a plan, if it ever reaches beyond the period of evanescence, certain definite things are involved. In the first place the plan itself must be drawn up in recognition of the present state of world affairs. The world has gone forward a considerable distance since 1918, but the place has not yet been reached where by the mere declaration so momentous a principle as the outlawry of war can be established. Then, in view of the fact that even in 1924 there are wars and rumors of wars and international suspicion and fear, such a plan must involve a square facing of the problem of security. We may wish it otherwise, but it remains true that there are many states—large and small—who can hardly be condemned because of an unwillingness to barter away their national security in exchange for the assurance that the rest of the world hates war as much as they. Then, again, such a plan must involve the question of disarmament. No proposal to outlaw, or in any other way seriously threaten the existence of war, can claim serious attention for any extended period if it fails to lead to a reduction of armaments. It is not only that a military machine is costly, but also that sentiment is more and more converging toward the conviction that, with armaments on the down grade, the stock of peace will rise. Finally a plan to outlaw war must link itself to some effective

international machinery. Peace plans have always lacked adequate machinery. The best conceivable proposal for the outlawing of war will gather dust unless its sponsors move to bring it before whatever agency is best fitted to secure world action. Not only is such an agency necessary for the initial step. The same machinery must be intrusted with handling the many and complex problems that are certain to continue to arise after the first steps are taken.

It is at some of these points, which I believe are fundamental to the success of any scheme to outlaw war, that the proposals of Senator William E. Borah and the American Committee for the Outlawry of War are open to the most serious criticism. The essential principles of the plan which is being advocated by this group are as follows (*Security Against War*, by Frances Kellor, page 782, by courtesy of the Macmillan Company):

1. "The further use of war as an institution for the settlement of international disputes shall be abolished.

2. "War between nations shall be declared to be a public crime under the law of nations, but the right of defense against actual invasion shall not be impaired.

3. "All annexations, seizures, or exactions by force, duress, or fraud shall be null and void.

4. "The international laws of peace shall be based upon equality and justice between nations

and shall be expanded, adapted, and brought down to date from time to time by similar conventions.

5. "A judicial substitute for war as the method of settling international disputes shall be creaated (or if existing in part, adapted and adjusted) in the nature of an international court modeled on our Federal Supreme Court in its jurisdiction over controversies between our sovereign States; such court to possess affirmative jurisdiction to hear and decide all international controversies, as defined by code or arising under the treaties.

6. "The jurisdiction of the court shall not extend to matters of governmental, domestic or protective policy unless one of the disputing parties has by treaty or otherwise given another country a claim that involves these subjects. The classes of disputes excluded from the jurisdiction of the international court shall be specifically enumerated in the code and not be left open to the flexible and dangerous distinction between justiciable and non-justiciable controversies, including questions of national honor.

7. "War must be outlawed before the International Court is given affirmative jurisdiction over the disputes of the nations, just as the power to engage in war among our States was, under Article 1, Section 9 of our Constitution given up by our States before they clothed the Supreme Court with jurisdiction over their disputes.

8. "National armaments to be reduced to the

lowest point consistent with domestic safety and reasonable international requirements.

9. "All nations shall make public report once each year, setting forth fully their armaments, old and new, military and naval, structural and chemical. These reports to be verified by authorized committees acting under the direction and jurisdiction of the international court.

10. "Every nation shall by agreement or treaty bind itself to indict and punish its own international war breeders or instigators and war profiteers under powers similar to those conferred upon our Congress under Article 1, Section 8 of our Federal Constitution, which clothes Congress with the power 'to define and punish offenses against the law of nations.' Provisions for adequate legislation to this end should be made."

As to the ideals which these declarations represent there can be but little disagreement. Their actual value, in terms of applicability to the present world situation, however, is a matter of considerable doubt. Let us agree with the proponents of this particular scheme, that "the further use of war as an institution for the settlement of international disputes shall be abolished." What, then, are we going to do about it? It seems plain enough, as I have already indicated, that the starting point for any such undertaking must be in a recognition of the distance that separates the world from the realization of that ideal. Having clearly faced that fact, we are

obliged to choose at once as to whether we will ignore the present need of the world for peace and adopt a plan designed to come into operation when, at some future date, the world is more perfectly constituted; or whether we will still hold to the ideal of that more perfect world, but agree upon a plan that will begin to function even under the imperfect conditions of the here and now. The Borah scheme, after the admirable resolution in the first clause, goes on its way on the assumption that the world is different than it is, and, in consequence, mankind is left without any means with which to meet its immediate needs.

Whatever practical proposals the plan contains are presented without reference to the fact that these precise practical steps have already been undertaken, on a much more significant scale, by the representatives of most of the rest of the world, in the League of Nations. Are those who advocate the outlawry of war to refuse, at the very outset, to proceed on the basis of that principle of cooperation upon which their whole scheme is founded? Or is this interest in the outlawry of war to be made secondary to the concern for the success of a particular outlawry scheme? Certainly, any organization that so glibly proceeds with its own proposals and has neither eyes to see nor ears to hear what the rest of the world is doing cannot expect that its plan will have significant world approval.

Then, the proposals of this group after abol-

ishing war as a means for the settlement of international disputes proceed to recognize that "the right of defense against actual invasion shall not be impaired." This, certainly, involves a naïve oversight of the fact that all modern wars are wars of self-defense. If it is answered that this scheme proposed only defense "against actual invasion" one may inquire just when actual invasion begins? France, certainly, was invaded in 1914. But the Germans contend that their territory was threatened by Russia to the point where resistance to invasion would have been called a matter of self-defense. Is it not true also that German Zeppelins invaded England? And was not the submarine warfare of Germany against American ships an actual invasion of the United States? Modern warfare is so complex and far-reaching in its weapons that to outlaw all wars save those of self-defense, and then fail to define self-defense, is in reality to outlaw no wars at all.

That the international laws of peace shall be further codified is, of course, an essential part of any peace program and constitutes an undertaking, as we shall see later on, that is already well under way. A judicial substitute for war, we are told, "shall be created." Well and good—with two exceptions. What is the world to do in the interim—which it is safe to say will cover a considerable period—before this judicial substitute is set up, accepted by the governments of the world and vested with authority sufficient to

make it an effective instrument for peace? And how about the settlement of issues out of court? It is apparent that international law, even though rapidly codified, will never cover every issue arising between states any more than common law covers every issue arising between individuals. More individual disputes, unquestionably, are settled out of than in court. Nations, quite as much as individuals, will hardly desire to appeal to the court save in regard to the most serious issues. Where, in this scheme, is there an international back fence over which the representatives of various powers, without exciting the suspicions of panicmongers, can thresh out those countless minor problems of neighborly adjustment out of the accumulation of which many of the major conflicts arise?

Disarmament is called for "to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety and reasonable international requirements." That, I believe, is exactly the point at which armaments, in all nations and from time immemorial, have been maintained. So far as the report of the armament status of each country is concerned, it may be remarked—as a point of information—that such a committee performing such a function already exists in the League of Nations. That it does not find its authorization from an international court should not make its data less valuable to the proponents of this scheme—prior to the time that their own machinery begins to operate.

Finally, every nation having determined its own guilt in a war is called upon to punish itself. By treaty each power is to be bound "to indict and punish its own international war breeders or instigators and war profiteers." That, to be sure, is an extraordinary proposal. A nation, convicted by itself of its crimes, proceeds to inflict its own punishment upon itself. The spectacle of a full-grown people reading out the indictments against themselves, acting at once as judge, jury, criminal, and executioner—this is a burlesque. Could a mere treaty agreement convince Germany of its war guilt or have led the Germans to punish their own war lords? Could such a treaty have served to inflict punishment upon America's war profiteers? At the present moment, when American jingoes are making a well-calculated drive to bring about an anti-Japanese panic in the United States, what restraining effect would such a treaty have? Obviously, some agency must be given authority to determine when a nation violates the peace and the penalties which must result from that violation. That authority can never safely be vested in the individual nations themselves. Rather it must be a result of an international judgment to which all nations a party to the plan will be committed.

This entire scheme, of course, rests upon the creation of a world opinion in its support. But so far as the plan itself is concerned no means

are provided for the creation of that machinery. And yet, with little question, that is the most formidable undertaking confronting the proponents of the plan. Not only is there no suggestion as to the creation of a favorable world sentiment, but not a single reference is made to the only effective machinery now working to accomplish precisely that end. There is no denying the failures and shortcomings of the League of Nations. The convictions of humanity have not, by its activities, been wholly mobilized for peace. But it is safe to say that there has never been in the history of the world so formidable a support for the agencies of peace as that which has rallied behind the League's attempts to bring united world action. Nevertheless, even conceding the failures of the League, the friends of the Borah plan to outlaw war are faced with three alternatives: they can contend that no machinery is necessary for the education of world opinion to the indorsement of the outlawry proposal; they can set out to build machinery of their own; or they can agree to make use of the imperfect machinery of the League itself.

The first alternative, obviously, is impossible if one gives a serious second thought to the present state of world—and particularly of American—opinion. There are two problems connected with the second alternative. First, the new machinery must be demonstrably better than the League machinery. Second, it must be enough

better to convince the fifty-four nations already in the League of that superiority. The third alternative recognizes the inadequacy of the League, as at present constituted, but provides the opportunity to work within the only existing machinery to bring about its improvement, on much the same principle that the Constitution of the United States was adopted—not as a perfect document, but as the basis for a common effort to establish a more perfect union.

The first significant international action in recognition of the principle of the outlawry of war was taken at the Sixth Assembly of the League of Nations in September, 1924. This action, incorporated in the "Protocol of Arbitration, Security, and Disarmament," was the unanimous expression of the representatives of forty-eight governments. Already it has been ratified by the Parliaments of fifteen nations. Whether or not it ever comes into effect, the proposition to outlaw war has been advanced by the Protocol from the period of speculation to that of definite negotiation and agreement.

In its major features the Protocol (Foreign Policy Association Pamphlet No. 29)

1. "Declares war of aggression an international crime.

2. "Outlaws the nation which starts such a war; stipulates that it shall bear the costs.

3. "Offers peaceful methods of settlement of every international dispute.

4. "Promises to every nation which will use only peaceful methods for settling its disputes with other nations united protection and security from danger of war.

5. "Creates agencies and methods, judicial and arbitral, by which to secure justice and promote friendly solutions for all difficulties.

6. "Provides for a World Conference for the Reduction of Armaments."

The Protocol begins in terminology similar to that of the plan which I have been discussing. The signatory powers, in recognition of the "solidarity of the members of the international community," assert "that a war of aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and is an international crime."

But instead of limiting this outlawry to wars which are not in "self-defense," the League Protocol proceeds to clear up the ambiguities which surround this distinction by a clear statement of the circumstances under which a nation becomes an aggressor. This definition, in the words of Edouard Herriot, declares that an aggressor state is "that one which refuses arbitration." In the more exact terminology of the Protocol, "any state shall be presumed to be an aggressor unless a decision of the Council, which must be taken unanimously, shall otherwise declare:

1. "If it has refused to submit the dispute to the procedure of pacific settlement provided by Articles XIII and XV of the Covenant as ampli-

fied by the present Protocol, or to comply with a judicial sentence or arbitral award or with a unanimous recommendation of the Council, or has disregarded a unanimous report of the Council, a judicial sentence or an arbitral award recognizing that the dispute between it and the other belligerent states arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter state; nevertheless, in the last case the state shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly of the League, in accordance with Article II of the Covenant.

2. "If it has violated provisional measures enjoined by the Council for the period while the proceedings are in progress as contemplated by Article VII of the present Protocol."

Thus an "aggressor nation" is defined as a nation that goes to war refusing to accept summons to court, or the measures of arbitration and conciliation provided for through the League. Decision here is not left to the uncertain discriminations of an individual state under the stress of a crisis. Rather it is the joint decision of a large number of states, arrived at after deliberation and discussion that has gone on through a period of three years.

But the Protocol does not stop with a mere declaration that aggressive war is an international crime. It proceeds to find a substitute for

war itself. The Protocol, therefore, provides for the compulsory authority of the World Court.

"The signatory states," declares Article 3 of the Protocol, "undertake to recognize as compulsory, *ipso facto* and without special agreement, the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice." It is significant that such jurisdiction has already been accorded to the Court by twenty-two nations, including France.

There are, however, certain questions which, because of the fact that international law is only partially codified or because of their nonlegal character, would not fall under the jurisdiction of the Court. Nations, parties to a dispute, may agree—if the questions involved are outside the authority of the Court—upon their own agencies of arbitration. In such case there is no obligation to use the machinery of the League of Nations. If such an arbitral agency cannot be agreed upon, the signatory powers are obligated to carry their dispute before the Council of the League. Under the direction of the Council an attempt will then be made to find a means for arbitration. If this too fails, the Council itself will undertake to act as the arbitrator. If the decision which the Council reaches in regard to the dispute is unanimous, the verdict must be accepted. If it is not unanimous, the Council will proceed on its own authority to set up a tribunal, the decision of which will be binding.

Only in regard to questions adjudged to be

domestic is the decision of the Court or the Council or other agency of arbitration not held to be binding. Domestic issues—contrary to the impression in the United States—are excluded from the field of compulsory arbitration, although the council and the Assembly of the League may still exert their good offices for the maintenance of peace.

Article V, because it has been so widely misinterpreted, needs to be set down here:

"If in the course of an arbitration, such as is contemplated in Article 4 above, one of the parties claims that the dispute, or part thereof, arises out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of that party, the arbitrators shall on this point take the advice of the Permanent Court of International Justice through the medium of the Council. The opinion of the Court shall be binding upon the arbitrators who, if the opinion is affirmative, shall confine themselves to so declaring their award.

"If the question is held by the Court or by the Council to be a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the state, this decision shall not prevent consideration of the situation by the Council or by the Assembly under Article II of the Covenant."

A further reference to the question of domestic issues is contained in Article X of the Protocol, where it is declared that any state shall be pre-

sumed to be an aggressor in the event of hostilities having broken out after it has disregarded a unanimous report of the Council, a judicial sentence, or an arbitral award, recognizing that the dispute between it and the other belligerent state arises out of a matter solely within the domestic jurisdiction of the latter.

"Nevertheless," says the much discussed sentence introduced to satisfy Japan, "in the last case the state shall only be presumed to be an aggressor if it has not previously submitted the question to the Council or the Assembly, in accordance with Article XI of the Covenant."

Now, briefly, the meaning of the Japanese amendment is this: Under the original text of the Protocol a state whose dispute with another state had been dismissed on the ground of domestic jurisdiction would, in case hostilities broke out, have to be considered as an aggressor unless *unanimously acquitted* by the League Council. Under the text as it now stands, with the Japanese amendment, such a state would not be declared an aggressor if it had appealed to the Council or the Assembly after the legal action had gone against it. Neither party to the dispute could be declared to be an aggressor *unless unanimously condemned* by the Council. Failing to reach such a unanimous conclusion, the Council could only enjoin an armistice on both parties, the terms of which would be fixed by a two-thirds majority of the Council. The state that refused the armis-

tice would be presumed then to be an aggressor unless a unanimous decision of the Council declared otherwise.

Thus the terms inserted at the request of Japan considerably modify the seriousness of the situation that might arise over a domestic issue. There is no opportunity on the mere "presumption of aggression" to declare a state to be an aggressor if even one state, member of the Council, declares against such decision. This, of course, is provided the state, party to the dispute, has appealed to the Council or the Assembly.

Now, when a question is referred to the Council or the Assembly under Article XI of the Covenant these bodies have no power, even by a unanimous vote (excluding the disputants), to impose any kind of decision or award on the interested parties. All the Assembly or the Council can do is to mediate between the parties, try to conciliate them, discuss the matter with them and seek to persuade them both to accept some kind of a formula or agreement. In other words, the Council and the Assembly can give the matter an "international airing" in a conciliatory atmosphere. The Protocol does not, therefore, give to the Council or Assembly or any other body any power whatever, even to give an award on a matter of domestic jurisdiction, let alone to impose a decision.

Manley O. Hudson, Professor of International Law at Harvard, explained this point in a recent

address as follows: "Let us be clear about the effect of the Japanese amendment, therefore. It has been greatly exaggerated in the United States. What Japan insisted upon was this: 'If we should go to war about a question found to be domestic, we insist that we shall not be regarded as aggressors unless we have failed to give the Council a chance to consider the situation and avert hostilities first.' This is very far from saying that the Council can make any binding recommendations with reference to a domestic question. It is an attempt to lay down some limitations which would extend the outlawry of war even to hostilities begun over a domestic question."

Another important matter in regard to the Protocol is its provision for the further codification of international law. The jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice will never cover all questions of dispute between nations, but already steps have been taken to call together a group of the world's most eminent international lawyers for the purpose of further building the structure of international law. Through the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice and through the activities of the League the body of international law has steadily grown since the close of the war. With the present proposal for the outlawry of war before the nations of the world it has become of even greater importance to speed the development of this system of law between nations. Such an

undertaking is already under way, with American lawyers serving with those of other nations in the task.

Now, the next step, after the judicial judgment of aggression, for which the Protocol provides, is the determination of measures to outlaw the aggressor. It is mere tautology to declare for the outlawry of war and ignore the necessity for outlawing the agency by means of which war comes. To refuse to provide for the outlawry of the aggressor nation, moreover, is to deny the existence of the problem of security. The seriousness of the question of security is frequently overlooked in the United States. Geographical isolation—perhaps more imaginary than real—has bred in many Americans a fine scorn for those who, living closer to unpleasant realities, insist upon giving those realities some consideration in any discussion of the international situation. If the problem of security is to be ignored, one may as well abandon all efforts to set up the working machinery of peace. It is unfortunate perhaps that this is the case. Idealism would be much more unsullied under different conditions. The European *status quo*, we may believe, should not be guaranteed. But certainly, American influence in Europe can never be asserted either on the problem of the outlawry of war or on that of disarmament unless the intricate relation of both of these matters to the question of national security is clearly seen. Nor can the desire of the

peoples of Europe for peace be discounted because of this insistence that national security be provided for.

Edouard Herriot expressed the matter before the Sixth Assembly of the League:

"At all times and for all peoples," he declared, "war has been a dreadful reality; we must now make a reality of peace. I use definite terms because I feel that we are now faced by the greatest of all our duties to mankind, if we wish our work to be regarded by posterity as something more than barren proceedings of some vast sterile academy. Arbitration must not be made a snare for trustful nations.

"If upon the foundation of this trust you desire to establish a final charter to govern international relations, you must, of your free will, afford protection to all countries that loyally observe their bond—if necessary, the smallest country—against the deceit and menaces of force. A great nation can, if need be, protect itself unaided; a small nation cannot."

"We Frenchmen believe—and in speaking thus I am expressing a moral rather than a political idea—we French believe that a nation which accepts arbitration; which, notwithstanding the uncertainties and risks that still exist in the world, sets this example of willingness to accept the dictates of justice—we Frenchmen believe that such a nation, be it great or small, has a right to security."

Therefore to meet this demand that security be guaranteed to those nations which accept the dictates of arbitration, the Protocol provides for joint action against the aggressor state. All the states parties to the Protocol shall come to the aid of the nation that is attacked. Now the extent of the support which any nation gives to the state which is attacked is not determined in advance. There is no surrender of control over the military forces of a nation, and no dictation to the various governments as to the extent and the ways and means of the employment of their armed forces. No state under the Protocol assumes any particular obligation to send its military support under any circumstances. International action of this sort against an aggressor is the last resort. When it becomes necessary each government will be called upon to determine the extent of its contribution to the common enterprise.

Now this cooperative outlawry not only of war but of the provocateur of war is important not only because it meets adequately the demand for security, but also because it serves as a deterrent to the war makers. The proposal contained in the Borah plan for the outlawry of war affords no basis for cooperative action. A single state, if it is attacked, makes its own defense. Just how that program will work to prevent war is not clear. Something more than a nation's pledged word is necessary to keep the peace—especially

when that word is capable of the variety of meanings in which "self-defense" could be interpreted. It is hardly acceptable to the pacifist point of view perhaps, but it remains true that a "policeman's club" of some proportions must be provided for in any peace plan from which permanent results are expected.

In fact, a certain group of pacifists and the proponents of the Borah scheme have asserted the League Protocol is "not a scheme to outlaw war. It proposes to control the world by force, to outlaw war with war. . . . Security for the powers is the end, not the outlawry of war." Well, it seems to me that neither security for the powers, nor the outlawry of war, but peace should be the end. If we are so insistent that peace be won in this particular way rather than that, the whole discussion shifts away from the end and we are lost in a heated advocacy of some scheme.

The League Protocol, moreover, merely proposes to do more effectively what the Borah proposals admit must be done, but fail to do. "The right of self-defense against actual invasion shall not be impaired," runs the statement of this American group. Here, then, we have our choice between an aggressor nation punished by the action of the single state against whom the aggressor moves, or the aggressor state punished by the united action of the world. In the former case each state must maintain a military establishment "consistent with domestic safety and reasonable

international requirements"—in other words, reduced to a point no lower than that required for protection against a neighbor state. In the latter case, however, disarmament may proceed to the point where the united military establishment of all the states party to the agreement is sufficient to afford protection against the possible aggression of any one.

"The Protocol," say some of its opponents, "does not contemplate abandonment of force, but provides for a massing of force on a more universal scale." It is strange to see these same individuals throwing themselves with great enthusiasm behind precisely that same principle as it is incorporated in the Borah plan. It is at this point too that the question of a police force enters in. Even most pacifists will admit the need of an international police force, but will draw a clear and, I believe, valid distinction between the functions of the police and those of an army and navy.

"There are four fundamental differences between war and the use of police," declares Kirby Page in *The Abolition of War*, pp. 108, 109:

1. "The police function as neutral third parties for the purpose of restraining criminals and bringing them before a judicial body for trial and judgment. In war force is used by the belligerents themselves, no effort being made to bring evildoers before a judicial body, each army acting as sheriff, judge, jury, and executioner, usually under the sway of passion.

2. "The police take action against the criminal himself; they do not kill his family and friends. . . .

3. "There is a fundamental difference in the situation which confronts the police and the army. In order to protect society the police are compelled to restrain or convert the criminal himself, whereas in a national situation it is possible to deal with criminal rulers or officials by strengthening the groups within that country which are opposed to military aggression. . . .

4. "The police actually do serve as a constructive and redemptive force in society, in spite of many miscarriages of justice and occasional misuse of power. Modern war—whatever may be said about wars of previous generations—in actual operation is not constructive but so enormously destructive as to menace the existence of our civilization."

Now, the distinction which Mr. Page makes here between the functions and activities of the police and the army is a precise description of the difference between war as we have known it and the cooperative action of the nations signatory to the Protocol to punish an aggressor. Under the Protocol before such steps are taken every effort has been exhausted to hale the criminal into court. He is, however, still at large. His presence is a threat to society. The international police, composed of the delegated military forces of the world's nations, are sent against

the criminal. They proceed not to destroy but to check him; not to work revenge but to hale him before those tribunals which he has refused to heed, in order that justice—not the arbitrament of the battlefield—shall declare his punishment. There is, of course, no way by which bloodshed can be wholly prevented in the process of effecting this national arrest any more than it can be prevented in the case of individual arrest. But certainly, the arresting force is no longer the judiciary nor the jury nor the executioner. What military establishments remain become under the Protocol the means for preserving domestic order and, as the world police, the means for maintaining international order.

Reference will be made in greater detail in another connection to the disarmament question which, with those of arbitration and security, is bound into the Protocol. The Protocol itself does not come into effect unless ratified by three of the four Great Powers—the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan—as well as by ten other members of the League, and until the Conference on Disarmament has adopted a plan for reduction of armaments. Providing ratification was forthcoming the date for that conference was tentatively fixed for June 15, 1925. The necessity for consultation with the members of the British Empire has made postponement inevitable.

Regardless of the fate of the Protocol, it is safe to say that no disarmament conference—that

seriously sets about it to limit land, sea, and air forces—can succeed if it proceeds without giving, as is given in the Protocol, adequate consideration to the question of national security. It is easy enough to say that the United States will not dabble in European politics. But it is exceedingly difficult to see how the disarmament problem can be met without facing, simultaneously, those political problems which constitute at least a part of the basis of the demand for armaments.

The Protocol is a document designed with particular reference to the European situation. It includes a complete system for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes. A prominent place is given, in this system, for political and semipolitical methods instead of concentrating on judicial methods, and, as a result, exempting questions of "honor and vital interests," as many Americans would have preferred. The United States, moreover, is not asked to adhere to the Protocol. If adhesion ever comes, it will be, doubtless, with certain reservations. The important matter, however, even for the United States, is that Europe for the first time in history has squarely faced the whole war question. The second Hague conference endeavored to establish the principle of compulsory arbitration. But no such attempt has ever been made, before the Sixth Assembly of the League, to outlaw war itself.

The Protocol may never be ratified by the neces-

sary number of powers to bring it into effect. But the fact that a plan so far beyond the proposals of any prewar schemes for peace could win the votes of the representatives of forty-eight nations and the ratification of fourteen marks a long stride forward. Here, certainly, is Europe hard at the job of establishing peace. If Americans who have demanded that Europe, as a preliminary to American cooperation, make some efforts on its own behalf, have been sincere in their demands, the near future will witness a widespread conversion of isolationists.

Whether or not such a development is in the offing—and I am afraid my faith is not strong enough to believe that it is—the very minimum of American good will would seem to demand a full measure of approval for Europe's efforts. After all, Europe keeping Europe's peace is keeping the peace for the United States as well.

The Protocol may not bring the final outlawry of war, but it is so far in advance of any other plan, both in its particular proposals and in the extent of its acceptance by the nations of the world, that it can hardly fail to win the support of those who have sponsored other schemes but are concerned, first of all, in destroying war. And whether it fails or succeeds before the Parliaments of the world, the Protocol will continue to stand as one of the most significant of the milestones that mark the road over which mankind is journeying from the jungle.

CHAPTER IX

EUROPEAN RELIGIOUS RECONSTRUCTION

European reconstruction has been considered almost wholly from the economic and political points of view. Scant attention has been paid to the reconstruction of religion. Europe's statesmen have journeyed hither and yon from conference to conference in search of a way out of their difficulties. No such agitation has been apparent among religious leaders. At Genoa and Spa, London and Geneva, politicians and financiers sought to find common ground from which to approach the problems of Europe's material rebuilding. There have been very few conferences to indicate that an effort was being made for the spiritual rebuilding of Europe. This fact, certainly, cannot be due to a belief that no religious wreckage was left in the wake of the war. One of the most apparent of the devastations of Europe is the debris of many of the prewar religious structures. Particularly is this true in Germany, Russia, and the Succession States of Central and Eastern Europe. There many of the old ecclesiastical buildings were shattered and few new edifices have been constructed to replace them.

In Germany since the Protestant Reformation, national churches (*Landeskirchen*) existed in all of the individual states of the German Empire. These churches, though they differed widely in their doctrines and ecclesiastical organization in various parts of Germany, were governed by Constitutions that were very similar, and in all of them the ruling Prince in the state was also the head of the church. Although these *Landeskirchen* could not, strictly speaking, be called national churches, they represented the control of political autocracy over the organization of religion with the consequent evil and good attendant upon such a system.

The revolution of 1918 brought an end to religious as well as to political autocracy in Germany. The Weimar Constitution called for the "separation of church and state." There was a pronounced hostility to the church in the early days of the republic, and churchmen, with a few exceptions, looked to the future with despair.

In Russia, as I have indicated in a previous chapter, the Greek Orthodox Church, under the Czars, was the right arm of the government. The Orthodox religion of Russia received official state support, and in turn served as the tool of the country's rulers. Under the Soviets, however, the old system was completely shattered. Complete "freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda" is guaranteed under the Constitution, but only the anti-religious clause is widely

operative. No policy is more rigorously enforced in the Soviet Empire than that which separates all religious activity from cooperative dealings with the government.

In the Succession States, those which have arisen from the empire of Austria-Hungary, a similar change has taken place. The Hapsburg dynasty was aggressively Roman Catholic. Temporal power was allied with religious power. The church and the state were one. The Revolution destroyed that unity. The church, though an active and frequently a controlling force in the politics of these new nations, lacks the tremendous prestige which belonged to it when the government represented religious as well as political despotism. Jugo-Slavia presents a peculiar situation in that the Serbs, the dominant nationality, are stanch adherents of the Greek Orthodox Church, whereas the Slovenians and the Croatians are as stanch Roman Catholics. In addition the new state includes within its borders a million or more Mohammedans. The major problem confronting Jugo-Slavia is that of reconciling to cooperation in a common government the members of these divergent religious groups.

Thus it can hardly be said that there are no religious devastated areas calling for reconstruction. Insofar as the war made an end to privileged classes in certain sections of Europe, it also undermined the status of privileged churches. The old forms, like the ancient cathedrals, remain,

but they have lost with the passing of the old order something of their significance. As yet there is little evidence that new forms have been found and a new service adapted to the demands of the new order that is slowly emerging.

From another point of view, the changed status of religion is apparent. Insofar as a new Europe is emerging, it is emerging for the most part under the leadership of individuals who are indifferent, if not hostile, to organized religion. This, obviously, is the price that religion in Europe is called upon to pay for having allowed itself to be used as the instrument of autocracy. In no country is this fact so apparent as in Russia. It was inconceivable there that the friends of a new order could also have been faithful sons of the church. Not only the government but religion placed the brand of outlawry upon those who desired change. The result was an underground organization, the members of which were as atheistic as they were revolutionary. And the new state gives as direct a reflection of the one set of convictions as of the other.

To a lesser degree a similar situation has developed in other European countries. The rising tide of European Socialism has brought to the fore a group of leaders who have always stood in diametrical opposition to the traditional program of organized religion. Liberalism before the war was confronted with religious as much as with political hostility. The one, in fact, implied the

other. Liberals, therefore, carried on in spite of and in opposition to the policies of both church and state.

The church, with the state, represented Nationalism. Liberalism, as represented by the Socialists, was an international gospel. When the pulpit spoke, it was in terms of dogmatism and authority. The Liberals stood for the supremacy of reason. Organized Christianity frequently was an advocate of chauvinism. Socialism represented the doctrine of conciliation. The line of cleavage could scarcely have been more distinct.

In France, more than any other European nation, the rising of a Liberal political power has come into direct conflict with the political force of organized religion. Edouard Herriot is one of those statesmen whose program has been bitterly opposed by the Clericals. Complete separation of church and state was made a major plank in his platform when Edouard Herriot became Premier. His declaration, in his first address to the Chamber of Deputies, that he proposed to discontinue diplomatic relations with the Vatican cleared the decks in France for a new struggle over the old question of the country's political relationship with the Church of Rome.

The situation of M. Herriot—who, after all, stands for the traditional policy of the Third Republic on this question—is complicated because of the postwar rise of Clerical influence in France. Support of the Clerical Party was necessary

for the governments that preceded that of Herriot. Such support had to be paid for by the significant concessions to the Clericals in matters of purely church concern. The result of these concessions has been a significant modification of the separation policy which French governments have followed since the separation laws of 1906 and 1907.

Prior to the French Revolution the Roman Catholic Church was supreme in France. Except in the case of Alsace, no other religious sect, Christian or non-Christian, had any legal right within French borders, although there was a certain amount of religious toleration. The Revolution, however, temporarily ended the state ties with the Roman Catholic Church, and between the years 1794 and 1803 a separation policy was followed.

But Napoleon, when he had established his position by a succession of military victories, saw clearly the value of a Vatican alliance. A Vatican alliance, accordingly, was made. The Concordat of 1803, signed by Napoleon and Pope Pius VII, guaranteed, without making Roman Catholicism the state religion, that the state would pay the salaries of certain of the clergy, with the nomination of priests subject to governmental approval. While recognizing Protestants and Jews, the new agreement gave the place of honor to the Roman Catholic Church as "the faith of the great majority of the French people."

Under this Concordat, the relations between France and the Vatican were governed up to 1906. Throughout this period it is significant to recall that the political influence of Roman Catholicism was uniformly on the side of monarchical reaction and in opposition to the republic. It was to the Clericals that Napoleon III owed his throne—a debt which he repaid by maintaining French troops at the Vatican and thus helping to delay Italian unity until 1870.

Later, it was the Clerical Party that sought to place the Comte de Chambord on the throne, pledged to restore the temporal power of the Pope. The Third Republic defeated this move, but the suspicion that the Clericals were anti-Republican persisted. Particularly was it believed that anti-Republicanism was being fostered in the Roman Catholic schools. Various laws, looking toward the restriction of Roman Catholic influence in the schools, were passed between 1886 and 1901. These were followed, in 1905, by the Separation Law. This law, which was supplemented by a more conciliatory measure in 1907, brought the Concordat of 1801 to an end and abolished state support for religion. Furthermore, it took from Rome the possession of church property in France and vested it in the hands of associations for religious worship.

The war brought about a revival of the political power of the Vatican in France, and this, with the acquisition of Alsace and Lorraine, led toward

reconciliation. Alsace-Lorraine, under Germany, was governed, religiously, by a Concordat with Rome and the separation policy of France was never carried into these two provinces. The 1,400,000 Roman Catholics in this region and the powerful Clerical Party there brought the question of reconciliation to the foreground of French politics, once German control was broken. It was recognized, further, that in Roman Catholic Poland the question of French influence might be considerably affected by a failure of France to come to an agreement with the Pope. It was even said that French colonial ambitions in Syria might be thwarted if the Vatican were led by French hostility to favor other teachers in the schools of Syria, than those sent out from France.

Accordingly, after several attempts which were bitterly opposed by the anti-Clerical Socialists, a papal envoy was proposed for Rome in 1920 during the Premiership of Alexandre Millerand. This move, it was explained, came not to end the policy of separation but to "recognize the great moral power of the Vatican." The Socialists, however, were able to block the move and it was not until 1920, while Aristide Briand was Premier, that ratification for a Vatican Ambassador was finally secured.

At the 1924 election one of the major issues was that of Clericalism. The Roman Catholic Church politicians carried on a most bitter and intensive campaign against the Socialists. In

southern France, in order to becloud this issue, they put in the field a last minute "Catholic Socialist" party. But M. Herriot won the election, and his anti-Clericalism is a logical result of the opposition which his party has always felt and experienced in relation to the Clerical Party.

The war toppled a great many of the edifices of European autocracy. More of those edifices are threatened by the new methods and the new ideals of political and economic relationship that gradually are becoming ascendent in Europe. And with this destruction of autocracy and the rise of liberalism, the men and women, such as M. Herriot, against whom the bitter hostility of church and state in prewar days was leveled, are coming into greater power. The political authority of the church is thereby seriously curtailed. But more than that, the spiritual authority of the church in many places is waning and will continue to wane until it raises up new prophets capable of leading Europe into a religious renaissance.

Despite the pressure of political and economic problems no fact is more apparent in Europe than the need for a religious awakening. In the long run if such an awakening does not come, it is exceedingly doubtful if either the problems of politics or of economics can be permanently solved, for at their basis Europe's difficulties are chiefly spiritual. No fact of history is more plain than the certainty of war where the good

will to peace is lacking. Until the fundamental outlook—the heart outlook—of men is changed the mere tinkering with boundary lines, or the scribbling of economic treaties, or the establishment of paper alliances can provide only a negative and uncertain security—a stop-gap process until the time when adjustments of a deeper nature are possible.

At the end of 1924, for the first time since 1919, one finds something of a basis for genuine optimism in regard to the European situation. A certain measure of hope has entered in to displace the despair that clouded the outlook at the end of 1923. This change has come, in part, as I have pointed out in a previous chapter, because the people have sloughed off the shell shock of the war and are able to view with some degree of objectivity the horrors through which they have come and to give articulate expression to a determination to prevent their recurrence. But in another decade a new generation will have arisen and the realism of war will no longer have the force it now possesses.

It is imperative, therefore, that the widespread reaction against war and the equally widespread desire to establish peace be capitalized before time has softened the experiences of this period, and mankind has lapsed into indifference. If the present opportunity to set up machinery of international settlement is lost, generations, perhaps centuries, will elapse before another so auspicious

time will arrive. And then a new and more devastating holocaust may be required to bring the nations to see as clearly as they now can see the utter folly of the philosophy of conflict. If human reason is not a colossal fraud, now, above all others, is the appointed time for men to devise a new world structure in which humanity can spurn the jungle laws and dwell in self-mastery and brotherhood.

But the mere erection of such a structure is no certain guarantee that the peoples of the earth, henceforth, will "do justly, love kindness, and walk humbly with their God." More vital than new machinery for interhuman relationships is the development of the will to utilize that machinery to the end for which it is created. And a force more powerful and more permanent than the memory of the suffering which the World War brought is required to develop that transformed will. Outside the realm of religion it is difficult to see where such a force will be found.

This will be so much sentimental twaddle to those whose noses are kept to the grindstone of "the things" of modern life; who never get above the day and the materials that fill it to inquire whence they have come, whither they are going or the tragedies en route. But in another group who are concerned with pasts and futures these facts are receiving a constantly more careful consideration. Lord Bryce declared religion to be the "strongest of all the forces by which govern-

ments have been effected." And there are indications that that may be no less the case in the postwar than in the prewar world.

I met a good many politicians in various countries in Europe during 1924. Their testimony in regard to the new Europe that was emerging was strikingly similar on this one point. With few exceptions, these men and women who have to do with the shaping of governmental policies declared that the forces now working to bring about permanent reconstruction would be dissipated sooner or later unless they found a deeper spiritual basis than was possessed at present. That such a basis would be found was considered unlikely. And that fact, more than any other, tempered the optimism that otherwise they might have felt as they faced the future.

Such an outlook in regard to Europe's religious future is shared by other students of conditions there. Reinhold Niebuhr, writing in the Atlantic Monthly, January, 1925, declared that "what is true in Europe and is becoming increasingly true in America is that the humble and lowly folk, and world's burden-bearers, whose religious attitude was once proverbial, are not only alienated from but hostile to religion. This alienation is due not so much to the remoteness of the natural world as to the unwillingness of the dominant classes, who still profess religious faith, to be guided in their social actions by the obvious moral implications of their declared faith. For every

person who has renounced religion in our day because it failed to convince his mind, two have renounced it because it has outraged their conscience by its tacit support of traditional social wrong. . . .

"In France religion has never recovered the power which it lost when the Revolution found it in league with feudal reaction. In Germany, the cradle of more than one vital religious movement, the nation is being torn asunder by a violent Communism in conflict with an equally extreme Nationalism, and the church survives only as a more or less despised ally of Nationalism. In this desperate struggle Catholicism has gained some influence, as a conciliatory factor in the conflict, but Protestantism has been rendered practically impotent. . . . Even in countries which did not suffer from the war, such as Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark, and in which the class struggle is not so desperate, there is the same strong drift to cynical economic determinism among the workers. In England alone the situation is somewhat more favorable, for the English Church never lost contact completely with the labor movement, and so the class struggle is tempered with a measure of religious idealism."

Despite these facts there have been some encouraging religious developments in the history of postwar Europe. Western and Southern Europe, with the exception of England and Germany, is Roman Catholic. Protestantism cannot

expect ever to supplant Catholicism—if that were to be desired. But it cannot be denied that small Protestant groups, aggressively organized in many of the countries of Europe, are bringing to the religious life of these nations a newly interpreted Christian gospel. Since the war those Protestant groups which are affiliated with American Protestant bodies have considerably increased both in numbers and in influence. This doubtless is a result in part of the rise of political leaders of these churches. Certainly, conditions were never before so favorable for the growth of these American affiliated churches.

The great mission of such Protestant bodies, I believe, is not in the inauguration of a struggle against the established religions of Europe in an effort to break their hold upon the people. Rather it is to provide a few practical laboratories where broad-minded religious leaders will come into touch with the demonstrated facts of a gospel that is intellectually appealing and socially applied. And the spokesmen for these church organizations are more and more earnest in their efforts to do just that. The Sunday school in certain parts of Europe has been introduced, since the war, by the representatives of such Protestant churches. Social settlements in various European cities and community centers in many rural districts have been similarly established. The lagging religious interest of the youth in communities touched by these activities

has been greatly stimulated. The maintenance of American Protestant work in Europe presents, in general, not a threat, but a challenge to Catholicism—a challenge that Catholicism in many places is wisely meeting. Any consideration of European religious conditions that leaves this work out of account omits one of the most significant of the factors that are contributing to a European religious awakening.

More spectacular evidence of the vitality of religion in Europe is found in the rise of the National Church in Czecho-Slovakia. Bohemia, under the leadership of Jan Hus, became in the Middle Ages the first Protestant country in the world. The Hussite wars that resulted from this experiment in religious freedom constitute the Golden Age of Bohemian history. Patriotic Czechs, even in this modern day, can never wholly dissociate their patriotism from the principle of liberal religious faith for which their ancestors fought. The establishment of the supremacy of the Roman Catholic Hapsburgs in Bohemia was a bitter experience for the Czechs, and one of the most certain results of the overthrow of that authority was a break with the Church of Rome.

That break came with the establishment of the republic. The new constitution provided for complete separation of church and state. During the years that have followed, nearly two million Czechs have withdrawn from the Roman Catholic Church. Instead of representing 96 per cent of

the population, as before the war, Catholicism now represents less than 70 per cent.

Out of this number who withdrew from the Roman Catholic Church the new National Church of Czecho-Slovakia has been organized. Its membership totals approximately two million. The leaders of the new church are former Catholic priests, school teachers, or ministers hastily trained to undertake religious work.

At the outset the National Church won a great following because it appealed to the patriotism of the Czech people. But the religious motive is an increasingly powerful factor. The organization of the church as well as its doctrines have swung definitely away from Roman Catholicism. In the beginning of the movement, since most of its followers knew no other form of worship, many Roman Catholic forms were retained. But many of these have been abandoned, and the tendency toward evangelical Protestantism is more apparent. The relation between the National Church and the native Protestant churches, which have multiplied their congregations since the war, has been most cordial. Whether or not the new church will fall a victim to the snares of politics is still a question. Undoubtedly, however, this effort to introduce a more liberal and evangelical religious faith is in response to a fundamental demand of the people themselves—a demand that exists but has not been met in many other European countries.

Another European religious development that is at once hopeful and significant is seen in Germany. Before the war rather ineffective efforts were made to effect, in Germany, a Church Union. Since the war and the establishment of a republic, however, the Church Federation idea has made remarkable progress. Cut off from the traditional sources of support the representatives of various church groups suddenly found themselves facing common problems of readjustment. As early as 1919 church leaders met in Dresden to discuss these problems. Another meeting was held in Stuttgart in 1921. Finally, on Ascension Day, 1922, in Wittenberg, over the grave of Martin Luther, the German Evangelical Church Federation (*Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenbund*) was formed. Twenty-eight German church organizations representing thirty-eight million German church members associated themselves together for common action.

For the first time, therefore, German Protestantism is prepared to speak with a single voice. Already the result of this union is apparent in an increased religious toleration, an increasing realization of the demands upon religion of the new order in Europe, an abandonment of meaningless dogmatisms, and in a new approach for Germany's religious leaders to the religious leaders of other lands. Organized religion, in Germany, came through a trial by fire during this first postwar period. That out of this trial a

new religious fellowship should emerge is a fact of considerable importance. How much this fellowship will find expression in terms of significance for the problems that Germany faces remains to be seen. It is already apparent, however, that the social implications of Christianity have been given a new emphasis in the postwar religious life of Germany. Not only is this true in the pulpit proclamations of religious leaders but also in the larger share of responsibility toward the pressing social needs of the country.

It is in England, however, that one finds religion contributing most definitely toward the tasks of reconstruction. Reinhold Niebuhr, whom I have quoted, rightly declares that the church in England never completely lost touch with the rising liberal movement. And beyond the fold of the church in England there is a significant body of opinion that, without conforming to the ecclesiastical order, nevertheless gives loyal support to the extra-doctrinal leadership of the church.

Ramsay MacDonald writes (*Socialism, Critical and Constructive*, p. 9, The Bobbs Merrill Co.) that "at a time when the influence of the church has sunk to a very low level, the influence of the Christian spirit steadily extends. And it has become a social regenerating force as well as an individual saving one. It is being applied as a law to which our system of social relationships should conform. It is being consulted as an adviser rival to the materialist councilors who have hitherto led

us. It is making us examine our whole social fabric from top to bottom, both in its design and in the materials of which it is constructed."

I think it is no exaggeration to say that one of the most important, if one of the least noticed of postwar conferences was the Christian Conference on Politics, Economics, and Citizenship (C. O. P. E. C.) held in Birmingham, England, in April, 1924. It is doubtful if any meeting since the war has reflected so clearly the determination of a great body of professing Christians to find practical application of their faith to the task of social betterment. Housing, unemployment, illiteracy, and peace—these were the major considerations before this great assembly. The proposals that came out of Copec and the aggressiveness with which these proposals have been followed up since the conference startled England into a realization that an awakened religious force was abroad in the land.

The developments which I have cited do not provide conclusive evidence that Europe is on the verge of or even, perhaps, approaching a religious renaissance. Organized religion in Europe and, I believe, in America is far from possessing those characteristics which would qualify it to enter into the foundations of a new world-structure. But these somewhat uncertain efforts to grapple with the fundamental issues of the situation do furnish basis for the belief that such characteristics are in the making.

Particularly in England and the United States the church represents, if not a wholly satisfactory, at least a much more advanced position in regard to the problems that touch the welfare of mankind than any other social institution. This, obviously, is no more than should be demanded of the church. But the church before now has side-stepped the obvious demands upon it. To see it squarely facing questions that for centuries have been shunned is a hopeful portent.

Never before has organized religion spoken in such incisive terms on the problems of industrial and international relationships. And never before has the voice of organized religion had so respectful a hearing at the councils of authority. Labor, especially in the United States, is very often hostile to the Church—without realizing that the growth of public opinion in support of a greater measure of industrial justice has resulted as much, perhaps, from the preaching of a social gospel in the Christian Church as from the legislation of labor leaders. Many pacifists are impatient that the church lags behind them in the acceptance of the absolutist position in regard to war and never realize that both in England and America no force is making such inroads upon the war system as that of religion.

In regard to neither question can the position of the whole church be counted wholly in keeping with the highest religious principles. But despite

those who cry out against it the church is not without its prophets, and their note of prophecy is coming to have a new clarity and insistence. In that fact, more than in new schemes of material adjustment, is there hope for the permanent reconstruction of the world.

Philip Marshall Brown, Professor of International Law at Princeton University, declared (*International Relations*, by courtesy The Macmillan Co.) that in the new world-order religion will be "the greatest common denominator in international society to enable men to understand each other and to realize their common brotherhood. It is not to be the denominator of the Buddhists, of the Moslems, of the Hebrews, or of the Christians. It is to be a synthesis, a fusion, a merging of all in that religious consciousness which Paul expressed so sublimely on Mars' Hill among the Greek intellectuals and æsthetes: 'God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshiped with men's hands, as though he needed any thing, seeing he giveth to all life, and breath, and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us; for in him we live, and move, and

have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his offspring.' "

Here is the answer to the futile striving of an age that has placed too great reliance on "reeking tube and iron shard."

Woodrow Wilson, in his last written analysis of the present world situation, declared (Atlantic Monthly, August, 1923): "The sum of the whole matter is this, that our civilization cannot survive materially unless it be redeemed spiritually. It can be saved only by becoming permeated with the spirit of Christ, and being made free and happy by the practices which spring out of that spirit. Only thus can discontent be driven out and all the shadows lifted from the road ahead. Here is the final challenge to our churches, to our political organizations, and to our capitalists, to everyone who fears God or loves country. Shall we not earnestly cooperate to bring in the new day?"

Without this more abiding power the machinery of peace will rust in disuse. Humanity may build a new world structure and occupy it, but without a spiritual transformation men will live, as they have always lived, under the pall of fear and hate. Beneath all surface reconstructions there lie the fundamental problems of religious reconstruction. Europe, and the world, may find temporary respite from the plagues that threaten civilization, but there will be no permanent security in human relationships until mankind has found this spiritual redemption.

CHAPTER X

THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT

THERE has never been a "great and solemn referendum" on the postwar foreign policy of the United States. No one has ever honestly interpreted the vote in 1920 for Senator Harding as a vote against the League of Nations or for American isolation. No feature of Senator Harding's campaign was more often stressed than his emphasis upon the necessity for an "Association of Nations." Nothing was more striking in that campaign than the letter of the prominent Republican leaders, among them Charles Evans Hughes and Elihu Root, urging those who desired a league of nations to support the candidacy of Mr. Harding. And, in the light of subsequent developments, no fact of that campaign is more significant than the silence of the Republican irreconcilables on the question of the League. Mr. Cox went up and down the country seeking to make the League an issue. The Republicans avoided the issue by silencing their own League bitter-enders, and then proceeding to agree with Mr. Cox that a league we must have and that the Republicans would see to it forthwith that we would

have it. The vote for Mr. Harding, therefore, can be interpreted as an indorsement of the League idea quite as much as a repudiation of it.

Once the Republican victory was won, however, the irreconcilables were unmuzzled and unleashed. They proceeded at once to squelch effectively the "Association-of-Nations" pledges of their candidate. They derided by their activities the pro-league statement of the leading Republicans—although they never peeped when the statement was issued. They pranced into the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States Senate and assumed control. For four years, with the exception of the Washington Conference, they were able to block, by one means or another, every effort of the government to assume a fair share of its responsibility in Europe.

The year 1924, however, marks the passing of the irreconcilables. A small group of forlorn-hope politicians and a few carping newspapers still pipe the old strains of 1919 and 1920. But they are a dwindling lot. If any fact is apparent in the international outlook in the United States at the end of 1924, it is the bankruptcy of isolationalism.

The most significant "great and solemn referendum" on foreign policy which the United States has witnessed since the war was staged at the National Republican Convention in the summer of 1924. There, one after another, the irreconcilables, men like Henry Cabot Lodge, who had

dominated the convention four years before, were quietly slipped into the party discard. The dictatorship of this minority group finally collapsed at Cleveland.

Now, in the Senate of the United States, only Mr. Borah, Mr. Moses, and Mr. Hiram Johnson remain of those who defeated the League in 1920. Senator Lodge and Senator Brandegee and Senator Medill McCormick are dead. It is doubtful if either Senator Moses or Senator Johnson can seriously interfere with the progress of America's foreign affairs. Both, moreover, have been somewhat chastened by the decisive Coolidge victory. Senator Borah, as Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, is always a force to be reckoned with, but it is unlikely that he can corral enough votes to block some constructive action.

It is safe to say, therefore, that the Republican Party at the beginning of 1925 is shaking off the shackles of irreconcilable leadership. A good declaration of that fact and a first expression of the new spirit that the present administration now proposes to follow is contained in the address of President Coolidge at Chicago.

"We cannot expect, in the long course of events," he declared, "to maintain our country on a permanent level of general well-being far above that of other peoples. Even if we could hope to accomplish it, it would bring us little satisfaction if our prosperity must be gained and

held at the cost of suffering of others. In the long course of affairs, and in a world which has become little more than a great neighborhood, our common sense must tell us, if our self-interest did not, that our prosperity, our advancement, our portion of good fortune, must largely depend upon the share that shall be allotted to our neighbors. At the last, those of us who are partners in the supreme service of building and bettering our civilization must go up or go down, must succeed or fail together, in our common enterprise.

"We cannot hope indefinitely to maintain our country as a specially favored community, an isle of contentment, lifted above the general level of the average of the standards of humanity. I know there was a time when many of us believed this was possible. But who now can continue clinging to such a faith in view of the lesson which the war brought to us? If we could not avoid involvement in a war whose causes were foreign, and whose issues were chiefly alien to us, because we had settled them for ourselves long ago, how can we avoid our full share of responsibility in connection with other world problems which if they are ever to be solved, must be solved in an atmosphere of peace and good will?

"It is our wish to live in a world which shall be at peace. But we can no more assure permanent and stable peace without cooperation among the nations, than we could assure victory in war without the Allies among them."

There is no need to attempt an analysis of this declaration of President Coolidge. In it is to be found a most direct repudiation of isolation; and a most positive acceptance of the cooperation principle. Just how this new charter of the foreign policy of the United States will eventuate in action remains to be seen. That President Coolidge and Mr. Kellogg, his Secretary of State, are in agreement on the principles contained in it is fairly certain. And there can be little question that public opinion in the United States, at the present time, is ready to follow the leadership of the President rather than of Congress—should Congressional sentiment fail to support Mr. Coolidge.

So far as Europe is concerned there are four specific, though not wholly distinct questions, in regard to which this cooperation doctrine may find occasion in the not distant future for practical expression. These questions are: the World Court, the War Debts, Disarmament, and Russia. American membership in the World Court is certain to be an issue—the foremost international issue perhaps—before the next session of Congress. The question of the war debts owing to the United States from Allied nations is already, at the opening of 1925, in the forefront of official and unofficial discussion. It will remain there doubtless until a more satisfactory declaration of policy than any heretofore stated is finally adopted. The disarmament question, whether

the Geneva Protocol fails or succeeds, is the next practical step confronting the nations of Europe as well as the United States in an effort more certainly to establish permanent peace. If the Protocol is adopted, it is difficult to see how America can refuse participation in the arms conference that will result. If it fails of adoption, the way will be opened for the United States to call a world conference on disarmament—a move which President Coolidge is said to favor. Finally, in the face of the action of other powers, the Russian issue can hardly be ignored.

In regard to the World Court, the foreign policy of the United States—long before the League of Nations was made a matter of party politics—has given support to such a project. The record of the Republican Party on this question is significant. In the 1904 campaign the platform of the Republican Party declared that "we favor the peaceful settlement of international differences by arbitration." Four years later, in strong terms, the proposals of the Hague Conference were indorsed. The 1912 Republican platform was even more specific.

"Together with peaceful and orderly development at home," it declared, "the Republican Party earnestly favors all measures for the establishment and protection of the peace of the world and for the development of closer relations between the various nations of the earth. It believes most earnestly in the peaceful settlement of

international disputes and in the reference of all controversies between nations to an international court of justice."

The 1916 platform placed the Republican Party on record with the statement that "we believe in the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and favor an establishment of a world court for that purpose." And in 1920, although the League of Nations had been rejected by the Republicans of the Senate, the party platform indorsed the Court and League principles in the pronouncement: "We pledge the coming Republican administration to such agreements with other nations of the world as shall meet the full duty of America to civilization and humanity, in accordance with American ideals, without surrendering the right of the American people to exercise its judgment and its power in favor of justice and peace."

The platform of 1924, the side-tracking of the irreconcilables allowing for a more specific declaration, stated: "We indorse the Permanent Court of International Justice and favor the adherence of the United States to this Tribunal as recommended by President Coolidge."

President Harding gave positive advocacy of American membership in the Court. His contentions were not based upon the assumption of a perfect Court, but, rather, on the fact that America could do more to better the Court in it than out of it.

"The perfect Court must be a matter of development," he declared in addressing a luncheon of the Associated Press in New York on April 24, 1923. "I earnestly commend it because I think it is a great step in the right direction toward peaceful settlement of judiciable questions, toward the elimination of frictions which lead to war, and a surer agency of international justice through the application of law than can be hoped for in arbitration which is influenced by the prejudices of men and the expediency of politics.

"We can do vastly more to perfect it in the capacity of an adherent than in an aloofness in which we arrogate to ourselves a right to say to the world, 'We dictate, but never comply.' I would yield none of our rights, none of our nationality, but would gladly give of our influence and our cooperation to move forward and upward toward that world peace and that reign of justice which is infinitely more secure in the rule of national honor than in national or international force."

In indorsement of this stand for the World Court Charles E. Hughes, Secretary of State, addressing the American Society of International Law in Washington, April 27, 1923, expressed a similar disagreement with those who are unwilling to accept any save a perfect court. "We have," Mr. Hughes said, "an acute world need. We shall make no progress toward the prevention of war if we adopt a perfectionist

policy. Whatever else we should have, we need at once a permanent court of international justice. No plan to promote peace can dispense with it. Why should we wait for the solution of difficult problems of policy and the settlement of the most acute international controversies of a political nature before we meet the obvious necessity of providing for the appropriate disposition of those controversies with which an international court is competent to deal? . . . The support of a permanent court as an institution of peace will be a powerful influence in the development of the will to peace. I hope that the United States, in deference to its own interests and in justice to its ideals, will do its part."

The dwindling irreconcilables in the Senate have harked back repeatedly to the argument that the present World Court is unnecessary, in view of the Hague Tribunal. This argument was met by Mr. Hughes in the speech above quoted and in even greater detail by Mr. Elihu Root, who is more familiar with the establishment of both tribunals than any other American.

"The World Court," Mr. Root declared in addressing the same session of the American Society of International Law, "does not supersede but is in addition to the old so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, from which it differs widely.

"The old Court of Arbitration was not, properly speaking, a court. It was merely a panel of

persons available to act as judges, made up by appointments of not exceeding four persons by each of the states taking part, and a clerk's office to carry on the administrative business made necessary whenever an arbitral tribunal was selected from this panel.

"Experience has shown that this plan of constituting the court specially for the purpose of each particular controversy was not a very good way for getting legal rights decided, because, as a general rule, arbitrators selected by one side or the other in a particular controversy tend to represent that side of the controversy, with the result that there are negotiation and compromise rather than judicial decision. Doubtless some controversies which involve fact and feeling rather than fact and law can be settled most usefully in that way, and for that reason the old so-called Court of Arbitration has been left and the new Court, which is a real Court, has been established, composed of permanent judges, whose selection has no relation whatever to any particular controversy, whose number is so great as to make their body superior to any special local influence, who are conspicuous and distinguished figures in the international world, who are members of a great institution, the high reputation of which they must be solicitous to preserve and who must necessarily year by year acquire increased competency for the discharge of their judicial activities."

To the widely broadcast misstatement that the Court is controlled by the League of Nations and, therefore, is a League Court, Mr. Hughes, in the address quoted above, replied: "The fundamental question is whether the League of Nations controls the Court. To this there is a ready answer. The League does not control the Court; that is an independent judicial body. The League is composed of states; they, of course, continue to exist as states. When the League acts it acts under the Covenant which creates the rights and obligations pertaining to the League. But when these fifty-two members act in separate capacity to elect judges they are, as I have said, not acting under the Covenant but are following a course of procedure defined by a special international agreement in order to secure the independent and impartial judicial body for which the world has been waiting. . . .

"Why, in supporting an institution which embodies a cherished ideal of the American people should we revive the controversy over the League? Why should we not support the Court as a judicial body?"

A final bogey, certain to be conjured up in the forthcoming debates on this question in the United States Senate, was dealt with by Mr. Hughes, namely, the six votes of the British Empire in the election of judges. Under the conditions proposed for American membership, Mr. Hughes said, "The United States will not

only participate in the election of the Assembly but also in the election by the Council and in the Council the British Empire has but one vote. We are far better protected by this arrangement than by one which would have all states vote together on exactly the same footing as the United States. The arrangement for our participation in the voting for the judges by the Council is really a stronger protection to the interests of the United States than has heretofore been suggested in any plan for a permanent court. The question should also be considered in the light of the nature of the action that is involved. It is practically impossible, under the scheme that has been adopted, for the British Empire, or for any combination to secure an election of judges in aid of a particular political interest. Such an effort would die stillborn, because of the necessity for a concurrent choice by both groups of nations in the manner that has been devised."

Despite these answers to the arguments against American participation in the World Court, as now constituted, and despite the unanimity of American opinion in favor of such participation, an alternative plan will almost certainly be presented as a substitute for the Administration proposals. As I indicated in the discussion of the outlawry of war, two problems confront the proponents of such a scheme. Their alternative proposal must be better than the plan already adopted by most of the nations of the world and

in effective operation. Further, it must be enough better than the present plan to lead those nations to scrap the machinery which is already operating and set about it to replace that machinery with a structure devised by this minority group of Americans.

In the face of what the Court has done and is doing it is exceedingly unlikely that this machinery will be scrapped even for the purpose of securing American adhesion. This stand doubtless will not be dictated by the belief that the present tribunal is perfect, but, rather, by the conviction that a better tribunal can more speedily be secured through the improvement of the present than by the creation of a wholly new World Court. The exhaustive World Court plan of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge presented last year as a substitute proposal received scant attention even in the United States and much less in Europe. Its one result was obstructive. Another alternative scheme, the insistence upon a perfectionist policy, will serve no other than an obstructionist purpose.

Professor Manley O. Hudson has outlined (*Annals of the American Academy*) three ways in which the Court is working for the maintenance of peace:

1. "In its decision of disputes and vexed questions as they arise.

2. "In its building a cumulative body of international law.

3. "In its facilitating the settlement of problems directly handled by Foreign Offices."

Under the first heading Professor Hudson cites the settlement of the Kiel Canal dispute, which involved Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, and Poland, on the one hand, and Germany on the other hand. In this settlement the Court decided an issue which the Foreign Offices of the various states had been unable, through months of negotiations, to solve.

In addition to these disputes which have reached a more critical stage the Court is available for opinions on questions which arise before the Council and the Assembly of the League. The constructive contributions of the Court to the maintenance of peace are indicated, declares Professor Hudson, "by its procedure in the seven cases in which opinions have been handed down. For each of the seven opinions has involved the settlement of an issue which has arisen in practical affairs; in each case the Court has heard through argument on behalf of all interests that requested to be heard, in each case the judges have taken time for careful deliberation, and in each case the whole proceeding has been public in such a way as to fasten a feeling of responsibility upon the judges."

In the building of a greater body of international law the work of the Court is of equal significance. A permanent judicial body, such as constitutes this tribunal, develops a technique and

insures a standard result in this field. One of the shortcomings of the Hague Tribunal was the fact that, despite the decisions handed down, those decisions did not result in the establishment of precedent in international dealings and in the increased codification of the law between nations. The fact that the judges serve for a period of nine years indicates the extent of the contribution that they may make to the development of international law.

Finally, the Court is a new factor to be reckoned with by the Foreign Offices of various states when interstate disputes arise. As Professor Hudson puts it, "one more expedient, one more proposal, one more piece of machinery stands between the peoples and war." In many of the critical disputes that have arisen in Europe during the past two years the availability of the Court has been a factor in speeding settlement. Particularly at Corfu, when Italy invaded the rights of Greece, the Court in the background as a potential force for compromise placed the negotiations in an atmosphere which made it possible to avert hostilities.

As I have pointed out in another connection, the jurisdiction of the World Court does not cover all of the issues which arise between states any more than it handles all of those problems which nations share in common. The field of international contact is much broader than the jurisdiction of the Court. American membership in the

Court, important though it is, should not be accepted as though, *ipso facto*, the cooperative ideal upon which the foreign policy of the United States finds its theoretical basis were fully realized. An international round-table is none the less necessary with America in the Court; an international clearing-house is none the less essential. But American adherence to the Permanent Court of International Justice is a first step toward the reassertion, in actual practice, of those principles of world dealing for which the government of the United States has always stood.

The question of the war debts, as well as that of the World Court, is certain to continue in the forefront of attention for some time to come. So far as the settlement of Europe is concerned it is probable that the debt problem is of greater importance than that of the immediate entrance of the United States into the membership of the Court. The official policy of the Administration, as expressed by President Coolidge, is that of sympathetic collection. Cancellation is taboo. Just how soon a more frank statement will be given to all of the implications of the debt question it is impossible to say. Certain facts in regard to the debts, however, are of more than passing concern to the United States and to Europe.

The war, according to the Bankers' Trust Company Publications, cost the world $80,680,000,000—a sum over three times as great as the total

expenses of the United States government from its foundation in 1791 down to 1913, including the cost of four wars. If in addition to the expenses of running the government during that century and a half were added the cost of the purchase of Louisiana, Alaska, the Virgin Islands, the sum paid Spain for the Philippines and the cost of constructing the Panama Canal, the total would still be under one third of the total cost of the World War.

About $28,000,000,000 is involved in the credit operations of the Great War. Of this sum, according to the Bankers' Trust Company figures, $26,000,000,000 represents loans from Ally to Ally with unpaid accrued interest. The remaining $2,000,000,000 represents postwar loans.

Now, there were three distinct stages in the credit operations in the last war. The first stage was that prior to America's entrance, during which the loans among the Allies totaled about $8,000,000,000. The second stage dates from the time of America's entrance to the Armistice, during which the interally loans reached a total of $21,599,000,000. The third period, since the Armistice, brought the total, including interest, to $28,261,000,000.

The burden for these operations fell upon Great Britain and the United States in about equal weight, with this distinction: the United States did not borrow. Consequently, by 1923 the United States was a gross creditor to the extent

of $11,858,000,000 and Great Britain a net creditor to the extent of $4,682,000,000. The other nations were net debtors. In this total France owed the United States $3,990,000,000; Great Britain $4,600,000,000, and Italy $2,015,-000,000.

It is necessary to remember that these loans were not made but only reckoned in terms of money. They were, as a matter of fact, the loans of commodities of one sort and another, clothing, food, cotton, chemicals, etc., and the materials of war.

Of its major debtors the United States has effected a settlement with but one—Great Britain. The terms of that agreement, signed in June, 1923, called for the issuance by England to the United States of government bonds for a total of $4,600,000,000, not quite one half of the total war-debt of all nations to the United States. These bonds mature December 15, 1984. Interest is paid semiannually and the principal is paid annually on a sliding scale of payments running from $23,000,000 in 1923 to $175,000,-000 in 1984. The payments may be made either in the gold coin of the United States or Great Britain, at the option of Great Britain.

These credits of France, England, and Italy still held by the United States constitute the greatest potential force for the settlement of Europe that is available. They constitute, also, a practical economic problem for America. Eco-

nomic opinion, more and more, is converging toward the conclusion that the United States cannot afford to collect the debts. Professor Edward R. A. Seligman, of Columbia University, declared when discussing this subject that "even if it were possible to compel our Allies to pay their debts, it would make the situation still worse. . . . The debts cannot be paid, and it would harm us more than our debtors. Let us not in the excess of zeal kill with one stone two birds each of which we should seek to keep alive—the one, the hope of European regeneration in the interests of a broad humanity; the other, our own prosperity, which will surely be impaired by the ruin or ill will of our best customers."

Now, these international obligations may be settled in a number of ways. First, of course, gold in sufficient quantities to cover the debt may be transferred from the debtor to the creditor nation. But in the case under consideration this is impossible, since already a large proportion of the world's gold is in the United States and that which remains available to the debtor nations is insignificant compared with the total indebtedness.

Again, the obligations could be settled by a transfer of the securities of the debtor nations to the United States to the extent of the indebtedness. But such a transfer of securities would involve the acceptance by the American government of foreign properties which, in turn, would

have to be resold to American investors. Now, it is very improbable that American investors could be interested in the purchase of such securities to the extent represented by the sums outstanding. Nor is it likely that the American government would welcome so extensive support of foreign industry which would, to some extent, be obliged to prosper in competition with the industries of the United States.

In the third place there is the most likely possibility that the products of European industry should be shipped into the United States in sufficient quantity to cover, in time, the amount of the indebtedness. Now, Europe's net debit balance of trade with the United States each year amounts to well over $1,000,000,000. Thus, before a dollar can be made to apply on the debts by this method this favorable balance of several hundred million dollars must be converted to a debit balance sufficient to meet interest payments of five per cent and one per cent amortization.

The result of such a process, writes Frank A. Vanderlip (*What Next in Europe?*), "would be profound if the payments could be made and were made with any degree of promptness. We need not look further than to contemplate merely the receipt of half a billion dollars a year of interest. If that came in the form of goods, our industrial situation would be upset in a way and to an extent we have not heretofore experienced. The effect upon our labor situation and the consequent

social problems which would be raised would be menacing."

Dr. Benjamin N. Anderson, Jr., economist for the Chase National Bank of New York, declares, after an extensive refutation of the arguments against cancellation, that "it is not necessary to urge moral or sentimental grounds for refraining from exacting the pound of flesh when economic and banking considerations so clearly point the same way."

But there are moral considerations which should weigh in this discussion. The United States has a responsibility not always recognized for the restoration of Europe—particularly the rebuilding of France. I discussed this situation not long since with a member of Congress. He told me, in some detail, of a recent visit to France and the battlefields. In the district through which he passed the American army officer who was his guide pointed out town after town still in utter ruin—a ruin wrought not by the guns of Germany but by those of the American artillery. At the end of one day's traveling this American Congressman produced a map of the district and in the territory they had covered, the army officer declared at least 150 towns had been destroyed by American shell-fire.

For the repair of this ruin the United States has paid out not a single cent. Training areas back of the lines were paid for, but for the towns razed under the shell-fire of American troops no

compensation has been made. France, up to the present, has rebuilt some 250,000 houses. There remain some 140,000 still to be rebuilt. For these purposes of reconstruction the French have gone down into their own pockets and loaned to the devastated areas over 100,000,000,000 francs. These loans were made against Germany's promise to pay—against the possibility of collecting reparations.

The Dawes plan, as we have seen, assumes a reparations total of $10,000,000,000. America, if the war debt of France is collected, will force from France over one half of the total she can collect from Germany. The United States, collecting from France, will induce Great Britain to make similar demands—and to Great Britain, accordingly, will go more than the remainder of the sums which are collected from Germany. France, therefore, will secure reparations not for the restoration of northern France, but for the payment of the United States. It hardly seems possible that the United States proposes to step in and demand the only funds available for France for the colossal task of reconstruction.

"Because of the existence of the unprecedented sums owing to the United States by her associates in the World War," writes Herbert Adams Gibbons in the New York Times (December 28, 1924), "American policy has much more to do with the economic rehabilitation of Europe than American public opinion has up to this time

been willing to admit. We have fancied ourselves as being in the position of disinterested outsiders in the solution of the problem of reparations. We have been prolific with advice and experts, and we have been prone to lecture France for her unreasonableness.

"In 1925 this astonishing blindness must give way to clear and sympathetic vision. The executive and legislative branches of the United States government, influenced and supported by American public opinion, can play an active and constructive rôle in the solution of the reparations war debts problem by setting the example in renouncing what it is impossible to obtain, except by a virtual free trade policy which we are unprepared to adopt. For us this is a privilege and an opportunity if we care anything at all about the 'moral leadership of the world.' More than that, however just and legal may be our claims as a creditor nation, if we press these claims, the responsibility will be ours for retarding the economic rehabilitation of Europe."

It is needless to say that the question of the debts involves the question of disarmament. Certainly, not one cent of interest or principal on the debts should be released without the assurance that this increased revenue will go for reconstructive and not for military purposes. Another Washington Conference, at which the United States appeared, willing to back its ideals with sacrifice—this time with the sacrifice of the sums

owing from the Allies—could, I believe, insure another enormous stride toward world disarmament.

Cancellation is not an expression that lends itself to popular political statement. The idea—so long after the war—of giving something for nothing is not easily accepted by the public. But there has been little enough evidence that those who make fiery speeches against cancellation have considered the economic significance of the policy they sponsor. The whole proposition finally simmers down to the question of whether or not the United States can afford to collect the debts. International credit, we are told, will be impaired if the debts are canceled. But those loans were made, it must be remembered, not primarily as an investment but as a war contribution. That their cancellation should affect international credit in peace times is an unwarranted assumption. This fact becomes patent when it is seen that economists and financiers—and not politicians—are most urgent in the advocacy of cancellation. The American Bankers' Association itself is on record favoring cancellation. In the event of another war there is no more reason to conclude that credit would be withheld because these debts were canceled than that men would be withheld because some of those who went out in the last war were obliged to sacrifice their lives.

Detailed policies in regard to debt cancellation cannot be outlined. But a square facing of

the facts can be called for. The United States cannot afford to go limping between two decisions—not with such serious issues in the balance. And debt-cancellation appears to open the way not only for the rehabilitation of Europe but also for disarmament. The United States, if it is to lead to agreement in regard to land and air forces and submarines, as at Washington it led toward the limiting of the construction of capital ships, must be prepared to assert that leadership with more than a gesture. If the collection of the debts is so obviously poor business, and debt cancellation can be utilized to lead toward disarmament, it is difficult to see how America can fail to declare its willingness for such conditional cancellation. It is as an investment in American prosperity and European restoration as well as in world peace that the debt problems must be considered.

Another problem in the relations of the United States with Europe which is certain to demand more serious attention is that of Russian recognition. As I have endeavored to point out in two chapters devoted to Russia, no serious international problem, either east or west, can be finally or completely solved that leaves Russia out of account. And the more one studies the Russian situation at close range the more apparent it becomes that extremism can continue only if Russia continues to be isolated. Modification is the inevitable result of Russia's contact with the rest

of the world. Ramsay MacDonald and Edouard Herriot, when they recognized the Soviets, and Stanley Baldwin, when he continued that recognition, dealt Communism a much more serious blow than any given by the previous policies of isolation.

I am not unaware of the present extremism of those who are in power in Russia. Stalin, Kameneff, and Zinoviev, the party dictators, are not compromisers in any sense of the word. Lenin stood for modification. Trotsky stood for the same policy. Trotsky, after an open break with the party, was temporarily "railroaded" by the ruling triumvirate. But the very fact that the issue was so serious as to lead to this open break —the thing, above all others, that the Communists have sought to avoid—indicates the forces of division that are at work within the party itself.

Now, the extremism of the rank and file members of the Communist Party is maintained by a religious faith in the truth of certain conclusions regarding capitalistic nations. These conclusions for the most part are false. They can be accepted at face value in Russia only so long as the Russian Communist is kept in ignorance of the facts. Isolation makes it less difficult to prevent the facts from becoming known.

The United States contributed definitely toward the ending of Communism only when it abandoned the policy of isolation. Through the American Relief Administration, organized by Herbert

Hoover and administered in Russia by a large and extraordinarily efficient staff of Americans, a large sum of money was spent for famine relief. The A. R. A. has been the extent of American official contact with the Soviets. But that one contact has aroused questions among the Russian people for which the government is still endeavoring to find orthodox answers. The spectacle of a capitalistic nation coming to the aid of Communists bent upon the destruction of the system of capitalism was not in keeping with the Communist picture.

Something obviously had to be done. The illusions in which the Soviets find the source of much of their hatred of capitalism—based upon false generalizations from their experience of capitalism in Russia—had to be maintained. Consequently, a deliberate campaign of misrepresentation was entered upon to prove that the American Relief Association was a counter-revolutionary agency. Many Russians, particularly peasants in the villages where relief was so sorely needed, refused to believe this propaganda. They still insist that the American Relief Association was a demonstration of capitalism doing for the proletariat exactly those things which the Soviets maintained could only be done by Communism. But the return of the United States, following the famine relief, to its policy of aloofness has prevented the development of this feeling of distrust of Communism and confidence in non-Communistic

nations, and has strengthened the arguments of those who insist upon the total depravity of all things capitalistic.

Without a single exception every foreign observer with whom I talked in Russia declared that modification in the Soviet regime could be brought about only as a result of increased contacts between that regime and the rest of the world. The policy of the United States, it was frequently pointed out, plays directly into the hands of those who represent the continuance of extreme Communism. These extremists more than once have strengthened their hold upon the people with the appeal that the capitalists, and particularly the United States, are seeking to destroy, by isolation, the workers' and peasants' republic.

There is, to be sure, a considerable amount of money owing to the United States from Russia—a debt which the Soviets refuse to recognize in full. It is significant that, though the Soviets are to be held fully accountable for the debts of a previous regime, no mention is ever made of the failure of the Succession States, say Czecho-Slovakia and Jugo-Slavia, to assume the obligations of the government that these states succeeded. And yet, repudiation is repudiation quite as much in one case as in the other. Furthermore, it is a serious question how long the United States can permit the Soviets' refusal to sign on the dotted line to stand between the American and the Russian people.

Recognition of the Soviet government has been frequently interpreted as an extension of American approval of the policies of the present regime. Nothing could be further from the truth. Diplomatic relations with the Czar's government were maintained not because the United States approved of the Czar's government, but because the maintenance of diplomatic representatives in Russia provided the most convenient means for protecting American interests in and adjacent to the Russian Empire and the most effective channel for effort on behalf of the Russian people themselves. The Soviet government is a government by minority. But the Soviet minority is no smaller, if as small, as that which governed prewar Russia and is much closer to the people. The fact that America could never approve of the doctrines of six hundred and seventy-five thousand party members does not appear an adequate basis for the surrender of active interest in the welfare of one hundred and sixty million Russians. If there were any immediate prospect of a political overturn in Russia, this waiting policy might find justification. But the stability of the present government confronts the United States with alternatives of going on indefinitely without active, helpful contacts in Russia or dealing directly with the representatives of the Soviet regime.

One fact appears fairly certain: isolation merely makes martyrs of those whose policies the

United States desires to see changed. After six years of the Soviet regime there is not the slightest evidence in Russia that aloofness has helped in even the smallest degree in the evolution of Russia toward the place where it can with honor resume its place at the council tables of the world. There are, however, many indications that the most certain method for demonstrating friendliness for the Russian people, on the one hand, and disapproval of Communism, on the other, is found in a policy of negotiation leading toward recognition.

In all of these problems of America's relationship to Europe more than the immediate future of Europe is involved. There is a great deal of talk and much writing nowadays to the effect that the center of world interest is shifting from the Atlantic to the Pacific, from the Occident toward the Orient. While there is no denying the tendency, two facts must be borne in mind if we ever are adequately to understand it.

In the first place that shift from Europe to Asia, from the states surrounding the Atlantic to those surrounding the Pacific, will not come so long as the economic center of gravity is in the West, and so long as the West is the center of those agencies which are making for modern scientific and social progress. However important the problems of the Pacific are, at the present moment it is safe to say that the major issues of

world relationships will be threshed out for some time to come in the Atlantic arena.

Then a second fact needs to be emphasized: when this transfer of world attention does come, the hand of the West will be stretched out and for many generations will exert a directing influence upon the affairs of the East. The rising tides of national and racial consciousness that are surging across Asia had their origin in ideas that were heralded from the West. The perils of the new industrialism which are threatening many ancient social structures of the Orient are but the transplanted perils of the industrialism of the Occident. However much the authority of the West in the affairs of the East is loosened, the influence of that authority at the present moment is providing the force that will determine for a long period the direction toward which the Orient will set its face.

It is no exaggeration to say that as go Europe and America so goes the world. For good or ill, the international policies of the United States and Europe from 1925 to 1950 will set the standard that the world for the century, perhaps two centuries following, will adopt. It is "the long course of events," to which President Coolidge referred, that is involved in the problems we have been considering. Absorption in the details—from an historical point of view, frequently trivial details—of day-by-day international transactions cannot with safety be al-

lowed to turn us from the larger and longer vision of things. Neither diplomatic precedents nor monetary considerations nor political expediency can compensate for the failure of statesmen to find *now* the basis for that new structure of world society on which the hope of mankind is fixed.

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